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CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Chernyshev Criticizes U.S. Stand on 'Open Skies' *[TASS]* 1
Grinevskiy Sums Up Fifth Round of Vienna Talks *[IZVESTIYA 24 Feb]* 1
Progress Toward Arms Agreements Reviewed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Feb]* 2
Lobov on Dissolution of Warsaw Pact, NATO *[Hamburg DIE WELT 28 Feb]* 3
U.S. Cuts in Foreign Military Presence Urged *[Ovchinnikov in PRAVDA 26 Feb]* 4

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Economic Might To Set Europe, World Standing *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 14 Feb]* 7
NATO Persists With 'Military Games' in Norway *[PRAVDA 18 Feb]* 8
Historian Describes Vision of Future Europe *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Feb]* 8
Western View of Soviet Developments Examined *[PRAVDA 25 Feb]* 12
PRAVDA Views Kohl-Modrow Bonn Meeting *[16 Feb]* 13
FRG Seen as 'Blitzing' GDR Into Union *[PRAVDA 22 Feb]* 14
Pogodin Comments on President Bush-Kohl Talks *[Moscow International]* 16
CSSR's Havel on Unification Issues Cited *[PRAVDA 20 Feb]* 16
Zagladin Addresses Brussels Security Conference *[TASS]* 17
USSR Welcomes British-Argentine Agreement *[TASS]* 17
USSR Delegation Attends Mideast Conference *[TASS]* 17
Minister Urges Comprehensive Accord on Drugs *[TASS]* 18
Uranium Enrichment Services Exclude S. Africa *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 16 Feb]* 18

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Gorbachev Holds Phone Discussion With Bush *[TASS]* 19
Bush Notes 'Reason,''Calmness' *[TASS]* 19
Constraints on USSR-U.S. Trade Assessed *[PRAVDA 19 Feb]* 19
Agreement Reached on Siberia-Alaska Air Links *[IZVESTIYA 20 Feb]* 20
Report on Shevardnadze's Talks in Canada *[Moscow Radio]* 21
Comparison of Shevardnadze Meeting in Canada 21

China

Status of USSR-PRC Ties Viewed *[Razov in PRAVDA 1 Mar]* 21
'Serious Contradictions' in Sino-U.S. Relations *[Moscow International]* 24
Rogachev Receives PRC Ambassador 26 Feb *[IZVESTIYA 28 Feb]* 24

Northeast Asia

Yeltsin Interviewed on Relations With Japan *[NEW TIMES No 6]* 24
IZVESTIYA Queries South Korean Politician *[19 Feb]* 26
Correction to Gerasimov Northern Islands Speech 27

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shevardnadze, Indonesia's Atalas Exchange Tidings *[IZVESTIYA 4 Feb]* 27
Upcoming U.S.-Singapore Base Talks Previewed *[Moscow International]* 27
Moscow Comments on Indochinese Ministers' Meeting *[Moscow International]* 28
Rogachev Holds Meeting With Indochinese Envoys *[IZVESTIYA 23 Feb]* 28
Rogachev Receives New Zealand Ambassador *[IZVESTIYA 25 Feb]* 29

New Ambassador to Papua New Guinea Appointed *[TASS]* 29
Fishing, Other Accords With Australia Signed *[TASS]* 29

Near East & South Asia

'Growing Strife' Seen in Afghan Opposition *[TASS]* 29
Belousov Visits Afghanistan, Meets Najibullah *[TASS]* 30
Bogachev Comments on Afghan Peace Settlement *[Moscow Radio]* 30
Pakistani Official Cited on USSR Relations *[TASS]* 31
Lukyanov Receives Pakistani Parliamentary Group *[TASS]* 31
Israeli Delegation Reaffirms Friendly Ties *[PRAVDA 18 Feb]* 31
Foreign Minister Meets With Libyan Officials *[Tripoli JANA]* 31
Visiting Libyan Oil Official Interviewed *[Moscow International]* 32
USSR Involvement in Egypt in Sixties Examined *[Moscow TV]* 32
Interior Ministry Delegation Visits Egypt *[TASS]* 33

East Europe

Shevardnadze Welcomes GDR Unification Initiative *[TASS]* 33
Yakovlev Holds Meeting With GDR's Boehme *[TASS]* 33
Commentary Views Boehme Visit *[Moscow International]* 33
GDR's Modrow States Position on Reunification *[NEW TIMES No 6]* 34
Berlin Rally Urges Caution on Unification *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Feb]* 34
PDS Assessed Ahead of Its First Congress *[IZVESTIYA 25 Feb]* 34
IZVESTIYA Reports on First PDS Congress *[26 Feb]* 35
SPD's Leipzig Election Congress Examined *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 27 Feb]* 36
Genscher Censures Aide's NATO, GDR Remarks *[PRAVDA 19 Feb]* 37
Commander Cited on Troop Withdrawal From CSSR *[IZVESTIYA 27 Feb]* 37
CSSR State Security Service Restructured *[IZVESTIYA 18 Feb]* 38
Husak Reportedly Expelled From Ranks of CPCZ *[IZVESTIYA 20 Feb]* 38
CSSR Political Opinion Poll Results Detailed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Feb]* 39
CSSR Representative Details Trade Protocol *[Prague CTK]* 39
Bulgaria's Lukanov Messages Gratitude to USSR *[IZVESTIYA 18 Feb]* 39
BCP's Lilov Cables Gorbachev With Thanks *[PRAVDA 16 Feb]* 39
Bulgaria's Mladenov Confers With State Leaders *[IZVESTIYA 21 Feb]* 40
PRAVDA on Bulgarian Interparty Consultations *[26 Feb]* 40
Moscow TV Interviews Bulgarian Oppositionist 41
Opposition Destroys Communist Daily in Bulgaria *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 16 Feb]* 42
Bulgarian Central Authority Chided Over Turks *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Feb]* 42
Levin Comments on Changes in East Europe *[Moscow Radio]* 42
Historian Views Developments in East Europe *[MOSCOW NEWS No 5]* 44

West Europe

Shevardnadze Meets With FRG SPD Leaders *[TASS]* 46
Yakovlev Meets FRG SPD Officials *[TASS]* 46
Commentary on FRG Expert's Proposal on Germany *[TASS]* 46
Commentary Focuses on Kohl, German Unification *[Moscow Radio]* 47
PRAVDA Reports Mitterrand-Kohl Meeting *[17 Feb]* 47
West German Book Hails Gorbachev FRG Visit *[PRAVDA 22 Feb]* 48

Latin America & Caribbean

PRAVDA Cites Castro on Rectification Process *[22 Feb]* 48
Plenum Confirms Commitment to Rectification *[PRAVDA 18 Feb]* 49
Cuba Fears Growing 'U.S. Military Threat' *[Moscow Radio]* 49
Defense Plan Against U.S. Reported *[Moscow International]* 50
Article Examines Soviet-Cuban Economic Ties *[NEW TIMES No 8]* 50

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Closed Session on Transcaucasus *[Moscow Radio]* 52
Supreme Soviet Examines Draft Law on Secession *[Moscow International]* 52
Moscow TV Carries 28 Feb Supreme Soviet Session 52
Nikonov Discusses Draft Law on Land 52
Deputies Offer Amendments 53
Several Amendments Rejected 54
Vote Proceeds Article by Article 54
Draft Law on Land Approved 55
Implementation of Law Discussed 56
TASS Outlines Provisions of Land Law 56
Deputy Nikonov on Land Law Procedures *[Moscow TV]* 57
Economist Bunich Interviewed on Land Law *[Moscow Radio]* 57
Further Reportage of Presidency Debate 57
Baltic Deputies Abstain *[Vilnius International]* 57
Ivashko Stresses Convening Congress *[Moscow TV]* 58
Deputies Voice Opinions *[PRAVDA 26 Feb]* 58
Privileges, Health Facilities Reexamined *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA]* 59
Soviet of Nationalities Agenda Viewed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 14 Feb]* 60

Political & Social

Shishlin Explains 'Executive Presidency' *[Tokyo KYODO]* 63
Political Scientist on Presidential System *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 24 Feb]* 63
Ryzhkov Interviewed on 'Current Difficulties' *[Moscow Radio]* 65
Slyunkov Opens Scientific Management Forum *[TASS]* 68
Probe of Gorbachev, Yazov Activities Urged *[Vilnius Radio]* 68
Defense Ministry Dachas Criticized *[MOSCOW NEWS No 7]* 69
Abolition of Food Privileges Discussed *[PRAVDA 13 Feb]* 69
AUCCTU Protests Auction of Consumer Goods *[TASS]* 71
Union of Cooperatives Meets 17 Feb in Moscow *[Moscow Radio]* 71
Prosecutor's Office Seeks To Improve Methods *[PRAVDA 24 Feb]* 72
Democratic Platform's Program Viewed *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 7]* 72
Moscow City Political Alignment Poll *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 7]* 73
Poll Indicates 90 Million Worshippers *[Moscow International]* 74
Committee Discusses Anti-Semitism *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 20 Feb]* 74
Broadcasting Restrictions on Deputies Investigated *[MOSCOW NEWS No 7]* 74
Plans To Ease Travel Procedures Outlined *[IZVESTIYA 5 Feb]* 75
Aeroflot Requires Hard Currency From Foreigners *[PRAVDA 25 Feb]* 77
Building of New Paper Plants Urged *[PRAVDA 22 Feb]* 78

Economic

Finance Minister on Monetary Reform Issues *[Moscow Radio]* 78
Economic Aspects of CPSU Platform Discussed *[PRAVDA 26 Feb]* 79
Department To Handle Developing Securities Market *[IZVESTIYA 25 Feb]* 81
EEC Seen as Ideal Economic Model for Federation *[IZVESTIYA 21 Feb]* 81
International Center for Small Enterprises Opens *[TRUD 9 Feb]* 84

Agricultural

Umbrella Agro-Industrial Labor Collective Formed *[IZVESTIYA 36 Feb]* 84
Stroyev Addresses Agricultural Academy Meeting *[PRAVDA 28 Feb]* 85

Scientific

Cargo Ship 'Progress M-3' Successfully Launched *[TASS]* 85
Launching of Information-Gathering Satellites *[TASS]* 85

Oceanographic Satellite 85
'Nadezhda' Navigation Satellite *[TASS]* 85
Thermal Electric Power Station Reports Accident *[Moscow TV]* 86
Nuclear Waste Dumping May Be Cause of Illnesses *[Helsinki Radio]* 86

Military

Reportage on 1975 Mutiny Aboard Soviet Destroyer 86
Details Revealed *[IZVESTIYA 28 Feb]* 86
Mutiny Remembered *[Moscow Radio]* 87
Yashin Uses Military Reform as Campaign Platform *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Feb]* 88
Article on Defense Spending, Professional Army *[Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI 22 Feb]* 89
Chief Inspector Sorokin Defends Armed Forces *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 8]* 89

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Lithuanian Official Urges Coalition Government *[AFP]* 92
Sajudis-Backed Deputies Meet in Vilnius *[Vilnius International]* 92
Depoliticalization of Lithuanian Militia Viewed *[GIMTASIS KRASTAS No 4]* 92
Lithuania Ends Broadcasting Censorship *[Vilnius International]* 94

RSFSR

Ligachev, Girenko Address Moscow Workers *[Moscow TV]* 94
Yakovlev Addresses Moscow Party School *[Moscow International]* 94
Journalists Attacked at Russian Festival *[IZVESTIYA 23 Feb]* 94
Reader Questions Yevtushenko Crowd Appeal *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 24 Feb]* 95
Bashkir Obkom Bureau 'Retired' *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 11 Feb]* 95
Public Protests Stop Karelian AES Project *[TASS]* 97
Khabarovsk Mayor Quits Election Race *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 9 Feb]* 97
Leningrad Oblast, City Hold Party Plenum *[Moscow Radio]* 98
Former Leningrad Chief Expelled From Party *[IZVESTIYA 3 Feb]* 98
Magadan Oblast Secretary Expelled From Party *[Moscow Radio]* 99
Communist Party Club Founded in Ulyanovsk *[Moscow Radio]* 99
Moscow TV Updates Volgograd Oblast Situation 99
Party Official on Volgograd Oblast Elections *[PRAVDA 5 Feb]* 100
Volgograd Oblast Forms Coordinating Council *[Moscow Radio]* 100

Western Republics

Crimean Lawyer Protests Charges Againt Tatars *[Moscow International]* 101
Post-Chernobyl International Aid Requested *[TASS]* 101
'Anti-Army Sentiments' in Moldavia Deplored *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 24 Feb]* 101
Moldavia's Luchinskiy, Snegur Beat Rivals *[IZVESTIYA 27 Feb]* 102
'Socialist Perestroyka' Union Set Up in Ukraine *[Moscow Radio]* 102
Voroshilovgrad Obkom Releases First Secretary *[Kiev Radio]* 103
Donetsk Obkom Plenum Closes After 'Intermission' *[IZVESTIYA 16 Feb]* 103
13 Die in Pochenkov Mine Explosion *[Moscow TV]* 103
Picketers Demand Resignation of Lvov Party Bureau *[Kiev International]* 104
Red Cross Tours Contaminated Ukraine Areas *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 13 Jan]* 104
Ukrainian Doctors in Chernobyl Requested *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 7]* 104
Attacks in Kharkov Not Considered Racial *[TRUD 15 Feb]* 105
Construction of Mukachevo Radar Station Halted *[Moscow International]* 105
Yazov Agrees With Decision *[IZVESTIYA 28 Feb]* 105
Week's Political Events in Ukraine Reviewed *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 25 Feb]* 105

Caucasus

Danger of Missiles in Transcaucasus Viewed *[Gelebov on Moscow International]* 107

KGB Issues Statement on Pogrom Rumors *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Feb]* 107
NKAO Paper Calls For Cooperation With Commandant *[Yerevan International]* 107
Gorisskiy Rayon Official on 'Self-Defense' *[Yerevan Radio]* 108
Tyumen Delegation Investigates Baku Rumors *[Moscow Radio]* 108
General Rodionov on Perestroyka, Azerbaijan *[Paris LE FIGARO 21 Feb]* 109
Azerbaijani Deputies' Term of Office Extended *[Baku Radio]* 109
Armenia, Azerbaijan To Draw Up Security Measures *[TASS]* 110
Operational Staff Focusing on Refugees' Problems *[Yerevan Radio]* 110
Further on Armenian 'United Front' Organization *[ARMENPRES]* 110
Armenian National Hero Andranik Commemorated *[Yerevan Radio]* 111
Armenian Church Leader Denies Allegations *[TASS]* 111
Armenian Earthquake Rehabilitation Viewed *[TASS]* 111
Baltic Emissaries Seen Fomenting Trouble in Georgia *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Feb]* 112
Georgian Social Democratic Party Reformed *[TASS]* 112
Party's Principles Explained *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 24 Feb]* 113

Central Asia

Army Candidates Successful in Uzbek Voting *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Oct]* 113
Administrative Division Changes in Uzbekistan *[Moscow Radio]* 113
Penalties Imposed for Ethnic Abuse in Uzbekistan *[IZVESTIYA 17 Feb]* 114
Uzbek Leaders, Turks Meet on Tashkent Conflicts *[TASS]* 114
Tashkent Party Chief Sentenced to Six Years *[IZVESTIYA 6 Feb]* 114
Turks Homes Burnt Down in Tashkent Oblast *[IZVESTIYA 23 Feb]* 114
Refugees Destabilizing Tajik Situation *[TRUD 17 Feb]* 115
Dushanbe 'Gradually Returning to Normal' *[TASS]* 115
Tajik Central Committee Discusses Dushanbe *[Moscow Radio]* 116
Turkmen Arms Thefts Report, Gorbatko Commentary *[IZVESTIYA 20 Feb]* 116

Chernyshev Criticizes U.S. Stand on 'Open Skies'

LD2802220990 Moscow TASS in English 2148 GMT 28 Feb 90

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—The recently concluded first "Open Skies" conference of 23 member-countries of the Warsaw Treaty (WTO) and North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) organisations has undoubtedly become a major event in international life.

Its aim was to create a system that would enable the countries to use unarmed aircraft for surveillance flights over one another's territories to monitor military activites.

The conference was the first step towards supplementing the package of disarmament measures by an exceptionally interesting and promising project.

Aerial monitoring is regarded by experts as a particularly effective arms control means that renders secret military activity impossible. The open-skies plan may become an effective addition to the national means for monitoring compliance of countries with arms reduction and limitation accords.

At the same time the system will serve to enhance trust between countries in the military field and will make virtually impossible a secret preparation for a surprise attack.

The very readiness to allow overflights to monitor military activities is of great importance from the political point of view. East-West relations are being given a qualitatively new dimension.

Of course, during the relatively short conference it was difficult immediately to coordinate all matters. Considering that talks in such a sensitive field as security usually take quite a long time, it is possible to positively evaluate this phrase of work.

I believe that upon getting acquainted with one another's positions in detail, participants will work out compromise positions to next conference which is expected to begin in Budapest late in April.

So far, one can list the following main points over which the positions of WTO AND NATO countries diverge:

—quotas of overflights for the military-and-political alliances and individual states,

—degree of the openness of territory,

—equipment that will be used for monitoring,

—aircraft of which alliance or country will be used.

It is particularly important, in my view, to create such a system which would ensure equal conditions for all parties to a future treaty.

With this end in view it is utterly essential in particular to give equal access to information for all parties. From this point of view the United States' position may hardly be regarded as constructive.

The U.S. stand is that information should be received by only those countries which possess sufficient technical resources for gathering information.

Can one speak about trust in this case when an information-gathering country would not wish to share it with other parties to a treaty? It seems that any unprejudiced person would answer this question in the negative.

Taking into account the principle of equality of the participants, the Soviet Union suggests that a common pool of aircraft be set up, equipment with agreed-upon parameters be made available, with information being processed possibly at some common centre and supplied to any participant.

This problem must be apparently analysed in NATO capitals in a particularly thorough way during preparations for the Budapest conference.

Nevertheless, despite the arisen difficulties, one can say that the conference in Ottawa became a good beginning for the realisation of the open-skies idea. Subsequently, the main thing will be to keep the main goal in sight: To create a democratic system that would ensure genuine openness.

Grinevskiy Sums Up Fifth Round of Vienna Talks

PM2802164990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent S. Tosunyan dispatch: "Austria: Quest for Compromise"]

[Text] Vienna—Yet another—the fifth—round of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe has ended. It is generally admitted by its participants that it was extraordinary. Foreign ministers were involved in its work at a certain stage and its problems were discussed at summit meetings.

The Ottawa meeting of Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO foreign ministers managed to secure a breakthrough in the solution of an important question like reducing the numerical strength of USSR and U.S. troops stationed outside their national territories in Europe. More clearly defined ways for solving other questions were also mapped out.

Ambassador on Special Assignment O.A. Grinevskiy, leader of the Soviet delegation, noted that the accord reached at the foreign ministers' Ottawa meeting is supplemented by another important mutual understanding which is beginning to emerge in Vienna as regards solving the question of personnel levels for NATO and Warsaw Pact troops in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Soviet Union also advocates

that accord be reached on reducing NATO and Warsaw Pact troops in Central Europe to the level of 700,000-750,000 men.

The dynamics of European processes dictate the need for far-reaching troop and arms reductions. This is fully in line with the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals. We believe that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from other countries' territories in Europe by 1995-1996, and all military bases on foreign territory should be eliminated by the year 2000.

The question of aviation, the Soviet delegation leader went on, is another important problem. Its discussion showed that differences still exist between the NATO and Warsaw Pact positions. The NATO countries have finally agreed that, in addition to an overall aviation level, there ought to be a separate level for air defense fighter-interceptors. But we differ on what this level ought to be.

For our part, we have also met our partners in the talks halfway by expressing readiness to include certain categories of medium-range bombers in the general aviation totals. At the same time, the sides' positions still differ regarding the inclusion of ground-based naval aviation in calculations. To put it briefly, we all have quite a long way to cover in order to solve these problems.

Progress Toward Arms Agreements Reviewed

PM0103095190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Colonel M. Ponomarev "Military Observer's View": "Finishing Straight. Priority to Arms Limitation and Reduction Problems. Overcoming the Confrontational Approach. New Horizons in East-West Relations"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] During the Malta meeting, it was decided to complete the elaboration of a treaty on 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive arms in 1990. It is also planned to sign a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states in 1990. Solutions to certain other questions are just around the corner.

Of course the work still to be done is gigantic, and time is short. How do things stand at the moment? The results of the visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker and his talks with E.A. Shevardnadze in Canada make it possible to answer this question. So then, in order.

Strategic Offensive Arms. Notable progress has been achieved on the long-disputed question of air-launched cruise missiles [ALCM's]. Essentially, the "counting rules" have been agreed—that is, the definition of how many ALCM's should be counted on each Soviet and U.S. heavy bomber equipped to carry cruise missiles. A definite compromise has been achieved in this area. The only issue yet to be agreed is that of "range delimitation" [rubezhi dalnosti]. The U.S. side is trying to retreat from the decision agreed back in the SALT II Treaty that the delimitation for ALCM's should be set at 600 km and over. The United States would like to push back this delimitation to a minimum of 1,000 km so as to obtain a definite advantage by not counting some of its missiles.

Incidentally, the question of "range delimitation" also arose in connection with sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM's]. The problem of these missiles will be decided on the basis of statements that are parallel to rather than part of the text of the treaty on 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive arms. Thus, on SLCM's the United States would like not to raise but, on the contrary, to lower the "range delimitation" from 600 km to 300 km so as not to include Soviet antiship missiles which bear no relation to strategic arms in the total. The difference on this point still remains.

On the other hand, a solution has been found to the question of access to telemetry data produced during test launches of ballistic missiles. We have been encoding this data for some time. The Americans do not resort to code, but they too conceal the true data, relating it to some start point unknown to us. That is why we cannot read it. Now both sides are gaining access to telemetry information.

Conventional armed forces in Europe. A great deal has already been agreed in this area. Great progress is being created by the Soviet Union's acceptance of the U.S. proposal to limit Soviet and U.S. troops in central Europe to a level of 195,000 servicemen plus no more than 30,000 U.S. servicemen in peripheral areas of the continent.

The main obstacle now at the 23d talks in Vienna is the question of aircraft. Above all, the United States is attempting to restrict the quota of the sides' air-defense fighter-interceptors to 500 aircraft. This, of course, is unacceptable to the Soviet Union, which is forced to have large numbers of such aircraft to defend the country's territory. It is hard to see the logic in the U.S. proposal to include Soviet land-based naval aircraft in the permitted level of combat aircraft (4,700 aircraft for each side) while flatly excluding U.S. naval aircraft. The United States tries to justify this by the fact that its aircraft are based on carriers rather than being land-based. There are also differences as regards the approach to combat training aircraft. The point here is that the Warsaw Pact countries' aircraft of this type are located in the area where cuts will take place, whereas most of the corresponding NATO aircraft are on U.S. territory, where all the NATO countries' flight personnel (apart from the British and French) are trained. Yet U.S. territory is not part of the reduction zone.

Returning to the question of both sides' armed forces personnel in Europe, it should be noted that the Soviet side is now no longer insisting on defining an overall level for such personnel. This problem, in the Soviet Union's opinion, can be left for the future.

Chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has agreed to the U.S. proposal to conclude a bilateral agreement to cut

stocks of these weapons. As is well known, Moscow has published a special statement on this score.

Ending nuclear tests. In this area the disagreement that previously existed and had prevented the conclusions of work on the protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties on limiting nuclear explosions has been overcome. These protocols are now virtually ready for signing at the June summit.

It is now obvious that this summit should finally bring into the finishing straight the resolution of all these exceptionally complex and important problems. Admittedly, the inertia of the past is still very strong, particularly in certain Western circles. This needs to be overcome—everyone has an interest in this. I think that Lord Carrington, the former NATO secretary general, put it very well in this respect: "The Western democracies need to remember that our security depends to a considerable extent on the Soviet Union's security." The quicker results are achieved at the talks which are under way, and the weightier those results are, then the faster the inertia of the past will lose its potential and the more persistently will the flywheel of the future pick up speed.

In connection with all the above I would like to raise a few questions. We still lack glasnost, which leads to unnecessary costs. Thus, our agreement to the Bush proposal on Soviet and U.S. troop numbers in central Europe was in practice given at the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and J. Baker in Moscow. But, judging by Soviet articles, over the course of some 3-4 days the Soviet Union had changed its position and made a concession to the United States. But Baker himself refuted this, and the U.S. press reported it.

It is understandable that not all the details of the talks that are being held and the data examined at them on numbers of arms and armed forces can be published until a final decision is made on them. But then we by no means always cover things that are well known to the entire world. And we have been forced to use other figures. Take the following example. Insofar as I am aware, the Soviet press has not precisely reported how many Soviet servicemen are serving in our groups of forces abroad. But these figures were reported at a military doctrines seminar in Vienna: 363,700 on GDR territory, 58,500 on Polish territory, 49,700 in Hungary, and 73,500 in the CSSR. I think that these figures are of interest to everyone at the moment.

One other point. Questions of the future of the Warsaw Pact and NATO are being placed on the agenda increasingly acutely. Our fundamental position is well known: to transform them from military-political alliances into political-military alliances. But perhaps it is already time to think about the future destiny of the Warsaw Pact military organization? And perhaps about some forms of Warsaw Pact and NATO integration as well, turning them into a joint organ for collective security in Europe—within the framework of the all-European conference on security in Europe.

These questions are making themselves more and more persistently felt. So we need to resolve them, and this will open up new horizons in East-West relations.

Lobov on Dissolution of Warsaw Pact, NATO

AU2802131290 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 28 Feb 90 p 6

[Interview with Army General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact nations, by DIE WELT reporter Manfred Rowold; date and place not given]

[Text] [Rowold] General, much is being said about eliminating the enemy images. Can the military actually live without an enemy image? Who is the enemy of the Warsaw Pact?

[Lobov] The Warsaw Pact states do not consider any country or any people their enemy. On the contrary, they are willing to develop their relations with all states, without any exceptions, under consideration of mutual security interests and peaceful coexistence.

This stipulation is contained in the military doctrine of our coalition and it is the basis for the structure and straining of the joint armed forces. They must be able to repel any external attack against any Warsaw Pact state, but they are not supposed to be able to carry out any large-scale attacks.

As regards the ideological model of the "enemy image," it has to be eliminated in East and West. Otherwise, further rapprochement in today's mutually dependent and interlaced world might meet with great difficulties.

[Rowold] The Warsaw Pact was established as an alliance of socialist states. Great political changes have taken place in these states. This raises the question of whether all members still have the same political will. Has the military alliance lost some of its capability of action?

[Lobov] Recently the allied states have again declared their loyalty to the obligations arising from the treaty and have stressed that the Warsaw Pact guarantees their sovereignty and security and the respect and inviolability of the postwar borders to a decisive extent. At the same time, the necessity is stressed to perfect the instruments and activities of the alliance and to turn it from the military-political into a political-military organization.

[Rowold] Several partners of the Soviet Union have called for the reduction or complete withdrawal of the Soviet Army from their territories. Do you consider this a danger to the alliance?

[Lobov] Already two years ago the Soviet Union announced its intention not to have any troops at all outside its territory. In the recently published statement of the Soviet Government, the Soviet Union again affirmed its position to withdraw all troops from other

states in Europe by 1995 and 1996 and to eliminate all military bases abroad by the year 2000

The changes, which are taking place in Europe in particular, accelerate this development. For instance, the Soviet Union has decided to withdraw its troops from the CSSR and from Hungary. If Poland expresses the wish, the USSR is willing to start negotiations on the further stay of its troops in this country. The Soviet troops in the GDR have a special status. At the moment I do not want to comment on this question, in particular since in Ottawa certain agreements were reached on the German problem.

Furthermore: The withdrawal of troops does not destroy the approximate balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO as a whole. Only some aspects of the balance of power of the two alliances in central Europe are changed, whose effect on the security of the East European states is difficult to define at the moment. In addition, one has to take into consideration that security depends on many factors, which, not least, also include the development of the international relations and the international climate.

[Rowold] Germany is located at the boundary between the military alliances in East and West. If, in the course of the German unification process, the GDR were to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, would this not lead to corresponding demands in Budapest and Prague, for instance?

[Lobov] I have always thought and still think that every people has to decide on its fate itself. This is also the viewpoint from which I assess the further participation of the respective ally in the Warsaw Pact.

In my view, it is not yet time to dissolve the Warsaw Pact: Currently, it is guaranteeing the stability of its participants. I think that after its withdrawal a state will have far more difficulties to integrate itself into the existing economic relations in Europe and all over the world than within the framework of this alliance. The Warsaw Pact is also very important for the internal development of the respective state.

[Rowold] Does the Warsaw Pact still have a place in Mikhail Gorbachev's idea of the "common European home"?

[Lobov] The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states think that neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO will be necessary after the "common European home" has been established. Therefore, both alliances should be dissolved simultaneously.

[Rowold] Over the past months, one got the impression that in Moscow more emphasis is again put on the alliance in order to prevent a further erosion in East Europe. When, do you think, the military blocs might be dissolved?

[Lobov] I do not think that the Warsaw Pact and NATO will continue to exist forever. They will certainly be dissolved on the basis of mutuality. The path toward this leads via further disarmament, confidence-building, and development of cooperation, as well as via the system of collective security in Europe.

[Rowold] You have proposed consultations in order to review the military doctrines of the two alliances. What are the essential differences you see in the two doctrines?

[Lobov] Above all, there is the different attitude toward the idea of a war, in particular of a nuclear war. We reject such an idea. Any kind of quarrels must be settled peacefully, that is, by political means. We are willing to develop our work without support from nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons.

Officially, NATO also advocates the unacceptability of a nuclear war and proclaims the strategy of counterattack. However, the real plans for military operations and armament programs always envisage the possibility of making a "disarming" preventive attack against the USSR and its allies. We must necessarily take into account that the NATO doctrine of "flexible response" is based on the precondition of using the armed forces over the entire defense area of the enemy by making first use of nuclear weapons.

U.S. Cuts in Foreign Military Presence Urged

PM2802101790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov commentary: "Without Foreign Soldiers and Bases"]

[Text] The cold war is receding into the past. However, to ensure that it does not return, it is necessary to destroy the material base of confrontation, to promptly complement political detente with military detente, and to progress from superarmament to nonoffensive defense and from a balance of forces to a balance of interests.

The Soviet Union has called on the international community to resolve two historic tasks en route to this goal by the year 2000: First, to eliminate nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction; and second, to end the deployment of all troops and armaments beyond national borders. I would like to focus attention on the second point.

At the third session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament the USSR officially proposed an end to all foreign military presence and the dismantling all military bases on foreign territories by the year 2000. Just as in its program for a nuclear-free world, Moscow proposed that the set aim be achieved in stages and listed a number of intermediate steps along this path: no further buildup of the current level of military presence outside national borders; no deployment of nuclear and chemical weapons on military installations abroad; reduction of military activity in areas fraught with conflict situations; no transfer of military facilities to "third countries." In the USSR's opinion, the phased withdrawal of troops from foreign territories must take place under

conditions of strict verification, including on the part of the United Nations, and include access to bases for the purpose of inspection.

It is particularly important to implement these measures in Europe, where the armed forces of two military blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—are in direct contact, and also in Asia and the Pacific Region, which is also turning into an arena of dangerous military confrontation. At the Vienna talks, where military detente on the continent which has twice this century been the cradle of world wars is being discussed, the Soviet Union is committed to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from European countries in the course of five years and the dismantling of all foreign military bases there by the year 2000.

Wanting to set a good example which would contribute to the transition to nonoffensive defense, the Soviet Union has decided unilaterally to reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men in the course of two years, including cutting back its garrisons in Warsaw Pact countries by 50,000 men and recalling six tank divisions from these countries and disbanding them.

Recent events in East Europe have brought even closer a goal which the USSR proclaimed as long as two years ago: Not to maintain a single soldier beyond its borders. A political decision on the total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary has been adopted. Should Warsaw express a similar desire, Moscow is prepared to open talks also about its troops' presence in Poland. As for the GDR, the presence of foreign garrisons there, just like in the FRG, is a special question connected with the commitments of the four victorious powers of World War II and can be resolved only taking into account the security interests of all the states involved.

In general, the pace of rolling back the Soviet military presence in East Europe has accelerated. At the same time, no matter how paradoxical this may seem, this has evoked Pentagon concern. According to the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI, it is feared there that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary may boost public demands for equivalent steps to be taken by the U.S. side. I cannot rule out that it was precisely this consideration which prompted the U.S. Administration to revise in a more radical direction its own proposal put forward at the NATO Council session in May: To limit to 275,000 men the number of U.S. and USSR servicemen outside their national territories in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals.

President Bush's new proposal sets a lower limit for central Europe—195,000 men on each side—but it reserves the right for the United States to maintain in addition up to 30,000 servicemen outside this zone (in Britain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey). The asymmetry is further compounded by the fact that the West continues to refuse to take into account the 160,000 servicemen from other NATO countries deployed on FRG territory. Nonetheless, the USSR deemed it possible to accept the U.S. proposal. As far as I can judge, this concession has been made for the sake of paving the way toward an agreement in Vienna (on the reduction of forces and conventional arms in Europe) and sealing it during the current year with the signatures of the leaders of the 35 states taking part in the Helskinki process. Such a summit now brooks no delay in view of the need to jointly discuss the problem of European security in connection with the prospect of the unification of the two German states.

In the present conditions, when for the first time during the postwar period a real opportunity has emerged to dismantle the obsolete model of the European balance of forces which took shape during the years of the cold war, U.S. unwillingness to follow the example of the Soviet Union and roll back its military presence in foreign territories is particularly striking. Laying emphasis on the reduction of ground forces to equal levels (which presupposes deeper cuts on the part of the Soviet side), Washington is seeking to ensure that this process has less of an impact on the air force and does not affect naval arms at all.

U.S. Administration leaders are claiming that, as distinct from the Soviet Union, the United States is an island state which allegedly cannot exist without raw material imports and, consequently, without a "forward basing strategy." However, it is not difficult to ascertain that the foreign groupings of U.S. forces are by no means concentrated in areas from which the U.S. economy draws the resources it lacks. Two-thirds of U.S. garrisons are located in West Europe, and one-third in East Asia, thus encircling the Soviet Union.

The "forward basing strategy" was born as an echo of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As during the postwar years U.S. B-29 bombers were the only delivery vehicle for atomic bombs, U.S. strategists set themselves the aim of encircling the USSR with military bases in order to blackmail it with the U.S. atomic monopoly. Historically, the existing differences in the structure of our two countries' armed forces are explained precisely by the fact that for a long time the Soviet Union had to counter the U.S. threat above all from its own territory, laying stress on land-based nuclear facilities.

When U.S. cities came within the range of Soviet ICBMs, the Pentagon switched emphasis to the Navy. U.S. strategists clearly believe that it is advantageous for the Soviet Union to have a preponderance on land since Army personnel are cheaper. Therefore, in agreeing to a reduction of ground forces, they are seeking to consolidate U.S. superiority at sea in order to draw the Soviet Union into a more expensive sphere of the arms race.

The advocates of the "forward basing strategy" are, of course, having a hard time at the moment. First, because the specter of the "Soviet threat" has faded; second, because people have become more aware of the danger of foreign military presence in the nuclear missile age; and

third, because maintaining one-fourth of its military forces outside the country and some 1,500 bases in more than 30 states is now beyond the Pentagon's means. This calls for bigger appropriations, but as a result of the state budget deficit these are having to be cut back.

In response to demands from the Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense has decided to close down a number of foreign bases and installations which it deemed possible without incurring particular damage. This applies, for instance, to the Greenham Common base in Britain and Comiso in Italy, where intermediate-range missiles were based, and a number of installations of secondary importance in the FRG, Greece, and Turkey.

The cosmetic nature of these measures is even more obvious from the example of the Asia and Pacific Region. In order to present to Congress a report on the reorganization of U.S. Armed Forces on this flank, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney has just visited South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. The results of his visit indicate that the cuts—much more modest than those in Europe—may affect within the next two to three years 12,000-15,000 of the more than 120,000 U.S. servicemen deployed in the aforementioned three countries. On the whole, according to Cheney's statements, the United States does not intend to give up the "forward basing strategy" but merely wants Tokyo and Seoul to cover more fully the expenditure for the maintenance of U.S. forces on their territory.

It has to be noted that the U.S. side has still not responded to the Soviet initiatives put forward in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk and is unwilling to discuss the program for military detente in Asia and the Pacific Region which was proposed there. People in Washington continue to claim that changes in the USSR's policy are tangible in Europe but not in Asia. They allege that the "Soviet military threat" in the Far East has not diminished. And that prior to initiating something on the lines of the all-European process there, it is necessary to settle regional conflicts and controversial problems.

However, you only have to glance back at the time which has elapsed since Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk to see how consistently the USSR is seeking military detente in the region. The USSR's decision to unilaterally cut its armed forces by 500,000 men includes 200,000 servicemen in the east of the country. Under the Washington treaty, 436 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are to be destroyed in the Asian part of the USSR. For a year now there has not been a single Soviet soldier in Afghanistan. Three-fourths of Soviet forces are being withdrawn from Mongolia. Moscow and Beijing have agreed to reduce the garrisons on the Soviet-Chinese border and to work toward its complete demilitarization. The Soviet Union has begun to reduce its military presence at Cam Ranh base in Vietnam.

In recent years the Soviet Union has more than once proposed specific measures with a view to curbing the arms race at sea. In respect of Asia and the Pacific Region these initiatives, as mentioned earlier, were set out in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk; in respect of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, in Delhi; in respect of the seas in the North of Europe, in Murmansk and Helsinki; and in respect of the Mediterranean, in Belgrade and Rome. U.S. official circles are refusing to extend any form of arms control to the Navy. It can be said that in many respects Europe has been assigned the role of a pioneer, as it were, blazing the trail toward a peaceful period in mankind's history. However, it is evident from the example of the selfsame Europe that the waters which wash the shores of the Old World in the North and the South are still excluded from this process.

Yet the more actively disarmament on land is implemented, the more dangerous the destabilizing role of naval forces and forward based facilities becomes. If the USSR and the United States halve their strategic nuclear arsenals and the Warsaw Pact and NATO radically reduce their armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe while the U.S. Navy and U.S. bases around the Soviet Union remain intact, the military threat to the Soviet Union will not only not decrease but increase.

Gambling on naval superiority and forward based facilities is short-sighted, just like any attempt to strengthen your own security at the expense of the security of the other side. This could wipe out the successes achieved in the cause of disarmament in other areas and hamper the transition to nonoffensive defense. It is to be hoped that Washington will respond to Moscow's call to enter the year 2000 not just without nuclear weapons but also without a military presence on foreign territories.

Economic Might To Set Europe, World Standing

PM2102160390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 90 p 3

[M. Knyazkov article: "Renewal for Europe"]

[Text] Another sign of the times—and there are so many of them nowadays!—is that you hear less and less mention of nuclear confrontation. So have we been crossing swords in vain? The changes in East Europe have sharply altered the scale of values. Openness, democratization, political pluralism, and the appearance of different forms of ownership and economic activity have now taken the lead. Perhaps for the first time in the entire postwar period the factor of tense political and military confrontation in Europe is really ceasing to be the main factor.

Visiting West Berlin in December last year, J. Baker, head of the U.S. foreign policy department, delivered a major policy speech in which he set out the new thrust of U.S. policy with regard to the Old World.

I will quote just the main propositions in Baker's speech. "Today NATO... is striving to create in Europe a new security system in which the military component is weaker and the political component stronger," the secretary of state said. It is not hard to guess that as soon as the role of the community starts to grow, we should expect a strengthening of ties between the United States and the EEC. In the opinion of the secretary of state, the new Europe must be created on the basis of "new Atlanticism."

In essence, we could probably say that the U.S. Administration has a new European doctrine geared to the political and economic reconstruction of Europe. I think that the slogan "a New Europe based on 'new Atlanticism'" is sufficiently clear.

Let us read on with Baker's speech: "Today we can see how the end of the postwar era is drawing near," he said. "In their peaceful aspirations the peoples of East Europe have become the mirror in which the eternal strength of our best values is reflected."

Economic restructuring in the East European countries, many of which are now experiencing a crisis, requires capital investment—considerable capital investment. According to the U.S. journal BUSINESS WEEK, the renewal of the GDR economy alone will need $280 billion. It is easier to mobilize these kinds of resources by working together, and together it is easier to coordinate investment policy.

However, as a rule, the West is not accustomed to throwing money to the wind. And it would be naive to assume that this economic aid will not be politicized, i.e. linked to conditions of a political nature. It is no accident that Baker talked in his speech about "a strategy of restoring the economy of East Europe using private capital.

"Private entrepreneurs in East Europe who are the beneficiaries of investment want to feel confident that they will be able to sell their products on Western markets," the secretary of state also said. This means that renewed cooperation between the United States and the EEC will also be geared to giving East European countries engaged in restructuring a definite niche in Western markets or, in other words, making them part of the division of labor system which operates in the world of free enterprise.

Clearly, this road will not be smooth. Because, as far as virtually everyone is concerned, the process of overcoming the division of Europe brings not only a sense of relief but also new headaches. "Europe's potential economic might," BUSINESS WEEK has predicted, "will grow to staggering proportions: It will almost be equivalent to that of the United States and Japan put together." This cannot help but affect U.S. positions in world markets.

Many EEC members are seriously concerned at the prospect of a united Germany, particularly in light of the forthcoming creation of a single European market. Their reasons are understandable: There would then appear on the European market an economically dominant force which would turn the other countries into junior partners. France clearly would not want any drawing together of NATO and EEC roles, evidently perceiving in this a threat of increased U.S. influence on the European Continent. It is no accident that, following Baker's West Berlin speech, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas spoke out in favor of each organization's "preserving its specific features, if we want each of them to preserve their harmony and strength."

There are not only restraining factors in this unity: There is also very strong bait. "Everyone is talking about the business opportunities in Southeast Asia," Jean-Louis Beffa, president of the French company Saint-Gobain, exclaimed, eyeing the rapidly changing East Europe. "What luck that the same kind of opportunities are suddenly opening up right on our doorstep!"

In order to understand the meaning of this statement, let us remind ourselves on what the "economic miracle" of Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea is based: Western technology plus cheap local manpower, land, and raw material resources. This has substantially reduced the prime cost of goods and made it possible to fill the markets of the Old and New Worlds with them.

All these factors are present in East Europe and, what is more, in view of its geographical location, the cost of transporting products is considerably reduced, which in turn increases the competitiveness of these goods. In short, the prospects for Western capital here are very promising.

Having read all this, someone will possibly exclaim: "But this means that real economic aggression against our allies is on the way!" I would not say so myself, because aggression always presupposes confrontation. Perhaps

what is more in evidence in East Europe is reciprocal movement. "The tattered countries of the East have rushed toward the Western economic orbit." This statement by BUSINESS WEEK does possibly exaggerate a little, but, as a whole, I feel, it does not err against the truth.

Is this good or bad? As a rule, there is no such thing as abstract truths. I believe that for the East European countries this is a question of sovereign choice. And the responsibility for this choice.

And what about us? I think that an unequivocal answer would be inappropriate here. An end to military confrontation in Europe can only be viewed positively—that goes without saying. No one has found it cheap to maintain troops abroad, and their withdrawal could only have a healthy impact on our budget. Economically stronger neighbors are also a positive factor, I feel. This will provide the opportunity to set our economic relations on a more mutually advantageous footing.

There is also no doubt that the gradual transformation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO from military into political groupings will help to ease tension and, consequently, enhance well-being.

But it is another matter as to whether there will be any basis for the existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, even as political organizations. Both alliances are, in one way or another, a product of the confrontation era and have made it their aim to safeguard the security of two blocs completely different from each other in terms of their political and economic structures.

The process of smashing the administrative-edict system, which began later in the East European countries than in our country, has now accelerated sharply. In our own country, on the other hand, this process has if anything begun to falter. A multiparty system, diversity of forms of ownership, and a market economy are becoming the reality in the East European countries. Many are taking perfectly real steps to make their currencies convertible. All this means that, as far as values are concerned, these countries could, with time, find themselves much closer to their former "probable adversaries." It cannot be ruled out that, one fine day, people motivated by too different interests could be sitting at the table of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

We certainly should also give some thought to our place in the future common European home. With the declining significance of the factor of military strength—in which we are undoubtedly strong—the emphasis will inevitably shift to the factor of the economy—in which we are also undoubtedly weak at the present moment. The real influence of any state on the European Continent and in the world as a whole will be determined by economic might—and possibly by this alone.

NATO Persists With 'Military Games' in Norway

PM2202115790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Unidentified own correspondent's dispatch: "Maneuvers Yet Again"]

[Text] Brussels, 17 Feb—Despite the fact that a trend toward a review of military policy is emerging in the North Atlantic Alliance, sundry military "games" still remain the most important component of NATO's practical activity.

Further proof of this is provided by the maneuvers of "allied mobile forces" which will begin on Norwegian territory 28 February.

NATO headquarters in Brussels announced that military contingents from the United States, Britain, Canada, the FRG, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, as well as a large group of servicemen from Norway itself—a total of 6,300 men—will take part in the maneuvers. The movement of troops and equipment to the "operations zone" (the Tromso region in Northern Norway) is almost complete. The objective of the maneuvers is to rehearse combat actions against an imaginary opponent in Arctic conditions. The region, as a glance at the map proves, is pretty close to the Soviet Union's border.

One typical feature is that FRG combat subunits (hitherto only auxiliary formations, like medical units, had been involved) will participate for the first time in the maneuvers on Norwegian territory, which are held regularly. Observers note that German troops have not been seen on Norwegian soil since World War II.

Historian Describes Vision of Future Europe

PM2302154190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 pp 2-3

[Article by Prof. V. Dashichev, doctor of historical sciences: "A Europe of Open Doors: Forecast"]

[Text] What kind of place will our country hold on this continent, where no walls are left but borders are still very real? We believe that the discussions at the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum underline the seriousness of this problem.

Last year could perhaps be compared with the year 1789 in terms of its significance for the future of Europe. Two hundred years ago the people of France took the Bastille by storm and thereby heralded the beginning of a new era of democracy in place of feudal rule. Now the cleansing storm of the people's wrath has swept away totalitarian regimes in East and central Europe. The terrible progeny of Stalinism has been eliminated: The "iron curtain" which divided one part of Europe from the other has collapsed.

For many, the sharp turnabout in the development of East and central Europe has come as a complete surprise. However strange it may seem, the Soviet public has

proved particularly unprepared for this. For years now it has had the idea drummed into it that Europe is divided into two parts: the capitalist part, which has outlived its age, and the socialist part, which is in the ascendant. The system established in the eastern part of Europe was declared the pinnacle of the human spirit's creation. Objectivity and truth were replaced with triumphant reports, self-deception, and deception of others.

Then the storm broke. The political system which had prevailed for more than 40 years in the countries of East and central Europe began to crumble under pressure from the masses. The alarm was sounded in the camp of Soviet and local conservatives and overt and covert Stalinists: "Socialism is in danger," "the socialist community is disintegrating," "capitalism is being restored".... Attempts were made to blame Soviet restructuring and its initiators for everything. The internal political struggle over the reformation of socialism began to spill over into the international sphere. Ceausescu, for example, called for the creation of an "international" of conservatives, opponents of restructuring, in order to reverse the development of events in Poland and other East European countries by military force. He said that reforms would come to Romania "when pears grow on apple trees." But history decided differently. The desire to preserve Stalinist pseudosocialism and prolong its existence at all costs plunged the countries of East and central Europe into profound crisis.

Would it have been possible to avoid this crisis and the development of revolutionary situations in the East European countries? Probably not. Because, to do this, they needed a democratic mechanism of power able to respond sensitively to the dictates of the time, unfettered with obsolete dogmas, answerable to the public, and capable of removing incompetent or simply ignorant leaders from office. As historical experience has shown, the totalitarian systems were unfit for this and, as a rule, their domination ended in tragedy or catastrophe for society. Even during Brezhnev's time a considerable number of attempts were made to prevent the East European countries from sliding toward crisis. I can remember, for example, how the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics of the World Socialist System Institute warned in its reports and memorandums of the danger of economic and political crisis in Poland and other East European countries. No reaction was forthcoming.

In the eyes of these peoples, the Soviet Union had then become an exceptionally conservative power imposing its system on them by force, preventing them from carrying out reforms that would renew their countries, not allowing the peoples of this region to live as they wanted, and condemning them to a state of material and spiritual vegetation.

This kind of approach to East Europe is rooted in the theory and practice of Stalinism. The top priority of this European policy was to preserve and consolidate (and, if possible, expand on) the "results of World War II and postwar development." In this instance the word "results" meant extending the sphere of Soviet influence to the whole of East and central Europe and establishing the Stalinist administrative-edict system, called socialism, in this region. This system was regarded as the basis of Soviet domination in East and central Europe. The Brezhnev policy toward East and central Europe was based on the Stalinist model and combined great-power ambitions, ideological messianism, and wrongly interpreted Soviet national security interests. In their ignorance the people who used to decide the fate of Soviet policy never asked themselves this question: But is the postwar status quo really to the advantage of the Soviet Union and is it really possible to preserve it? It never occurred to them that the answer to both these questions could only be—No. Moreover, while setting themselves up as Marxists, they simply ignored Marx' very correct idea that a nation which oppresses other nations cannot be free itself. Indeed, our domination in East and central Europe had damaging repercussions for the Soviet Union's own political and economic situation by stimulating the conservation of the Stalinist system in our country, suppressing attempts at democratization, and lying like a dead weight on our economy.

But this was far from being the whole picture. The postwar status quo also fettered Soviet foreign policy. Its distinguishing features were the division of Europe and Germany; confrontation between the two military-political and economic blocs; new borders marking the territorial changes in Europe; confrontation between Western democracy and Eastern totalitarianism; and a structural incompatibility between the market economy of West Europe and the bureaucratic-edict economy of East Europe which created political, financial and economic, administrative, legal, and other barriers in economic cooperation between the two parts of the continent that were hard to overcome.

From the viewpoint of Soviet national and state interests the most damaging consequence of the situation was that the Soviet Union found itself drawn into a confrontation lasting more than 40 years with a united front of Western powers and their allies whose economic potential was infinitely superior to that of our own country.

Stalinist deformations in domestic policy inevitably led to equally serious deformations in foreign policy. A rare opportunity appeared in 1945-1947 to assist the creation of a belt of really friendly countries along the Soviet Union's western borders: from Finland in the north to Romania in the south. The peoples of East Europe—and West Europe, incidentally—felt deeply grateful to the Soviet people, who, at the cost of a colossal loss of human life and unprecedented courage, had saved European civilization from fascist tyranny.

The psychological and political atmosphere which formed in East Europe was quite different to that which had existed before the war and was exceptionally favorable from the standpoint of reliably safeguarding the

security of the Soviet Union. The countries of central and East Europe embarked on a path of popular democracy. Their state structure was founded on the supremacy of the people's expression of will, political pluralism, free elections, and a parliamentary system based on the national features, traditions, and level of development of each country concerned. These countries' workers and communist parties and many of their leaders—G. Dimitrov, W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht, and others—believed this path of development to be the most correct and the one most capable of leading to democratic socialism.

If the countries of East Europe had actually followed this path Europe would not have been divided into two isolated parts hostile to each other, the bitter, dangerous confrontation between East and West would not have arisen, the Western powers would not have formed a united coalition against the Soviet Union, and our country would have been able to focus its efforts on solving its domestic problems: improving the people's well-being and developing its political institutions, economy, science, technology, and culture. But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had opted for this direction of development. The totalitarian, totally antidemocratic nature of his power constantly pushed him ever further toward coercion—both within the country and in foreign policy. Consequently, soon after the defeat of Germany, he continued his prewar policy of great-power expansionism to extend the sphere of Soviet influence in Europe—a policy earlier embodied in the pact with Hitler of 23 August 1939.

The first tentative attempts, following the 20th CPSU Congress, to move away from the Stalinist policy in relation to East Europe—reflected in the recognition of every people's right to choose the direction of their development—were overturned in 1956 with the bloody suppression of the uprising of the Hungarian people, who rose up against the externally imposed tyrannical rule of the Rakosi clique.

After 1964, any ideas about democratizing and liberalizing relations with our neighbors were banned and consigned to oblivion. They were replaced by the "Brezhnev Doctrine." The East European countries were placed on a "short leash." In fact, these countries produced their own "little Stalins" in the form of the Ceausescus, Honeckers, Zhivkovs, Bilaks, and Jakeses, who personified the outmoded bureaucratic-edict system which in no way fitted in with the postindustrial age of the scientific-technical and information revolution.

Gigantic armed forces were needed to preserve and strengthen our domination over East and central Europe and protect the Stalinist system implanted there. The logic of struggling against NATO and opposing the strategy of "rolling back" and "deterrence" demanded constant qualitative and quantitative growth in these armed forces. The Brezhnev leadership went to absurd lengths in this respect, setting the task of achieving military-strategic parity with all hostile forces surrounding the Soviet Union, which, incidentally, were the product of nothing other than Stalinism in Soviet policy.

Here is a telling statistic: The Soviet share of the Warsaw Pact's military expenditure was always more than 90 percent, while the U.S. share of analogous NATO expenditure has always been in the region of 50 percent. One result of such a reckless policy was the unprecedented militarization of Soviet society.

The Brezhnev leadership mainly relied on military strength and the bureaucratic-edict system, believing that they would reliably guarantee the unshakability of the system's foundations. This was a profound error. It transpired that it is possible to have colossal military potential but be politically impotent, incapable of influencing the development of events. Under cover of military strength the processes of the erosion of Soviet positions in East and central Europe developed at an ever more rapid pace. From being a zone of imaginary security for the Soviet Union this region was increasingly becoming a zone of instability and sociopolitical upheavals.

There are actually some people who, blinded by their great-power ambitions, are trying—either for demagogical reasons or out of ignorance—to portray the transformations in this region, which aim to overcome the crisis and restore the democratic foundations of society, as wrecking postwar efforts and the achievements of Soviet policy, abolishing the order established at Yalta and Potsdam, and undermining the Soviet Union's interests. They either cannot or do not want to see that the processes developing in East and central Europe are in our country's most vital interests.

So what kind of advantages does the present development in this region promise the Soviet Union? First and foremost, an end to the cold war and the exhausting confrontation with the whole of the Western world, inasmuch as their main cause—the Soviet domination of East Europe—is disappearing. The enormous merit of the perestroyka of Soviet foreign policy is that systematic, purposeful efforts have been made since 1985 to dismantle the prime sources rather than the consequences of East-West confrontation, as was the case under the Brezhnev leadership. This has been embodied in the new thinking and new foreign policy practice. The "Brezhnev Doctrine" has yielded to the universal principle of freedom of choice and noninterference in others' internal affairs; the damaging and dangerous class-ideological, left-wing sectarian approach—to the supremacy of common human values; tyranny—to respect for international law; the flouting of morality—to compliance with moral norms.

Those loyal to the old policies tried to intimidate people by saying that the United States and its allies would fill the "power vacuum" that would arise in East Europe if it ceased to be a sphere of Soviet influence. But nothing of the kind is happening. Firstly, they have stated the issue

incorrectly. This is a view taken from the past. There cannot be a "power vacuum" in East Europe because it is turning into a region of independent, sovereign states. Second, the Western powers have made it clear that they will respect the Soviet Union's special security interests and will not do anything in this region that could jeopardize these interests and upset European stability. Common sense has prevailed on both sides, together with a departure from the spirit of confrontation and a common interest in seeing a gradual, democratic, peaceful transition to a new quality of international relations in Europe. Thus there are now opportunities to solve numerous international problems which hitherto seemed insoluble. Real disarmament has begun, together with the process of scaling the two blocs' armed forces down to a minimum, because NATO's strategy of "deterrence" has been stripped of its justification, while the erstwhile functions of the Soviet forces in East Europe have lost their significance, and their continued presence on the territory of the East European countries is becoming simply superfluous. Confrontation between the two blocs is being replaced with their cooperation in maintaining European stability and security. This role of theirs will continue and even strengthen in the near future, until a new, peaceful order arises and becomes established in Europe. The outlines of this order are already gradually beginning to appear. It goes without saying that this order will not be distinguished by the division of Europe but by the full restoration of its unity and the creation of an integrated political, economic, and cultural European region stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

And what will this be followed by? A community with the germ of pan-European institutions, the closest possible economic integration among its members, a common parliament and single citizenship? Or will there remain regional integration groupings closely collaborating among themselves? Or maybe these will be supplemented by subregional integrations: the Danube region, central European, north European, and other regions? The concept of a European confederation, which is gaining a growing number of supporters, seems the most attractive. French President Mitterrand has spoken out in favor of this kind of confederation and, before him, the congress of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. The confederation could incorporate all European states, which would establish an all-European parliament and organs of political, economic, scientific, humanitarian, and environmental cooperation. Within such a confederation, every nation would be able to preserve its identity, make its own contribution to all-European development, and enjoy the benefits of all-European cooperation. There must be no place in the new Europe for enmity, great-power ambitions, striving for domination, ideological and sociopolitical messianism, intolerance, nationalism, or national exclusivity. Borders will cease to be barriers to communication between peoples. People, ideas, capital, and services will freely cross these borders. A utopia? No. A perfectly realistic image of the future. Europe has been led toward it by the past, with its countless wars, incredible suffering visited upon people, and folly, stupidity, and crime elevated to the rank of state policy.

The desire to overcome this past is reflected in the Final Act of the all-European Helsinki conference and in the subsequent development of the all-European process. However, the Helsinki Act was designed to create a modus vivendi between two blocs of states. For the middle of the seventies, this was a great achievement. But the Brezhnev leadership regarded the Helsinki Act primarily as a means to consolidate the "postwar realities" and preserve the division of Europe. All the rest—the democratic, humane, moral norms of state conduct in the international arena—simply did not fit into the neo-Stalinist concept of Brezhnev and his followers. By their subsequent domestic and foreign policy they in fact canceled out everything positive contained in the Helsinki Act and undermined the all-European process.

Now M.S. Gorbachev has placed on the agenda the convening of a new all-European conference, Helsinki-2, this year. This initiative has met with a broad response. The following questions could be raised for the conference to focus its attention on: overcoming the unnatural division of Europe and the German nation; building a common European home; radically reducing arms and armed forces; strengthening European security, stability, and cooperation. It must outline real measures and define the nature of the most crucial, complex transitional period in Europe's movement toward a new, peaceful order. The European peoples have already entered this period. Its essence lies in adapting and bringing together the political and economic structures of the East and West European countries, restoring the traditional ties between them which have been forcibly severed, and shaping all-European political, economic, and moral-ethical values as the ideological foundation of the common European home. The countries of East and central Europe have now overtaken the Soviet Union with regard to eliminating Stalinist distortions. The process of restoring devastated or deformed components of the social environment is moving considerably faster in these countries. In the political sphere this process involves reconstructing a rule-of-law, democratic state based on the principles of the supremacy of the people's will, the separation of powers, freedom of alternative elections, freedom of the individual, conscience, and information, renunciation of the one-party monopoly on all-embracing power, the establishment of political pluralism and pluralism of opinions, recognition of the legitimacy of and need for an opposition, depoliticization of the state apparatus, army, police, and state security—which have in the past served the dictatorship of one person or party oligarchy—and openness to the outside world. In the economic sphere it involves making the transition from a bureaucratic, state-run economy to a market economy, restoring the direct link between the market and production, socializing state-apparatus property—and transferring the right to dispose of this property to its direct producers—restoring

enterprises' independence as subjects of the national economy, restoring money as the universal equivalent of value, and introducing a convertible currency. In the moral sphere it involves returning to norms such as dignity, honor, humanity, tolerance, and charity. Even quite recently all these values were said to be the products of capitalist society. In actual fact they are the product and the pinnacle of the long development of human civilization, they are the offspring of its suffering.

Without fully restoring these common human values in their social life the Soviet Union and countries in the East European region cannot be respected members of the common European home enjoying full rights, nor can they play an effective role, with great benefit to themselves, in all-European economic and scientific and technical cooperation. Moreover, without this, it is generally hard to imagine the erection of a common European home or the creation of a new European peaceful order freed from the fear of war, enmity, and all forms of oppression. An order that will be able to guarantee prosperity and progress for all European peoples.

Western View of Soviet Developments Examined

PM2702093590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[Anatoliy Karpychev "View From Moscow": "When Nerves Are at Breaking Point"]

[Text] One can sometimes only be amazed at our extremes of feeling. Sometimes we sob with happiness after scant praise; at other times we angrily kick up a fuss, saying that it is not important what people in the West think of us, our opinion of ourselves is more important. Prudence evidently lies somewhere in the middle. I will not hide the fact that I was interested, for instance, in what emphasis the Western mass media would apply when describing the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum and the draft platform, and how they would analyze these materials.

If you remember, the situation "over there" on the eve of the plenum was very uneasy. A considerable amount of rumor regarding appointments and reshuffles in the "supreme echelon" always flies about before every plenum, but this time was something else. "The mass media's nerves are 'strained to breaking point,'" we were told by our correspondents from the United States. One U.S. television company's Moscow correspondent added more "fuel" to the fire when he sent home a report about M.S. Gorbachev's possible resignation from the post of general secretary. The report caused a fair amount of hullabaloo. It could not have been otherwise—the "authentic sources" cited by the correspondent obviously knew what they were doing.

Both the day before, observing what was going on, and later, during the plenum's work, I frequently thought how much people's perception and interpretation of events depends on us journalists, and that is why our actual profession compels us to be supremely exact in our treatment and interpretation of the facts when covering these events, when covering the vicissitudes in the fate of the peoples, the passage of history, if you like. To be frank, I saw nothing new in foreign correspondents' reports from Moscow, in some places they repeated one another. Of course, there were exceptions, but nothing particularly striking.

I do not want to offend my colleagues—especially Dan Rather, the well known CBS-TV presenter. I was told that Americans like him very much. I envy his popularity. During the plenum, Dan was in Moscow reporting on the spot. What reports they were! "He (Gorbachev) is making a desperate attempt to save himself, his party, and his country...." "Orthodox Communists from the right-wingers' camp are infuriated...." "Gorbachev's supporters are ostensibly working on compromise proposals and holding a meeting at an undisclosed location outside the Kremlin." "For the first time in Soviet history the leaders may not succeed in taking refuge from the people," those were the conclusions Dan drew. Honestly, it is as if you have been plunged into an adventure story.

There are few variant opinions about the plenum. Everything boiled down to three or four points of emphasis. The first is that the CPSU is abandoning its monopoly on power and a multiparty system is inevitable in the Soviet Union. The second concerns the fact that the abrogation of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution on the party's leading role is near at hand. The third is that the battle between the reformists and the hard-liners ended in victory for Gorbachev. The fourth is that the presidential form of government is rendering the soviets like many of the world's democracies.

However, there are very many emotions. For what it is worth, let us say, here they are. "Gorbachev is winning the war at the plenum," "72 years of CPSU hegemony wiped out," "Mikhail Gorbachev has crossed the Rubicon," "Moscow miracle," "The decision adopted by the CPSU Central Committee plenum may be seen as the tombstone on the grave of totalitarianism."

Notwithstanding the supreme polarity of the words (ranging from "miracle" to "grave") opinions of the plenum and the draft platform do share a common feature. Namely the emphasis put on the following idea: Communists have no future and all their past was a mistake. The idea is not a new one but it is a sought-after one "over there." I think that even serious politicians support the changes in East Europe because these changes have removed some communist parties from the helm. The West is already saying overtly that those who are bolder in replacing "totalitarianism" and renouncing the socialist idea will be the first to obtain economic aid.

As a rule the distinguished publications seemed notable for the categorical nature of their opinions. While, on the contrary, newspapers whose titles are encountered extremely rarely among the "arbiters of opinion" are calmer in their conclusions regarding the events in

Moscow. An Austrian newspaper, for instance, noted that anyone who thought that the Central Committee would announce its disbandment and the whole Politburo would resign was attentively following events in East European countries but had little grasp of Soviet realities.

...When I wrote these lines, I had before me on the table two U.S. magazines commenting on the plenum. I will cite just the headlines: "Nullifying Lenin's Legacy," "Gorbachev Turns His Back on Lenin," "Through His Extremely Bold Maneuvers Gorbachev Is Reducing Power of the Party." That is from TIME magazine. "Life Without Lenin," "Gorbachev's Plan Deprives Communist Party of Its Constitutional Monopoly on Power and Opens Way to Multiparty Elections." That was carried in NEWSWEEK magazine under a rubric on Soviet political reforms. Portraits of Lenin, Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Ligachev, and Yeltsin were all there.

Sociologists responded to the Central Committee plenum and the draft platform. Michael Beshloss [surname as transliterated], a historian from Washington's Woodrow Wilson Center. What does he think? I asked myself.

According to Beshloss, the transition to a multiparty system will not take place in the USSR as rapidly as in East Europe, but more gradually. The most suitable scenario from his viewpoint is the existence of two or three parties in the Soviet Union in the American mold. In his opinion this would promote stability in a superpower such as the Soviet Union.

Another specialist on the USSR, Charles Maynes, editor of FOREIGN POLICY magazine, reckons: "At a time when Gorbachev is trying to transfer power from the party to the state apparatus the Soviet state lacks the power structure and an opposition party, and the alternative to party rule may either be anarchy or a retreat into conservatism."

"I have been studying the Soviet Union for 44 years," Professor Marshall Shulman from Columbia University's Harriman Institute said. "I never thought I would live to see changes like those now under way in the USSR. I believed this would possibly happen sometime—after all, the country must logically and inevitably proceed along the path of reform. But I was convinced that this would not happen soon."

Letters to the editorial office indicate that readers are not always satisfied with accounts of other peoples' opinions. I agree with you, yet I would nevertheless like to cite another opinion and end the discussion here. It is that of the Swede Jakob Dalin [name as transliterated], the presenter of the variety program "Jakob's Ladder," whom we have frequently seen in the "Morning Mailbag."

"Journalists describe the Soviet Union as if they were sports commentators," he noted sadly. "They want results all the time. Our journalists think all the time that Sweden is the model for the USSR or that the West is the model. Of course, they now want to destroy the old system. But why are we the model? Maybe there will be something new? I think life would be dreadful if the aim is only to obtain a pair of new jeans. The Soviet people have a desire for culture. They love to read, they love the theater and art. We in the West have already forgotten these things. People here do not read as they do there. We may import that from the USSR. We must not forget that Soviet people know more about us than we do about them."

Knowledge and ignorance.... Maybe that is the reason for the nervous tension? Well?

PRAVDA Views Kohl-Modrow Bonn Meeting

PM2202120390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report by own correspondent Ye. Grigoryev: "Complex Unification Problems. On the Outcome of the Meeting in Bonn"]

[Text] Bonn, 15 Feb—There was an emergency debate on the German question in the Bundestag today, which turned out to be very heated. Federal Chancellor H. Kohl made a government statement in which he dwelt, in particular, on the results of GDR Council of Ministers Chairman H. Modrow's visit. The visit, as we know, lasted two days.

The sides were ostensibly intent on having a wide-ranging, in-depth dialogue. But the concrete results of the Bonn conversations were small. The FRG Government rejected the GDR Government's proposals on ways of assisting the country's economic stabilization above all. All it is doing is presenting and trying to impose its own "recipe for salvation"—the introduction of financial union, that is, extending the West German mark and the FRG economic system to the GDR. All they agreed on in Bonn was the setting up of a joint commission of experts to study this proposal by the federal government.

In fact, no one expected any miracles from the meeting, although it could have been more productive had the federal government so desired. However, it had decided beforehand on a tough, uncompromising approach to relations between the two countries. Hence the official and media propaganda about the GDR's "bankruptcy," which was intended to create the impression that the state was on the verge of insolvency, of disintegrating and falling at Bonn's feet. It is worth noting that, as if at someone's request, the West German press is ignoring data which refute this thesis and which were cited by the GDR Government head at a news conference. The only one on the West German side who had the courage to point out that, although experiencing serious problems, the GDR remains a developed state, among the top 10 countries in the world in terms of economic development, was O. Lambsdorff, chairman of the Free Democratic Party. Therefore, in the opinion of many

observers, the atmosphere of the meeting on the Rhine can scarcely be called healthy.

I quote the liberal KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER, which writes: "The Bonn government's position is no doubt connected with ideas that have recently been expressed about not doing anything that might increase the Modrow government's authority. After all, the election battle has already started in the GDR and the Bonn parties have intervened in it to finally eliminate the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, which is now called the Party of Democratic Socialism and still has Modrow as its deputy chairman. Kohl is bound to be concerned, therefore, about the outcome of the 18 March election, as it affects the "Alliance for Germany" electoral bloc which took such an effort to cobble together.

In my view, this analysis gives an idea of the nature of "national responsibility" which currently characterizes the local ruling camp's line. Hence the essential failure of the Bonn meeting. Many GDR delegation members, above all ministers from opposition parties, expressed disappointment with Bonn's stance. Opposition leaders in the Bundestag were blunter still. Their views are closer to the ideas and expectations of GDR political forces concerning the need to give immediate assistance to the republic's economy. As is known, according to GDR Government estimates, a sum of the order of 10-15 billion West German marks [DM] would be needed. As far as the FRG, which "earned" DM130 billion on exports last year alone, is concerned, this would be easily affordable national solidarity, important primarily from the humanitarian viewpoint. Many FRG figures believe that this could halt the enervating migration of GDR citizens to West Germany. Moreover, this phenomenon is also causing a marked increase in social tensions in the FRG, which has its own 2.1 million unemployed and a massive shortage of cheap housing.

Indeed, official Bonn's current approaches to relations with the GDR have very much the flavor of a "position-of-strength" policy. But, of course, economic, not military. In current conditions this is a weapon stronger than guns, and those that possess it believe they can dictate their terms on the path to emerging German unity. Although some representatives of the ruling circles also acknowledge that the recipe they propose is extremely risky in that it could cause events to snowball. It may be that after the elections in the GDR the element of "sobering up" will begin to grow.

Modrow said at the news conference that the unification process should take place in stages and in such a way that no one—neither ordinary people in the two German states, nor their neighbors in Europe—should feel apprehensive. This is the right idea, certainly.

As for the international aspects, the sides' views coincide in the main. Talking about the USSR's stance on the German unification question, Kohl said: "In no way do we see this stance as giving us carte blanche to behave in an arbitrary way on the national question. German unification should be incorporated in the general European architecture and the overall process of East-West relations. No one can be more committed to this than the Germans themselves."

It is characteristic in this connection that the news from Ottawa of the accord reached by the foreign ministers of the four great powers and the two German states on discussion of the external conditions necessary for the establishment of German unity met with interest in Bonn, despite all the different views here on this issue.

FRG Seen as 'Blitzing' GDR Into Union

PM2302121190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent May Podklyuchnikov dispatch: "Aiming for a 'Blitzparty'"]

[Text] FRG policy can be described as a desire to organize a political "blitzparty"—lightning actions which should result in the swallowing of the GDR. There was an especially graphic display of these tactics in connection with the trip to Bonn by a GDR delegation headed by Council of Ministers Chairman H. Modrow.

It is well known that the GDR has elaborated its own clear-cut and logical concept of unification, as outlined by Modrow. It envisages gradual and cautious actions which would serve to bring the two German states closer together stage by stage. The process of unification must be fitted within the framework of the all-European process, promoting the latter rather than running at odds with it.

In contrast, FRG strategists are banking not on gradual but on fast, lightning actions, claiming in the process that the GDR's economic situation demands such actions.

The GDR does not deny this: The republic's economic situation is really complex. Recently, two figures have cast additional light on it from different angles. One of them is the number of emigrants making their way to the West since the start of this year. It has already reached approximately 90,000. The GDR is being bled dry, and this creates serious problems also for the FRG: Where is this mass of people to be accommodated, how are jobs to be found for them, how are they to be provided with housing? The other figure shows: Output volume in the GDR is declining owing to the manpower outflow.

The process of decline could possibly be halted by slowing down the loss of manpower. In order to achieve this it is necessary to restore people's faith in their state's stability, their sense of social security, and their confidence that the economy, once it overcomes the present difficulties, will be able to move forward once more, utilizing both its own potential and help from abroad. In this context the public pinned considerable hopes on the GDR Government delegation's recent trip to Bonn.

Some people in the FRG are not only intently following the processes now under way in the neighboring German

state to the east but are also most actively interfering in them in an act of brazen transgression of GDR sovereignty. Eminent representatives of West German political parties have become daily participants in the GDR's political life: They deliver speeches in Leipzig, Halle, Schwerin—in short, wherever they deem it necessary. Their speeches do not lack either ardent sympathy for their "compatriots" who have gotten into difficulties, or assurances of a readiness to provide aid and assist stabilization.

Words, words. Deeds, on the other hand, lead to the conclusion that Bonn has something else in mind. It is applying the methods of—let us not be afraid to use this word—"blitzkrieg," the ground for which is prepared by demoralizing people, undermining their faith in their own strength, and sowing fear and panic. News reports and commentaries originating in the West abound with claims that the GDR "is falling apart," that its national economy is on the verge of "collapse"—a complete disintegration.

Yet another thesis was promoted just before the talks with Modrow: The GDR Government would supposedly find itself "totally insolvent" at any moment. But this thesis was short-lived. Experienced specialists in the West sensibly remarked that the very idea of a government's insolvency is economic nonsense. Let alone the fact that eminent West German economic figures who have recently visited the GDR also refute the claim that "its economy is falling apart." In Bonn, the interests of political "blitzkrieg" are evidently gaining the upper hand over reason.

When it comes to specific ideas which would promote the cause of bringing the GDR and the FRG closer together, including economically, Bonn has put its ace of trumps on the table—the Deutsche mark [DM], which is considered the firmest currency in the West at present. It has proposed financial and economic union to the GDR. This is a most important step along the path to the two states' unification. The problems of such a union deserve most profound and comprehensive study, consideration, and caution. But, even in this most complex matter, the FRG strategists are acting in a way to arouse suspicion: Is this not yet another instance of gambling on "blitzkrieg?"

Let us begin with the fact that the GDR learned of this proposal not from a seriously worked out West German document submitted to it but from news reports. Could this be because, as conceived by the authors of this proposal, it was meant not to be addressed to the GDR Government but primarily to confuse its ordinary citizens? That selfsame politically unskilled "Max in the Street," as the newspaper JUNGE WELT described him a few days ago. Today he is waving the West German flag at demonstrations, assuming that unification would bring a solution to all his material problems.

It became clear during the Bonn talks, however, that the FRG has no prepared document with any serious elaboration of all the currency and economic problems. Consequently, the only specific accord boils down to the creation of a joint commission of experts to study the problems of financial and economic unification.

The commission has plenty of work to do. There is a multitude of questions. On the one hand, GDR economists perceive positive aspects in a potential union. The country's domestic market will receive goods from the West, bottlenecks associated with shortages will be opened up. The problem of providing hard currency finance for private trips abroad by GDR citizens will be eliminated, and this is considered highly important here. An unusual positive aspect will be provided by the fact that GDR enterprises, finding themselves in the same economic pot with FRG enterprises, will come face to face with tough competition and will be forced to tighten their standards.

But the other side of the scales is weighed down by negative aspects. Many GDR enterprises will be unable to remain "afloat" during the forthcoming competitive struggle. Bankruptcy lies in store for them.

And what will happen to the numerous social gains of the German socialist state which are lacking in the FRG? Another complex question. It most seriously perturbs GDR citizens. The commission will have a great deal of work to do to untangle the social knots which would result from financial and economic union with the FRG. Provided, of course, that both sides approach with the utmost responsibility the problems associated with bringing the two German states closer together.

But if reliance is placed on lightning actions which take other people unawares and result in confusion and panic, there is no need for any serious study of complex questions. Other methods are used in such a case. For example, reports are already "leaking" into the press that the FRG has already printed brand new banknotes worth DM38 billion and has minted coins worth another DM3 billion. On "D-Day," which is supposedly in March, this money will be used in the GDR to replace the latter's currency at a set exchange rate. As was only to be expected, this kind of news generated a "flight from money" in the GDR—long lines outside savings banks and panic buying in the stores.

The reasons why the FRG is forcing the creation of a financial and economic union by inflating and provoking the GDR's economic difficulties are obvious. The West German newspaper TAGESSPIEGEL formulated them bluntly: "A currency, economic, legal, and social union would basically effect German unity. Even if talks on a single German state with the victorious powers and the GDR were to drag on for years."

Financial and economic union is still like two birds in the bush. But is there a bird in the hand? Just before the GDR delegation's trip to Bonn the "roundtable" worked out a mandate for Modrow. Specifically, it advocated

that the FRG should urgently give the GDR a nonrepayable "solidarity contribution" of DM10-15 billion, meant to compensate for the damage the country is suffering as a result of the opening of its border to the West. This money could be used to somewhat improve the situation and slow down the outflow of migrants, which is also of interest to the FRG. But the "round-table" suggestion was turned down at the meeting. Bonn openly declares: No aid until a free market economy has been established in the GDR. And this new market will provide an arena of attack for more than 100,000 FRG enterprises and firms which are ready and waiting.

The world is carefully watching the beginnings of the process of bringing the two German states closer together. The GDR—and this is clearly reflected in Modrow's concept—is aware that the creation of a single Germany is possible only subject to the unconditional recognition of existing borders. During his Warsaw visit a few days ago the GDR head of government reaffirmed the final nature of Poland's western borders. But anyone who expected an identical statement by the FRG in connection with the Bonn meeting was disappointed. Chancellor Kohl deferred everything until a future "all-German parliament" which would make its own decision.

The talks on the banks of the Rhine disappointed many people in the GDR. Bonn's starting positions, BERLINER ZEITUNG wrote, could be described as a demand for "fast and unconditional capitulation by the GDR."

Any steps in relations with the GDR are now taken by the West German side with one eye on the calendar: Elections to the People's Chamber are scheduled for 18 March. It is assumed that the new composition of the GDR's supreme organ of power and the government it appoints could take a stance in the context of German-German relations which would facilitate Bonn's pursuit of a political "blitzkrieg" aimed at the conquest of its German neighbor to the east.

Whether these expectations will materialize is a different question. So far it can only be said that the Bonn talks failed to produce the result expected by West German political strategists.

Pogodin Comments on President Bush-Kohl Talks

LD2602153890 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Aleksandr Pogodin looks at some results of the talks between the U.S. President George Bush and the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl:

I would like to point to two problems raised at the talks—that of the borders of future united Germany and its military and political status. On the eve of the meeting the American press speculated with reference to official sources that Chancellor Kohl would at last declare that its current European borders will remain unchanged after the unification of Germany. These expectations have failed to come true. According to the West German chancellor the issue of borders must be finally settled by the government of united Germany. This implies that Bonn does not rule out the possibility that the question of the revision of borders can be brought up. It seems to have ignored the fact that West Germany is a signatory to the Helsinki Accords and a number of treaties with East European countries. Meanwhile, all of these treaties state clearly that the postwar borders in Europe are final.

This attitude, ambiguous to put it mildly, disagrees with Chancellor Kohl's pronounced respect for the security interests of all countries and the feeling of neighboring nations.

The negotiators also said they were certain that united Germany must become a full fledged member of NATO and take part in the military structure of that alliance. Besides, the idea was voiced that U.S. troops should remain in united Germany.

By some twisted logic this is accompanied by the pronouncements of the desire for lasting stability in Europe. What stability can one talk of? United Germany's membership of NATO would inevitably and impermissibly upset the military and strategic balance between the Warsaw Treaty organisation and NATO.

There is another detail to the picture—recently it was agreed in Ottawa to hold a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, Federal Germany, and the German Democratic Republic in order to discuss the foreign aspects of German unity including the security of neighboring countries. In this context, attempts by some countries to anticipate events and to make the other participants in the forthcoming meeting face an accomplished fact look unjustified.

CSSR's Havel on Unification Issues Cited

PM2302101190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Preserving Stability"]

[Text] Ottawa, 19 Feb—President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia arrived here Sunday [18 February] on an official visit. As the local press reports, the purpose of the visit is to hold talks on the aid that Canada can give Czechoslovakia both in economic development and in the formation of democratic institutions.

Answering journalists' questions, the Czechoslovak president declared, in particular, that the unification of Germany must take place against the background of building the new Europe. Foreign Minister J. Dienstbier, who also touched on the German question, emphasized the importance of preserving stability in Europe at the same time. In this connection he criticized the stand taken by the leading party of the ruling Bonn coalition—

the Christian Democratic Union—which refuses to state clearly that the present border between the GDR and Poland will remain unchanged.

Zagladin Addresses Brussels Security Conference

LD2302230890 Moscow TASS in English 2252 GMT 23 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shashkov]

[Text] Brussels February 24 TASS—Prominent public figures and politicians from 21 European countries, the United States and Canada are attending an international meeting which opened here Friday.

The meeting, which was convened at the initiative of the International Committee on European Security and Cooperation, focuses on elaborating new concepts of ensuring security on the European Continent.

Representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the United States, and the general secretary of the North Atlantic Assembly addressed the forum's first session.

Despite divergent views on many issues, all of them pointed out that rapid changes on the "old continent" and the democratisation processes in East European countries called for a drastic revision of east-west relations and building a security system based on mutual trust rather than confrontation.

Many speakers noted that although the world's largest military alliance would evidently be preserved in the foreseeable future, the intensification of their political functions and broadening of contacts between NATO and the Warsaw Pact were assuming great importance.

Soviet representative Vadim Zagladin emphasised in his speech that the world was at the transitional stage of development. Both sides are now displaying determination finally to overcome the post-war period.

However, if we know definitely enough from what we want to depart, we have not agreed as yet on what we want to come to, he said.

The system to ensure security in Europe, which existed for many years, was based on the primacy of force, on the principle of mutual deterrence, Zagladin said.

The military factor still retains a weighty role. However, the scope and the more so the sharpness of military confrontation have diminished. The political component is taking on increased importance.

The gradual overcoming of alienation between east and west is typical of the present transitional stage in forming the new security system. The walls that had been erected for four odd decades are partially destroyed and it is not they, but cooperation that is turning into a factor of security now.

Zagladin laid down the principal criteria of a fundamentally new system, proposed by the Soviet Union. Political methods based on international law and human moral values should become the groundwork for ensuring global security under this system.

The USSR is ready to do everything for this system to turn into a reliable guarantee of a common European home. Members of parliament, governments, political, and public forces of all countries concerned should take part in working out this system.

A more detailed discussion of the issues on the forum's agenda will be held in three working groups on the themes "disarmament and security", "nuclear and conventional deterrence" and "defensive and offensive strategy." The groups will present their conclusions at the forum's final session on Sunday.

USSR Welcomes British-Argentine Agreement

LD2202142190 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—The Soviet Union welcomes a report on the resumption of Argentine-British diplomatic relations, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

In the opinion of the Soviet side, this decision and the package of agreements on bilateral cooperation open a new stage in the development of Argentine-British relations.

"The efforts of the two countries to normalise diplomatic and business contacts and to strengthen mutual confidence accord with the favourable changes that are gaining momentum in international relations," the spokesman noted.

USSR Delegation Attends Mideast Conference

LD2002094690 Moscow TASS in English 0915 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 20 TASS—A Soviet parliamentary delegation arrived in Brussels today to attend an international meeting on the Middle East.

The delegation is led by Mikhail Kapitsa, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Foreign Affairs Committee, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies and chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

"At the Brussels meeting with members of the parliamentary association for Euro-Arab cooperation we shall relay the Soviet stand on the Middle East problem our assessment of the situation in the region and possible ways to solve the Middle East Conflict," Kapitsa told TASS as he left Moscow.

"The solution of the conflict can be promoted by a dialogue between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the active participation of the Security Council, including bilateral consultations with its members," Kapitsa said.

"Convocation of an international conference on the Middle East is essential for the settlement of the conflict," Kapitsa believes. It is therefore necessary to put into play the mechanisms and the infrastructure of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and also public and non-governmental organizations," he stressed.

Minister Urges Comprehensive Accord on Drugs

LD2202093690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0306 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] United Nations, 22 Feb (TASS)—Viktor Komplektov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, has proposed elaborating a comprehensive and unified agreement on fighting the evil of drugs. This agreement, he said, would encompass measures provided for by the conventions currently in force, and would also provide for other steps in this field. It could raise to a new level international control over narcotics and psychotropics, would also regulate all aspects of cooperation in the fight against drug addiction, and would create a single mechanism of international control over narcotics.

The USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs proposed including in the final documents of the special session, as specific tasks for the short and long term, the elaboration of a multilateral system for curtailing the illegal cross-border movement of drugs. He also advocated the creation, within the framework of international programs, of effective methods of uncovering illegal narcotic plantations and their elimination by ecologically harmless means.

Among the other tasks of the international community in this area, Viktor Komplektov cited the creation within the UN system of a consultative centre for pooling and circulating experience in fighting the illegal drugs traffic, and also of a single UN information network and data bank on these matters.

Uranium Enrichment Services Exclude S. Africa

PM2202110790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 p 4

[A. Ishchenko article: "Nuclear Business"—first two paragraphs are a reader's letter]

[Text] It is rumored that the Soviet Union enriches uranium from the RSA [Republic of South Africa] and Namibia. Is this true?
[signed] D. Desyatkin, Mytishchi.

Actually, why should we not have the right to enrich uranium from the RSA and Namibia? I asked this question at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"The point is that the United Nations adopted a resolution on noncooperation with the RSA in the sphere of nuclear power engineering due to that country's apartheid policy, and our country is one of this resolution's signatories. The Soviet Union does not maintain any economic relations with the RSA. For their part, the West European partners who supply us with uranium for enrichment give us documentary assurances that this uranium has not been purchased in either the RSA or Namibia. All contracts are concluded with Euratom's participation, and nuclear material is under its control at all stages of processing."

Nonetheless, our country does enrich foreign uranium for several firms. I spoke about this with A.G. Chernov, deputy general director of "Tekhsnabeksport":

"Our organization deals mainly with the provision of services in the enrichment of uranium belonging to foreign clients for the preparation of AES [nuclear power station] fuel.

"This is a fairly complex and lengthy process, and similar production units exist only in the United States, the USSR, Britain, France, and China. The USSR receives for enrichment hexafluoride produced in Canada, Britain, and France. Thus, FRG firms carry out uranium enrichment contracts with 'Tekhsnabeksport' by delivering 'commodities' produced in these countries."

"How advantageous is this cooperation for us?"

"The Soviet Union possesses advanced technology for the enrichment of uranium hexafluoride (enhancing its uranium-235 content to a level not in excess of five percent) and the largest production capacities. Proof of this is provided by more than 10 contracts with many West European firms. This cooperation brings in large sums of foreign currency revenue. It must be noted that the provision of uranium enrichment services to foreign clients is strictly in compliance with the 'Directive for Nuclear Exports from the USSR.'

"One important detail: The waste resulting from this enrichment is returned to the client."

United States & Canada

Gorbachev Holds Phone Discussion With Bush

LD2802154790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1528 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb (TASS)—Today, within the framework of a regular exchange of opinions, a telephone conversation was held by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. An official report on this states that "certain topical international questions, including the situation in connection with the results of the recent elections in Nicaragua, and problems of European security, including its German aspect, were discussed. Questions connected with the preparation for a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting were also touched upon."

Bush Notes 'Reason,' 'Calmness'

LD0103104690 Moscow TASS in English 1017 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] San Francisco March 1 TASS—"This morning I called Mr. Gorbachev. We had a long talk on matters affecting Nicaragua and Eastern Europe," United States President George Bush said on Wednesday night.

"After the call and the rational, cordial discussion with this dynamic new Soviet leader, my mind went back to those days not so many years ago when a talk of this nature would not have been possible," Bush said.

"The mood of the day back then—confrontation, rhetorical overkill, tension bordering on hostility."

"Today's talk was so different—no polemics. Where we differed, we vowed to discuss the differences further. The point is, reason and calmness have replaced rhetoric."

"As your President, I am determined to consult often with President Gorbachev to keep open the door to negotiation and peace. These indeed are exciting times," Bush said.

Constraints on USSR-U.S. Trade Assessed

PM2802121790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Gennadiy Vasilyev "View From Moscow": "Unfulfilled Behest of a 'Founding Father'"]

[Text] News agencies have reported from Washington on the first round of trade talks between the USSR and the United States, which has just been held there. The meeting participants declared that, fulfilling the instructions of the two countries' leaders in Malta, they will seek to draw up the terms of a trade agreement in time for the next Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. The new agreement, according to C. Hills, head of the U.S. delegation, "is to clear the way for granting the USSR most-favored-nation status."

On reading this report, I recalled an interesting historical document. "It is with tremendous pleasure that I see growing commerce between our two countries... In our harbors your flag will find hospitality, freedom, and protection, while your subjects will enjoy all the privileges of a most favored nation." These words are contained in a letter from U.S. President Thomas Jefferson to the Russian Czar Alexander I. Almost two centuries have passed since then. But the promise of one of America's "founding fathers" does not hold good today. Normal trade and economic relations still do not exist between the two great countries, which cooperate successfully in many difficult spheres of international life—from disarmament to human rights.

Signs of change have appeared recently. Businessmen in the two countries are seeking new approaches and new forms of mutually advantageous exchange of commodities and technologies. One of the most noticeable manifestations of this search was the presence of a U.S. trade consortium—an association gathering beneath its wing such well-known U.S. companies as Archer-Daniels-Midland, the Chevron Overseas Company, the Eastman Kodak Company, Johnson and Johnson, and RJR Nabisco—at the recent Moscow exhibition "United States-89: Opportunities for Business Cooperation."

"The companies within our consortium," James Giffen, head of the Mercator Corporation, a private commercial bank in New York, told me, "are now conducting talks on the creation of 25 joint ventures in such spheres as the food industry, agriculture, power generation, chemicals, medicine, and woodworking. If all these projects are implemented, the capital investments could total $5-10 billion over a 15-year period."

But plans are just plans, and the present state of trade and economic cooperation between the two great powers cannot elicit joy. Incidentally, PRAVDA has written about this. But I wish to return again to the facts. The total volume of Soviet-U.S. trade is just in excess of 2 billion rubles [R]. These data provide still more grounds for dissatisfaction if you decipher them. Of the more than R2 billion of Soviet-U.S. commodity turnover, our exports account for just R0.3 billion. Imports account for R1.8 billion. Of these, R1.2 billion are grain, soybeans, and other food products. And what does the Soviet Union export to the United States? Valuable metals, primarily palladium, chemical products (ammonia and others), energy, furs, and vodka. We cannot yet boast of sales abroad of our industrial output. Belarus tractors, which have a quite limited but stable market in the United States, and the Sumy Plant's unique electron microscopes constitute an exception. And that is almost everything.

What accounts for this situation? Let us hear what such an experienced captain of the U.S. business world as A. Clausen, chairman of the board of the Bank of America, thinks. The businessman believes that the expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade and economic relations is seriously hampered by the Jackson-Vanik amendment adopted by

the U.S. Congress in 1974, which is still valid and which links questions of trade between the two countries to emigration from the USSR. Depriving the Soviet Union of most-favored-nation status in trade, this unfriendly measure results in such high duties being imposed on Soviet commodities imported into the United States that this frequently renders them uncompetitive. The second obstacle, which hinders the movement of goods in the other direction, from the United States to the USSR, is the restrictive rules of Cocom (the Coordinating Committee for Export Controls), which prohibit exports of many types of advanced equipment and technology to socialist countries.

Incidentally, as is clear from recent reports, Washington intends to persist in its discriminatory approach in this area. Commenting on the U.S. position at the recent Cocom conference in Paris, a high-ranking U.S. official declared that, as distinct from the East European countries, access to Western technology cannot be facilitated for the Soviet Union "since the USSR poses a real threat to the West." As we see, the "cold war" mentality is still making itself felt on the banks of the Potomac.

It is known that many politicians, public figures, and businessmen in the United States now advocate the temporary lifting or the total abolition of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. These include former Congressman C. Vanik, one of the authors of the sadly well-known decision. Former Senator Stevenson, the initiator of another discriminatory amendment (this decision set a limit of $300 million on state credits to the Soviet Union), also publicly advocates its elimination. Thus, it is possible to believe that on the U.S. side the doors to businesslike movement between the two countries will open slightly. But with what will we enter these doors? With what will we compensate for the goods and services coming our way?

I believe that, in recognizing the nonconvertibility of the ruble as one of the chief obstacles in the way of Soviet-U.S. trade and economic relations, it is impossible not to see also something greater—the certain "isolation" of the Soviet economy from the world market, which has taken shape in past decades, and its turning in upon itself, which has resulted both in this nonconvertibility and in the poor competitiveness of many types of Soviet output, particularly machine and technical goods and finished products in general. For long years a kind of "isolationist" stereotype predominated in our country. We artificially endeavored to cut ourselves off from the outside world. The processes of perestroyka are creating a basis not only for open foreign economic ties but also for the acceleration of our entire foreign economic activity.

Yes, the prospect of expanding Soviet-U.S. trade and economic ties does exist. The business circles of both countries have a mutual interest. It is possible to assume that in the very near future the United States will lift or abolish certain discriminatory measures adopted during the years of the "cold war" and the subsequent "frosts."

But I believe that much depends on us ourselves. Indeed, full-blooded trade and economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States will become a reality only when we succeed in our own internal affairs, in the perestroyka of the economy. This is a difficult matter, but otherwise it is not possible to count on a great deal even under the most favorable political and diplomatic conditions.

Agreement Reached on Siberia-Alaska Air Links

PM2302110190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[V. Nadein dispatch: "USSR-United States. Routes Will Be Opened Over Bering Strait"]

[Text] Washington—The Soviet Union and the United States have made a pact on cooperation in air traffic control between Alaska and Siberia. This is the first agreement of its kind between the two countries. It clears the way for regular passenger flights.

The agreement determines air corridors through the Bering Strait and methods of establishing radio communications between air traffic controllers in Anadyr and Anchorage, the largest city in Alaska.

The final phase of the agreement will determine how many Aeroflot aircraft and how many American transport aircraft will take part in the flights.

Since World War II, when this airspace was used to supply several thousands of aircraft from the United States to the Soviet-German front, only isolated flights took place here. Their commercial value was minimal.

"The talks were not complex," V. Shelkovnikov, the head of the Soviet delegation, said. In an interview with your correspondent he confirmed the opinion of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration representative on the elevated spirit of cooperation that prevailed at the meeting.

V. Shelkovnikov, who heads the air traffic organization service at the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation, stressed the long-term prospects of the decisions adopted. The links opened between Anchorage and Irkutsk, Anchorage and Khabarovsk, and Alaska and Kamchatka will lay down convenient routes from northwest America to Singapore, Malaysia, China, and Hong Kong.

V. Shelovnikov gave a high evaluation of the participation of Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, and Kamchatka local organs during the previous stages of the talks. A ridiculous situation has existed until now whereby a businessman from Seattle, for example, who wanted to discuss the possibility of opening a joint enterprise in Kamchatka, had to travel around the whole world via New York and Moscow. Understanding the advantages of the new routes, the local organs are prepared to invest resources in the development of airports.

Speaking about the future, V. Shelkovnikov expressed the conviction that Aeroflot's monopoly should soon come to an end. "Several Soviet aviation companies will operate on internal and international lines. Without healthy competition we will not be able to raise the quality of service, for which we are rightly criticized at present. The Ministry of Civil Aviation must change its functions and provide state supervision of safety standards, service, prices, and so on. It is already clear that neither the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation by itself, nor the ministry in conjunction with local soviet executive committees are in a position to 'stretch' their resources to meet all the costs needed to provide new international lines. In addition to our unions of cooperative workers and leaseholders, we must also attract foreign firms such as 'Sheraton,' 'Hilton,' and large insurance companies, on mutually beneficial conditions," he said.

"In Alaska great interest has been shown toward the lines," Frank Price, manager of the Alaskan regional aviation administration, said. "Aviation is the main form of transport in our state, just like it is in the northern part of your country. It is not just large companies that have expressed an interest in the prospects of the new lines, but also the Alaskan Pilots' Association, which brings together many thousands of owners of small private aircraft.

Report on Shevardnadze's Talks in Canada

LD1602162890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] The official visit to Canada by USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has come to an end. Vadim Fotinov, our correspondent in Canada, reports:

[Fotinov] Comrade Shevardnadze met with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Ray Hnatyshyn, the governor general or head of state, and held talks with Minister for External Affairs Joe Clark. One of the principal objectives of the Soviet minister's visit was to consolidate what was achieved in Moscow last autumn, during the visit to the Soviet Union by the Canadian prime minister. In Ottawa, a wide range of issues was discussed, including the prospects for cooperation in Arctic exploration, environmental protection, and trade. There was discussion of the need to conclude bilateral agreements in such fields as health care, humanitarian contacts, the exchange of people, and the organization of new air routes between the USSR and Canada.

Comrade Shevardnadze spoke in Canada's federal parliament to the members of the committees on international ties of the House of Commons and the Senate. Replying to a question from the senators on the prospects for opening up the sea as well as the sky for inspection, the minister said Canada could make a great contribution toward implementing that Soviet initiative. Comrade Shevardnadze stressed that the question of strategic stability is now being put on the agenda. Achievement of that must become a vital element of the dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the nineties.

I would like to make special mention of Canada's heightened interest in the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Probably more questions were asked about precisely that than about anything else. I shall add that Canada's interest in the Soviet Union is a special one. After all, every tenth Canadian originates from the East European countries or our country.

The talks that took place over the last few days between Comrade Shevardnadze and Canadian leaders are aimed at further extending and strengthening the historical ties between our countries—a requirement with a new and modern resonance.

Comparison of Shevardnadze Meeting in Canada

PM1602113990

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 16 February 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 5 a TASS report on USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevrdnadze's Ottawa meetings with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney and Secretary of State for External Affairs Clark. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, entitled "A New Quality of Relations," with the item headlined "Confers With Mulroney, Clark" published in the 16 February issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 8, reveals the following variation:

Column two, first paragraph, only sentence PRAVDA reads: ...and about the expected results of this...(substituting "expected" for "proposed").

China

Status of USSR-PRC Ties Viewed

PM2802175190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 First Edition p 5

[S. Razov article under rubric "Soviet-Chinese Relations Today: Visible Landmark"]

[Text] I will probably not be mistaken if I say that the state of relations between the USSR and the PRC is not only of concern to Soviet people but also exerts a considerable influence on the international climate on the planet as a whole. And so it was no coincidence that the results of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the PRC in May 1989 and of the meetings and talks that took place within its framework between the top leaders of the two parties and states after an interval of 30 years were perceived in the world as one of the most prominent landmarks in recent international politics.

The normalization of relations with China essentially constitutes a shift toward common sense, as well as regard for the realities of the modern world.

The time that has elapsed since those days, albeit not long, has been very full of events and enables us to look at Soviet-Chinese relations from the viewpoint of our national-state interests and the development of the situation on the planet. And here it is possible to single out some noteworthy aspects.

As a result of the summit meeting it was possible to draw a line under the negative past in bilateral relations and under the misunderstandings and deformations that had accumulated, particularly in recent decades.

"To close the past and open the future" and leaf through the pages of history that leave a bitter aftertaste, the leadership of the USSR and China had to display state wisdom and the ability to abandon deep-rooted dogmas and stereotypes and to make reasonable compromises, orienting themselves toward the fundamental long-term interests of the two countries' peoples.

Of course, it would be naive to believe that, even given the mutual political will, all the accumulated questions could be forgotten in the space of one hour and be left in the past. It is a question—having enriched ourselves with the experience of the past—of making consistent progress toward strengthening mutual understanding and trust and toward the constructive development of ties, while at the same time resolving the difficult problems inherited.

An accord has been reached that Soviet-Chinese relations must be based on the universal principles of interstate contact: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual advantage, and peaceful coexistence. Their strict fulfillment is the key to building qualitatively new, truly good-neighborly, stable, and healthy relations.

It is obvious that under the current conditions a return to a military-political alliance between the USSR and the PRC like that of the fifties is inconceivable. Being a product of a different historical epoch, it played an ambiguous role. The demands of the times would be met still less by the sixties and seventies model of Soviet-Chinese relations, which is altogether unacceptable in relations between any civilized states, still less socialist ones. Its components were dangerous military confrontation and the escalation of mutual suspicion and alienation.

It is clear today that a fundamental inadequacy of that type of relations was their excessive ideologization, sometimes bordering on the absurd. The desire to patent the invention of the only correct interpretation—faultless in any circumstances—of Marxist-Leninist teaching and to uphold one's own monopoly on the truth became farcical in a number of instances. Let us recall how in the midsixties we started criticizing China for the "dogmatization" of scientific socialism and were in turn accused of "revisionism" and "bourgeois degeneration." In the late seventies and early eighties, when China took the path of radical reforms while the Soviet Union was continuing to experience the anemia of stagnation, a kind of "ideological castling" took place, and the sides essentially swapped their mutual assessments for the opposite ones.

This experience confirms yet again the correctness of the more general conclusion on the futility and counterproductiveness of attempts to teach people how to build socialism and how to translate particular tenets of theory into the language of political practice. And, on the other hand, on the advisability of consistently de-ideologizing interstate relations and freeing them from the potential influence of nuances in views and assessments of phenomena.

There are quite a few consonant features in the current approaches of the USSR and the PRC to resolving many problems of social development, to strengthening and renewing socialism through reforms, and to endowing socialism with qualities that meet the challenge of the times. There are also perfectly natural differences in ideas and modus operandi which are dictated by considerable specific national features, traditions, way of thinking, and particular features of the political culture. However, this incontestable statement is seen not as a potential source of dispute and friction or as a precondition for more "castling" maneuvers but, on the contrary, as a boost to spiritual mutual enrichment through the committed, comradely exchange of opinions and experience. Its relevance increases many times over in light of the fact that the fate of socialism as a socioeconomic formation depends to a considerable extent on the success or failure of the transformations in the Soviet Union and China.

Normalization has created propitious conditions for progress toward mutual cuts in armed forces and toward confidence building, particularly in the regions along the border between the USSR and the PRC, the longest land border in the world. Talks on these problems are being held between the two countries' diplomatic and military experts to develop the accords achieved at the summit meetings.

It seems that the ideal here could be the eventual demilitarization of the Soviet-Chinese borders on the understanding that mutual security in the contiguous regions would be more effectively ensured not by the presence of military groupings but by the establishment of extensive cooperation among the population of the border area.

There is clearly no need to explain the significance of military detente for Soviet-Chinese relations, which for several years during the bad old days teetered on the brink of transforming a "cold" war into a "hot" war, and sometimes did, unfortunately, overstep that mark. Progress in this sphere would afford the opportunity to finally remove from the public mind the idea of each

other as potential military adversaries and release enormous resources—which are so essential at the current key stage of the two countries' development—for civil purposes.

This experience and example may also be highly valuable from the viewpoint of establishing an all-Asia talks process on problems of strengthening regional security. After all, this is essentially the first time that representatives of two Asian powers (possessing, furthermore, a mighty military potential, including nuclear weapons) have sat down at the negotiating table to discuss the mutual reduction of armed forces.

A political mechanism of collaboration, envisaging regular exchanges and contacts at various levels, is gradually taking shape and beginning to operate in a normal working regime. The reciprocal dispatch of the personal envoys of the leaders of the two countries and parties, to discuss topical questions of the renewal of socialism, bilateral relations, and the situation in the world, is becoming a regular practice. An accord has been reached on a visit to the USSR by Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council.

Ties are being established between the CPSU and the CPC, thereby closing one of the few gaps remaining in the entire complex of Soviet-Chinese relations. There has been, among other things, an exchange of visits by delegations from the two parties' central committee international departments, and further contacts are planned, including at a high level. Direct links are being established between party scientific institutions and publications.

Interparty relations built on the principles of independence and autonomy, full equality of rights, mutual respect, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs could be an extra channel for the comparison of views and the exchange of information and experience of social transformations, and of party work in the new conditions.

An impetus has been given to trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation and contacts in the sphere of culture, education, sport, and humanitarian exchanges. The task of expanding and deepening mutually beneficial ties in these spheres is increasingly at the center of bilateral relations.

Much has already been done in practice. Despite the difficult economic conditions in both countries, a record level of reciprocal trade turnover was achieved in 1989—around 2.4 billion rubles. A move into new spheres of scientific and technical ties has begun to emerge. Great significance is being given to the expected signing of a long-term program for the development of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation between the USSR and the PRC (through the year 2000). There has been tangible progress in the development of direct economic ties and border trade. Their volume in 1989 was 2.8 times higher than in 1988. More than 20,000 Chinese workers are working on USSR territory on a contractual basis.

The mutual reinforcement of and cooperation between the two countries' national economic complexes are, undoubtedly, a great opportunity to accelerate the development of regions of the Soviet Far East, Siberia, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian republics adjoining China and to join in the international division of labor in the rapidly developing Asia-Pacific region.

At the same time, the considerable potential for business cooperation is still far from fully utilized. The more active use of new and progressive forms such as the creation of mixed enterprises, joint-enterprise zones, the extensive use of direct ties (sectoral, local, and border), and joint participation in multilateral projects is becoming increasingly relevant.

The normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC is an intrinsic part of current positive trends in world development, while, at the same time, being a substantial contribution to improving the situation in Asia and in the world as a whole.

It is scarcely necessary to prove the thesis that such far-reaching steps as the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and a considerable part of our military contingent from Mongolia, the reduction of the USSR presence in Cam Ranh, the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, and, finally, the reduction of the military grouping in areas bordering on China were possible not least as a result of and in view of the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations. There were similar motives, apparently, behind the Chinese leadership's decision to reduce the PRC Armed Forces by 1 million men.

It is no secret that for decades the structure of international relations in Asia was formed (or, rather, deformed) largely under the influence of the former Soviet-Chinese confrontation. It was one reason for the regional tension and in one way or another affected foreign policy steps and decisions, explaining, in particular, the heightened accent on the military-strategic aspects of ties with third countries. Therefore the changing character of Soviet-Chinese relations, together with other factors, is a significant stimulus to the creation of a different order of things in Asia which will be based on new balances of forces and interests more favorable to the cause of peace and international security.

This order of things is still in an embryonic state and it will require a certain incubation period for it to mature and develop. But the possibility of such a course of events is reinforced by the conceptual pronouncements of the new political leadership about a new international political order and about the similar approaches by the USSR and PRC to many topical questions of international life—while remaining, of course, totally independent in their assessments and decisions.

Soviet-Chinese normalization also calls into question the notion, as old as the hills, that the improvement of relations between two states—particularly two of the caliber of the USSR and the PRC—is bound to be accompanied by encroachment on the interests of a third country.

Until recently the nature of relations between the great powers gave grounds for such arguments. For example, the mutual relations of the USSR, the United States, and China for a long time resembled a kind of "three's a crowd" situation. In the fifties, in conditions of the formation and rapid development of Soviet-Chinese relations, the United States was "superfluous." In the sixties it was China, which was at loggerheads with both "superpowers." In the seventies and early eighties the Soviet Union was "superfluous" for various reasons.

It appears that favorable opportunities now exist for building a new type of multilateral relations among the great powers, based not on "card playing" and other manipulations within the framework of geopolitical "triangles" and "polygons" but on mutual trust, openness, and an appreciation of the intrinsic value of ties with each of the partners.

This analysis alone is evidence of the importance of the normalization of our relations with China. Obviously, it is going to require purposeful and multifaceted mutual effort if they are consistently to be filled with real substance. If it is protected and tended with care, the tree of Soviet-Chinese normalization can bear substantial new fruit.

'Serious Contradictions' in Sino-U.S. Relations

OW2802134490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Dispatch by station reporter (Papoyang) from Beijing; from "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] As is known to all, U.S. President Bush visited China a year ago. At that time, XINHUA emphasized that the Bush visit to China a month after the inauguration explained the great importance attached by the U.S. military and political chief to the development of Sino-U.S. relations. Bush, discussing U.S.-Chinese relations, also admitted that they were built on a sound basis and that the two sides should further improve their relations based on the progress already achieved so as to further solidify such relations.

However, events over the past year show that U.S.-Chinese relations have not become solid, but have turned otherwise. A press briefing for Chinese and foreign reporters in Beijing a few days ago suffices to prove this point. Li Zhaoxing, spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, briefed reporters about a statement issued by the ministry. The statement said: The Chinese Government lodges a strong protest to the U.S. Government in connection with the State Department report on human rights, which has groundlessly accused China of violating human rights. Li Zhaoxing said: The Chinese Government and people are indignant of this act of breaking the basic code of conduct in international relations, regarding it as a wanton interference in China's internal affairs and violation of China's sovereignty.

Overall, Beijing has been satisfied with the development of Sino-U.S. ties. However, recent events show that there exist a number of serious contradictions in Sino-U.S. relations. In addition to the question of China's human rights, which Washington has often brought up, Taiwan poses a grave obstacle to a steady growth of Sino-U.S. relations because the United States continued to supply arms to Taipei. The United States also attempted to interfere in China's internal affairs by opposing the Chinese Government's family planning policy. Moreover, there is the U.S. Congress' stand on the Tibetan issue, which is known to all. The Chinese side is dissatisfied with certain rules of Washington's foreign trade policy, which undermine China's economic interests, and with U.S. reluctance to fulfill the promise of relaxing control over technology exportation to China.

Rogachev Receives PRC Ambassador 26 Feb

PM2802165390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, received Yu Hongliang, PRC ambassador to the USSR, at the USSR Foreign Ministry 26 February at the latter's request and had a friendly conversation with him.

Northeast Asia

Yeltsin Interviewed on Relations With Japan

PM2302151090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 6 6-12 Feb pp 20-21

[Undated interview with Supreme Soviet deputy Boris Yeltsin by Vladimir Ovsyannikov: "Boris Yeltsin: We Must Free Ourselves of the Legacy of the Past"—first nine paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Tokyo—Boris Yeltsin spent ten days visiting Japan in January this year. The Soviet MP was invited by the TV company TBS, the newspaper Mainichi, the Society for Asian Studies and the Association for Japan's Foreign Policy Problems which organized the Society of Dialogue with Yeltsin. The Soviet guest was also received by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama. Yeltsin met with Shintaro Abe, former General Secretary of the Liberal-Democratic Party, Tokako Doi, Chairman of the Socialist Party of Japan, leaders of other parties, businessmen, representatives of students. Yeltsin spoke to the public in Tokyo, Sapporo, Osaka and Hiroshima, gave a number of interviews, and appeared in TV

debates and at press conferences. The meeting with Japan's minister of construction was held in a most dynamic atmosphere—during a game of lawn tennis.

The Soviet MP justified the hopes of those in Japan who expected him to present sharp assessments and bitingly frank statements on the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic policy. The Japanese side was especially concerned with what Yeltsin would say on the territorial issue, the largest stumbling block in the Soviet-Japanese relations. Scandalous utterings of People's Deputy Yuriy Afanasyev, who visited Japan in 1989 and easily "returned" the four South Kurilie islands to it, are still fresh in the memory.

The volcanic character of the "island problem" seemed to have been taken into account. Speaking in Sapporo Boris Yeltsin stressed that his proposals reflected his own stand alone. He suggested a long-term programme consisting of five stages.

Stage 1. The Soviet Union must officially and clearly acknowledge the existence of the territorial problem in the Soviet-Japanese relations. It is necessary to start gradually forming a public opinion in the U.S.S.R., "unsealing" the problem and offering to the public all the necessary information on it starting with the time the problem first appeared, that is from the middle of the 19th century. This will take two to three years.

Stage 2. The four islands of the Kurile Chain are declared a free enterprise zone open for Japan. Japan is granted the most-favoured-partner status. Stage two covers, in Yeltsin's opinion, three to five years.

Stage 3. Demilitarization of the islands. "The islands belong to our military rather than to our state," said Yeltsin sarcastically. Stage three may take as long as five to seven years.

Stage 4. The Soviet Union and Japan sign a peace treaty. The people's deputy called on Japan to make "a half step forward," that is to drop its rigid condition that the four islands be returned before the signing of the peace treaty.

The four stages are expected to take a total of fifteen-twenty years after which the turn of the last, fifth stage will come. It will be implemented by a new generation of politicians and statesmen. "By that time great changes will have occurred in the world in the sphere of security, bilateral ties will have developed and mutual confidence strengthened," said Boris Yeltsin. "All this, coupled with shifts in the public opinion, will enable the new generation to find an original, unorthodox solution." As purely hypothetical variants of the solution Boris Yeltsin suggested joint protectorate of the Soviet Union and Japan over the islands, or declaration of their independence and a free status. Boris Yelstin also said the fifth stage could be concluded with the transfer of the islands under the Japanese Sovereignty.

To put it mildly, the Japanese Government reacted to the Yeltsin programme with caution. Leaders of political parties, including the LDP, displayed some interest. Soveitologists offered a wide range of opinions. Some of them, like Professor Nowuo Shimotomai in the TV debate with Yeltsin, considered different variants in line with the Soviet MP's proposals. Others, like Professor Hiroshi Kimura, rejected these proposals as "insufficiently radical." That's why Yeltsin's exclusive interview to NEW TIMES started with the question:

N.T. Could you tell us about your impressions from the meetings in Japan, first of all those with Premier Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama. It seemed to me that Nakayama's statement was rather tough when he resorted to the so-called "theory of entry": if the entry is open, then the Soviet-Japanese relations will develop rapidly. The "entry" means simultaneous return of the four islands. In Hokkaido, Hiroshi Kimura criticized your programme precisely from this position.

B.Ye. The Japanese reacted differently. Kaifu nearly did not respond at all. Nakayama, in my opinion, did not voice his tough stance, but refused, let's put it like this, to join in approval of our proposals. His stance was sort of neutral: the issue would have to be discussed, he said. But it seemed to me that he was simply unwilling to discuss it with me. He said that Shevardnadze is coming over in March and the problem would be considered on the govenrment level. I replied that mine was only a proposal which could help shape a public opinion. We can influence public sentiments after all. He agreed but still said he would discuss it with Shevardnadze.

As for leaders and prominent figures of political parties, first and foremost, Shintaro Ave, they all said my proposals were interesting. Tokako Doi was interested too, and, perhaps, she was even more in favour of a peace treaty which could open a way to solving other problems.

While debating on TV with me, Sovietologists Okura and Shimotomai assessed the programme very positively, but suggested, for instance, that stages two and three be interchanged, in other words, that the islands be demilitarized first and a free economic zone opened later.

N.T. You spoke of the necessity to drastically increase the volume of trade between the Soviet Union and japan from $5 billion to $50-60 billion. What opportunities do you see for such an increase, since we have nothing to pay back with to Japan which could in principle deliver anything to the U.S.S.R.? What can a bigger turnover be backed with?

B.Ye. There are several approaches to the problem. The first way is the one we are travelling now - establishment of joint ventures. However, the business is very much complicated: the Japanese are confronted by our bureaucracy and that's why they are unwilling to conclude joint venture contracts.

The second way. We must make the ruble convertible by improving our economic situation and stabilizing the exchange rate of the ruble. This will make it possible to

increase the volume of trade and to activate economic ties. The third way. We could allow Japanese firms to build residential buildings and social and cultural facilities in this country. The flats built by the Japanese would be sold to those willing to buy them for hard currency, at least at first. People in the Soviet Union have much hard currency earned abroad which they cannot spend anyway. Why don't they spend it to buy a good, comfortable flat without any restrictions, but according only to their free choice and capabilities? This could be done in various cities across the country, in Moscow and in the Far East alike. We discussed this prospect with the Japanese minister of construction. We also discussed the question of convering the city of Vladivostok and its environs to a gigantic centre of foreign tourism which we could exploit jointly. That is the Japanese invest money and get their investments back, and with a profit, in the course of exploitation. This is very attractive. The Japanese, the minister told me, will be eager to go there.

The fourth variant. Construction of "a motorway of the century," something like the Baykal-Amur Railway Line, leading to regions attractive for tourists, like Bukhara for instance. We spoke of restoring the Great Silk Route which used to cross the whole of Asia. The Japanese said they could invest in the project and build it. The project is international, and a great portion of this "motorway of the century" would go via the U.S.S.R.

We spoke to the president of Fujitsu Fanuc Ltd. at whose plants robots produce robots. He believes a similar plant could be built in the Soviet Union. The firm has immense profits, they export 40 per cent of the output and leave 60 per cent in the country. It has a highest profitability, while per capita productivity is about $50,000 a month. How could we settle our accounts? With the end product.

N.T. In your speeches here you repeatedly stressed the necessity to form a public opinion in the U.S.S.R. on the territorial problem and expressed your intention to start forming it on your return to the Soviet Union. What could you tell NEW TIMES readers in this connection? Our magazine has carried different views on the problem. Your Japanese interlocutors referred to some of our publications...

B. Ye. I see it like this. One Soviet song says that we shall never surrender an inch of our lands. But first of all it is necessary that readers could study the history of the problem and could feel the essence of it. Starting with the discovery of these islands, and the 1955 treaty up to the latest developments. All this must be studied if we are ever to understand why the Japanese are so much concerned over the problem and refuse to sign a peace treaty before the question is decided. Why our relations are not developing which could produce a favourable impact on the development of the Far East and social infrastructure there... Such relations could help solve the problems of bringing computers and the information sciences to our society, advanced electronic hardware to industry and services, that is they could help develop the branches which had generated the Japanese economic miracle.

First of all, we must study the problem in this light and then start solving it. Besides, the five-point programme we have offered here could also be presented for the readers' discussion. I believe this is the way to follow, because it could draw closer our two peoples and eliminate mutual fears and suspicion. A zone of confidence could appear in the East which is of great importance to us. We have been traditionally oriented at the West in our foreign policies. It's time we start dealing with Eastern problems in earnest.

N.T. The song you reminded us of has other words too, those about Samurai overrun by the Red Army. We could recall bitter moments of the Soviet-Japanese relations like the brutal execution of the Russian revolutionary Sergey Lazo, intervention to the Soviet Far East, military conflicts near Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin Gol river, Soviet transport ships sunk by "neutral" Japan... The question is whether we really should be raking the past.

B.Ye I was staggered by the Hiroshima Nucler memorial when I visited it. It is one thing when you know about all this nightmare from afar and quite a different matter when you go around the museum seeing all the horror of what happened to the city and the people living there. The echoes of war are still ringing in the remaining territorial disputes and in the drama of Japanese POWs held in Siberian labour camps for a decade after the end of the war and in the question of withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories occupied by them and in such psychological moments as far and suspicion the peoples feel toward each other - that is why we should free ourselves of the legacy of the past as soon as possible.

IZVESTIYA Queries South Korean Politician

SK2502041390 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] The first Soviet-Korean academic seminar on the present situation in socialist countries and the prospects for Soviet-Korean relations has been wound up in Moscow.

The seminar was attended by a noted lawmaker, representatives of big business corporations, and reporters from Korea.

In his interview with the IZVESTIYA, (?O Se-ung), director of the parliamentary and political relations research institute, said the following: First of all, economic relations should be established between the Soviet Union and Korea. The Korean side is interested in establishing official diplomatic relations as soon as possible and in achieving reconciliation between our two states.

Trade and economic cooperation has been carried out not on a governmental level, but at the initiative of companies and corporations.

In the interview, (?O Se-ung) stated that a new (?conception) of political thought is the only correct way for the Soviet Union and all mankind. At the same time, the policy of perestroyka has had no effect on relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea.

According to the opinion of the Korean side, continuous military cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea does not reflect a new way of thought.

Korea never wants to see relations between Moscow and Pyongyang aggravated. The best thing is to live on the principle of international [word indistinct] and reasonable compromise.

Referring to the prospects for trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Korea, (?O Se-ung) expressed his conviction that in general, the vista for economic relations is very bright.

There are two basic obstacles. One is a legal obstacle which Korean businessmen face when they visit Moscow. It is caused by the lack of official diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Korea. The other obstacle is that there is no possibility for them to carry convertible currency out of the Soviet Union. The second obstacle can be partly tided over, because some Korean corporations are interested in purchasing products in the Soviet Union.

However, many big businessmen refrain from investing more than $600,000 in the Soviet Union. Every businessman is very cautious.

Should political and legal problems be solved, trade and economic cooperation will be expanded.

In conclusion, (?O Se-ung) expressed his hope that the Korean parliamentary and political relations research institute will play an active role in establishing mutual relations between the Korean and the Soviet parliaments.

According to him, many influential politicians also want this. Among them is Kim Yong-sam, a cochairman of the Democratic Liberal Party, who is scheduled to visit the Soviet Union in March.

Correction to Gerasimov Northern Islands Speech

OW2602004390

The item headlined "Gerasimov Speech on Northern Islands Reported" published in the 26 February issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pages 23-24, paragraph three, sentence three should read: ...withdraw two fighter squadrons and [words indistinct]...(rewording).

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shevardnadze, Indonesia's Atalas Exchange Tidings

PM0902111790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On the Occasion of a Significant Date"]

[Text] In connection with the 3 February 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Indonesia the two countries' foreign ministers exchanged congratulatory telegrams.

In the past 40 years, E.A. Shevardnadze's telegram notes, thanks to the efforts of both sides Soviet-Indonesian relations have progressed along a long and fruitful path. Their advance serves the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Indonesian peoples and coincides with the core tendencies of the modern peace processes. The official visit to the USSR last year by the head of the Indonesian Government, the Soviet-Indonesian high-level talks, and the signing of the statement on the fundamentals of friendly relations and cooperation raised Soviet-Indonesian relations to a qualitatively new level characterized by deepening mutual understanding and trust and enhanced, mutually advantageous ties in various spheres.

Confidence was expressed on the Soviet side that constructive cooperation between the USSR and Indonesia will continue to develop to the benefit of the Soviet and Indonesian peoples and for the good of peace, security, and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as a whole.

A. Alatas' telegram says that in the period which has elapsed relations between the two countries and governments have invariably been characterized by lasting friendship and mutually advantageous cooperation on the basis of the principles of mutual understanding and mutual respect. President Suharto's visit to the Soviet Union in September last year was a new landmark in the history of bilateral relations. The statement on the principles of friendly relations and cooperation signed by the two heads of state laid down the basic principles on which the two countries intend to set new parameters for relations between them, and also for cooperation in international forums.

The conviction is expressed that a dynamic new period of development of bilateral relations is opening up for Indonesia and the USSR in the forthcoming years and decades.

Upcoming U.S.-Singapore Base Talks Previewed

BK2602061190 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1500 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Aleksandr Vadim commentary]

[Text] As reported from Washington, the United States and Singapore will begin talks in early March on deployment of U.S. warplanes in the island republic.

According to the U.S. secretary of defense and his assistant, who is in charge of Asian security, Singapore is considered an ideal location for the U.S. Air Force, which will assume control of the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, news on the coming talks is not surprising.

Singapore's decision on the matter was already announced last year. People have also heard dissatisfied reactions from Singapore's ASEAN partners. The emergence of new Pentagon facilities in Southeast Asia is considered a contradiction to the positive trend prevailing in the international situation. This opinion is voiced by many wise politicians in this region.

What is surprising is the arguments presented by U.S. senior military leaders to justify the expansion of the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia. While admitting that the Soviet Union has already reduced its military force in Mongolia and along the Sino-Soviet border and withdrawn a large part of its warplanes from the Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Admiral Richard Solomon made the following remarks: Even though the Soviet Union has reduced its ships and warplanes, it continues to modernize its armament system with more sophisticated weapons. U.S. military leaders believe that this represents an increased Soviet threat in the Far East.

Such remarks made by people well-versed in military matters are indeed amazing. These people pretend not to know that a soldier who has stopped maintaining his equipment for a certain period of time will not be able to function properly. No, the Pentagon knows this fact well and the modernization of the U.S. armed forces is now going ahead at all levels, including its space warfare.

We believe things are happening differently. Recently the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States on strategic weapons and the foreign military presence in Europe has been reduced sharply. We feel there is an increasingly better international climate in general. Faced with a new situation, the U.S. legislative branch has also started some serious thinking on ways to save the federal budget by cutting Department of Defense expenditures. The Pentagon also has to accept this trend, but in fact, through its unique style.

Moscow Comments on Indochinese Ministers' Meeting

BK1502092590 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Station observer Oleg Alekseyev commentary]

[Text] A few days ago, a meeting was held among deputy foreign ministers of the three Indochinese countries—Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. Our observer Oleg Alekseyev comments on the outcome of this meeting.

The Phnom Penh conference discussed the Cambodian issue. In my view, there is no need to explain why this issue is the objective of the Indochinese countries' special attention. Following the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, opposing Cambodian groups became very active against Phnom Penh government troops. Cambodia is being ravaged by a civil war. No task is more pressing than to end the bloodshed and divert the Cambodian issue onto a path for a peaceful political solution.

People expect that on 26 February another informal meeting will be convened in Jakarta among Cambodian parties with the participation of concerned states. A basis already exists for finding a solution acceptable to each side: the contribution recently made by Australian Foreign Minister Evans. This contribution, which has already received wide international support, envisages the establishment in Cambodia of a UN administration whose main responsibilities will be the organization and supervision of general elections.

What is the stance of the Indochinese countries on this issue? In their joint statement on the outcome of the Phnom Penh conference, it is stressed that the organization of free and democratic elections in Cambodia is the most important task, which should be the focus of the Cambodian sides and all concerned countries. The Indochinese states expressed their agreement with Evans' proposal allowing the United Nations to play a key role in solving the issue. As already stated in the joint statement, the Indochinese countries also realize the necessity to discuss at the meeting in Jakarta the issue of Cambodia's permanent neutrality and the establishment of a zone of peace, neutrality, and cooperation in Southeast Asia, to be guaranteed by the Paris international conference on Cambodia and the United Nations.

There is another major aspect of the joint statement to which I would like to draw the listeners' attention. Cambodia's UN seat, as everyone knows, is still occupied by the Cambodian opposition group—by the Khmer Rouge group to be precise. In the Indochinese countries' view, this situation is contrary to existing norms. Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and Vientiane demand that during the transitional period, until a new government is established in Phnom Penh in accordance with the result of the general elections, Cambodia's UN seat should be left vacant. It is this kind of proposal that was also put forward by Australian Foreign Minister Evans. The joint statement issued in Phnom Penh by the conference of the Indochinese countries concluded that every UN activity relating to the Cambodian issue should be on the basis of full and unconditional respect for the State of Cambodia's sovereignty and independence.

Rogachev Holds Meeting With Indochinese Envoys

PM2802111990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On the same day [21 February] a meeting took place between I.A. Rogachev and SRV Ambassador Nguyen Manh Kam, Laos Ambassador K. Phanvongsa, and Leng Peng Long, Cambodian charge d'affaires ad interim.

There was a discussion of several questions connected with the forthcoming international forums on a Cambodian settlement.

Rogachev Receives New Zealand Ambassador

PM2602164990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev has received J. McArthur, New Zealand ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request and had talks with him on the subject of the situation in the Asia and Pacific region and on some questions of Soviet-New Zealand relations.

New Ambassador to Papua New Guinea Appointed

LD2102060590 Moscow TASS in English 1659 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has appointed Yevgeniy Rogov Soviet ambassador to Papua New Guinea.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet relieved Yevgeniy Samoteykin, Soviet ambassador to Australia, from the duties of ambassador to Papua New Guinea.

Rogov was born in 1931 and has been on diplomatic service since 1955. He occupied a number of executive posts in the apparatus of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and abroad. From 1980 to 1986 he was minister plenipotentiary—counsellor in the Soviet Embassy in Australia. At present he is deputy head of the Department for South-East Asian and Pacific Countries of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Fishing, Other Accords With Australia Signed

LD1502095990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0554 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Canberra, 15 Feb (TASS special correspondent)—Within the framework of the official visit of N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the signing of agreements between the governments of the two countries took place today in the Australian parliament.

Agreements on cooperation in the sphere of fishing, the protection and improvement of the environment, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in the humanitarian sphere, and also agreements on the delivery of agricultural and raw goods from Australia to the USSR, on contacts between people, and a consular treaty were signed.

An accord was reached on the first joint issue of a series of stamps dedicated to research in Antartica. The relevant documents were signed.

The agreements were signed on the Soviet side by S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister, and on the Australian side, by G. Evans, minister for foreign affairs and trade; J. Kerin, minister for agriculture and energy; and R. Willis, minister for transport and communications.

N.I. Ryzhkov and R. Hawke, prime minister of Australia, were present at the signing ceremony.

Near East & South Asia

'Growing Strife' Seen in Afghan Opposition

LD2802152390 Moscow TASS in English 1446 GMT 28 Feb 90

[by TASS correspondent Nikolay Semerenko]

[Text] Islamabad February 28 TASS—According to information received from Peshawar, there is growing strife among different factions of the Pakistan-based Afghan armed opposition. The process seems to be irreversible.

Addresing a 50,000-strong meeting of Afghan refugees in Hayatabad (the north-western border province of Pakistan). Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA), strongly criticised the so-called Afghan provisional government, set up by the Alliance of Seven last February in Rawalpindi. He demanded its immediate dissolution. According to Hekmatyar, this "government" exists only on paper and is closely guarded by Pakistan police, even though it is based in Peshawar.

The meeting passed a resolution stressing that the provisional government has not fulfilled any of its promises during the twelve months of its existence and, therefore, has no right to represent the Afghan people. It is still in Pakistan, despite its promise to move into Afghan territory within a month after its formation.

The "government" did not get a vote of confidence from the Shura within the first six months of its existence. Since no elections to that body were held, the government arbitrarily prolonged its six-month term until the middle of this year.

"A government based on an alliance of six parties is unlawful and must resign, because it does not represent the interests of all the Afghan nation," the resolution

stresses. The document says the provisional government's formula for holding the elections to a representative consultative council (Shura) was unacceptable for the IPA. At the same time, the resolution calls for "armed struggle against the Kabul regime until full victory is achieved".

Hekmatyar, who was foreign minister in the provisional government, resigned it in mid-1989 and now his faction is independent of the Alliance of Seven. The alliance's disintegration is also bron out by the fact that Hekmatyar and other rebel leaders lately refer only to a government of six parties, thereby accentuating IPA's separate role in the Afghan resistance.

Belousov Visits Afghanistan, Meets Najibullah

LD2702221690 Moscow TASS in English 2040 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Kabul, February 27 TASS—A Soviet delegation arrived in the Afghan capital today. It is headed by Igor Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR council of Ministers and chairman of the Soviet part of the permanent inter-governmental Soviet-Afghan Commission for Economic Cooperation.

On the same day Belousov was received by Afghansitan's President Najibullah.

The head of the Afghan state summed up the situation in the country after the Soviet troop withdrawal.

He said that throughout the year that Afghanistan has been upholding its independence, the state power was consolidating, and its prestige in the international arena and confidence shown it by broad sections of the Afghan society were increasing.

The head of the Soviet delegation told the president about the developments in the Soviet Union, the processes taking place in the Soviet Communist Party and the state, and the activity of the Soviet leadership for economic restructuring to suit the needs of Soviet society.

There was an exchange of opinions about Soviet-Afghan relations at the present stage. It was noted that they should be placed on a new and more effective basis.

The Soviet delegation had negotiations with Chairman of the Executive Committee of Afghanistan's Council of Ministers Sultan 'Ali Keshtmand and had a conversation with Defence Minister Shahnawaz Tanai.

Belousov placed a wreath at the monument to Soviet-Afghan comradeship-in-arms.

Bogachev Comments on Afghan Peace Settlement

LD2802165190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] The foreign mass media are continuing a lively discusison of the new prospects for a peace settlement in Afghanistan, which have opened up following the meeting between Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and James Baker in Moscow. Some observers express the view that, just as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan promoted the stabilization of the situation in the country, an immediate and total end to foreign military supplies to the Afghan Government and opposition would sharply accelerate the process of a peace settlement there. Here is what TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev, who has recently returned from Kabul, thinks about this:

[Bogachev] I agree, of course, with the conclusion that the fewer weapons there are in Afghanistan, the higher will be the chances of stopping the bloodshed in this long-suffering country. But if arms supplies to Afghanistan are immediately stopped only by the Soviet Union and the United States, the military balance that has taken shape between the opposing sides could be upset, and events there could take on an unpredictable nature.

The point is that the government of the republic has only one source of military aid, the USSR. But the mujahidin receive military aid from several other countries, apart from the United States. In the event of, say, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia refusing to join a Soviet-U.S. agreement, the irreconcilable opposition would be able unilaterally to increase its military potential and achieve total supremacy. For this reason the first condition of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on ending military supplies must be the inclusion therein of Pakistan and certain other countries. Moreover, it is essential to elaborate an effective system of monitoring compliance with the agreement. This acquires particular significance in light of the fact that Pakistan, for example, has unceremoniously violated the Geneva agreements it signed in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Government has declared its readiness to accept a Soviet-U.S. agreement on ending military supplies to Afghanistan, expressing hope, however, that this accord will be based on an integral approach. This approach provides, among other things, for a ceasefire in Afghanistan, and for the withdrawal of arms stored by both sides from the country's territory.

We have already spoken of the inclusion in the agreement of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and, perhaps, other countries. It seems to me that an end to military supplies to Afghanistan must be implemented by stages. First of all, say, a ban is introduced on the import of missiles and aircraft, then on artillery systems and ammunitions, and so on. This will enable experience to be accumulated in monitoring compliance with the agreement, and if need be amendments to be introduced into the adopted verification procedures. A balanced reduction, and then also a complete end to military supplies to Afghanistan, together with other measures implemented inside and outside the country, will undoubtedly play an important role in resolving the problems of the country's national reconciliation. Our southern neighbor Afghanistan will finally gain its long-awaited peace.

Pakistani Official Cited on USSR Relations

LD2602122590 Moscow TASS in English 1140 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Text] Islamabad February 26 TASS—"The Soviet Union is our great northern neighbour and we wish to maintain the most cordial and mutually advantageous relations with it," first deputy foreign minister of Pakistan Tanwir Ahmad Khan said in a TASS interview.

"We have a fine and long history of ethnic and cultural relations. There is a good economic basis for consolidating our cooperation. I am very optimistic about the prospects of further Pakistani-Soviet relations. The construction with Soviet assistance of a metallurgical plant in Karachi is a vivid example of such mutually advantageous bilateral cooperation."

"The concepts of peace and stability, advanced by the Soviet leadership headed by President Gorbachev," Tanwir Ahmad Khan stressed "have ushered in a genuinely new era in international relations. The Soviet Union has initiated new political thinking—a creative and realistic approach to the solution of domestic and world problems that makes possible a lasting peace. [no closing quotation marks as received]

"The Afghan problem continues to hold back the development of Pakistani-Soviet relations. But new broad prospects will open up between our two countries once it is settled, and we hope this will happen in the very near future," Tanwir Ahmad Khan said. "Although the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan brought nearer a political solution of the Afghan issue, the conflict in that country is unfortuntely continuing. [no closing quotation marks as received]

"Pakistan and the Soviet Union can continue their cooperation in the spirit of the Geneva agreement in order to find ways to settle politically the Afghan problem. We believe that ideas, coming from different sides, will finally allow them to elaborate a settlement plan acceptable to all."

Turning to the problem of Soviet servicemen captured in Afghanistan, Tanwir Ahmad Khan said Pakistan had rendered and would go on rendering the Soviet Union assistance in this matter. At the same time, he stressed that Soviet POWs were held by the armed Afghan opposition, which, in turn, is interested in the release of captured rebels and is therefore striving to solve the problem on a reciprocal basis.

Lukyanov Receives Pakistani Parliamentary Group

LD2802190390 Moscow TASS in English 1757 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—Mutual interest in expanding Soviet-Pakistani relations in various areas, including contacts between representative bodies of the two countries, was expressed when a Pakistani parliamentary delegation was received by First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov today. The Pakistani delegation is headed by Speaker of the National Assembly Malik Meraj Khalid. The Pakistani members of parliament are staying in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

When questions related to the Afghan settlement were discussed, Lukyanov noted that a ceasefire between the warring sides and the establishment of a broad inter-Afghan dialogue with the participation of all political forces is the only possible way to settle the conflict in Afghanistan.

Khalid agreed that the Afghan problem, just as other regional problems, should be resolved by peaceful means.

Pakistan's assistance in the effort to secure the release and return of Soviet servicemen taken prisoner in Afghanistan was also discussed. Khalid said that the Pakistani side is doing everything possible to resolve this issue.

Israeli Delegation Reaffirms Friendly Ties

PM2202153390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Exchange of Opinions"]

[Text] A delegation of the Communist Party of Israel [CPI], comprising T. Tubi, deputy general secretary of the CPI Central Committee; U. Burnstein, member of the CPI Central Committee Politburo; S. Dzhubran [name as transliterated], candidate member of the CPI Central Committee Politburo; and L. Zakhavi [name as transliterated], member of the CPI Central Committee, was in the Soviet Union. A conversation took place in the CPSU Central Committee International Department. The Israeli comrades were briefed on the course of perestroyka and the results of the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) plenum. The importance of real steps toward a just settlement of the conflict in the region, on the basis of a balance of all sides' interests, was emphasized during an exchange of opinions on the situation in the Near East. The participants in the conversation condemned the Israeli authorities' cruel repressions in the occupied territories and their unlawful actions to settle immigrants, including people who have left the USSR, on Palestinian lands. The mutual desire to further develop friendly ties between the CPSU and the CPI was reaffirmed.

Foreign Minister Meets With Libyan Officials

LD2102223190 Tripoli JANA in English 1838 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, An Nawar [February] 21, JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY—The secretary of the People's Committee for Oil met in Moscow this evening the foreign minister of the Soviet Union.

In this meeting, which was attended by the secretary of the Libyan Arab People's Bureau in Moscow and the ambassador of the Soviet Union to Great Jamahiriyah. They discussed the Libyan Arab-Soviet relations and the aspects of existing cooperation between the two countries in various fields.

Visiting Libyan Oil Official Interviewed

LD2302210190 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Interview with Fawzi al-Shakshuki, Libyan secretary for petroleum affairs and head of Libyan economic delegation visiting Moscow, by Moscow radio correspondent Sergey Yevgenyev; place, date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Yevgenyev] First of all, minister, I am glad to greet you here in Moscow, in the USSR. Is it possible for you to talk to Radio Moscow's listeners in the Arab world about the purpose of your visit, about your meetings in Moscow and some of the results?

[Al-Shakshuki] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. First of all, I thank Radio Moscow, and I thank you in person for this opportunity to talk to Radio Moscow. As is known, I came with a large delegation from the various sectors in the Jamahiriyah to discuss the development of cooperation between the two friendly countries. This cooperation has undergone great changes since the eruption of the Great 1 September Revolution and had developed in the interests of the two friendly peoples. We always discuss with out friends on every suitable occasion the widening of this cooperation in the various fields. Today I had talks with the Soviet oil minister to discuss cooperation in the oil field and its expansion to broader fields, beginning with exploration, to production and exportation, and also cooperation in the international oil market.

[Yevgenyev] What is your opinion on the setting up of joint Soviet-Libyan oil ventures?

[Al-Shakshuki] We welcome any participation from our Soviet friends in the oil field or other fields which facilitate our economic, scientific, and technical development.

[Yevgenyev] Thank you, very much.

USSR Involvement in Egypt in Sixties Examined

LD2502232190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television in Russian at 1530 GMT on 25 February in its "Seven Days" program presented by Eduard Sagaleyev carries an 8-minute video report of Soviet involvement in the Egypt-Israel conflicts.

Using archive film, correspondent Yevgeniy Kiselev tells of the Unknown War fought by a limited contingent of Soviet servicemen and military advisers in Egypt at the end of the 1960s and start of the 1970s, to protect the Aswan Dam against Israel. The events in the Middle East were reported by Soviet television, but no mention was ever made of direct Soviet involvement in the fighting. Egypt lost virtually all its aircraft and hundreds of tanks in the Six Day War: "The rebuilding of the Egyptian Army proceeded thanks to huge deliveries of Soviet weapons and hardware, and to the help of our military advisers." But continued Israeli action hastened a new phase in the Soviet military presence in the Middle East. As retired Lieutenant General G.U. Dolnikov—until recently deputy commander in chief of the USSR's Air Force—recalls, the decision was taken to send a Soviet Air Force group to Egypt in total secrecy. Nobody—wives, children, commanders—should know where it was being sent. General Dolnikov was appointed commander of the Soviet group, and he arrived in Cairo on 3 March 1970. A month later, two regiments of fighter pilots were on duty. Their task, as Dolnikov recalls, was to protect Cairo and Alexandria from bombing raids. Very soon the outside world became aware of the Soviet troops—pilots and air defense troops—and it is said the Israelis even knew the names of all the pilots. At any rate they knew Dolnikov.

The Armed Forces Museum in Moscow contains the photograph and personal belongings of Lieutenant Colonel Popov, commander of a rocket division which, on 3 August 1970, shot down five Israeli Phantoms. For this he became "Hero of the Soviet Union," but the museum has not been allowed to display information about the action: Where, when or how. The work to declassify all such information is only beginning.

As Dolnikov recalls, the Soviet pilots in Egypt could only engage in battle with the personal permission of the Soviet defense minister, and then only over Egyptian territory to minimize the chances of a pilot being shot down and captured. On one occasion, however, Grechko ordered a real battle involving Soviet pilots. The upshot of the episode was that three Soviet pilots were shot down and two of them killed.

Kiselev concludes: "Why have we recalled this today? Merely to recount an unknown and only recently declassified episode in the history of our army? Of course not! Only recently the Second Congress of People's Deputies took the decision to condemn the involvement of troops in Afghanistan as a politically erroneous decision. But where do the roots of this mistake lie? In posing this question, we in no way want to besmirch our army or our servicemen, who have courageously fulfilled their orders thousands of kilometers away from home. We are not talking about the army. Nor do we intend to offer a political assessment of the military assistance which we rendered in the past to Egypt or any other country. All we want to do is state the obvious: Over the decades, our leadership has got in a huddle and, without any hint of glasnost, taken the secret decision not just once, and not just twice, to employ our armed forces far beyond the state's borders. Sometimes, as in the case of Egypt, this was, to all intents and purposes, a secret operation involving what really was a limited contingent of our

troops. But sometimes... [Kiselev pauses] just remember Hungary 1956; 1962 and the Caribbean crisis; 1968 and Czechoslovakia. The habit of using force in foreign policy was formed. And that road led to Afghanistan."

Kiselev's concluding remarks are accompanied by video showing scenes of devastation in Hungary; a ranting Castro; people hurling insults at tanks in Czechoslovakia; and Soviet soldiers disembarking from a helicopter.

Interior Ministry Delegation Visits Egypt

LD2602142890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0853 GMT 826 Feb 90

[Text] Cairo, 26 Feb (TASS)—A USSR Internal Affairs Ministry delegation led by V.V. Maksimov, deputy internal affairs minister, was in Cairo from 18 to 25 February at the invitation of Muhammad 'Abd a-Halim Musa, minister of the interior of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

During the visit, the Soviet delegation acquainted itself with the work of the Egyptian services for maintaining public order and also held talks with the leadership of the Egyptian Interior Ministry on arranging regular contacts and developing relations between the ministries.

East Europe

Shevardnadze Welcomes GDR Unification Initiative

LD2802180190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1717 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of foreign affairs, today received Gerd Koenig, GDR ambassador to the USSR. The official report on the meeting says that "the ambassador handed over a memorandum from the GDR Foreign Ministry on the inclusion of the unification [obyedineniye] of the two German states in the pan-European process.

E.A. Shevardnadze welcomed the GDR Foreign Ministry's initiative, which serves broad international discussion of the German question in connection with the establishment of a six-sided negotiating mechanism under the accord reached by the foreign ministers of the four powers and the GDR and the FRG in Ottawa. Evaluating the contents of the memorandum which was presented, after he had acquainted himself with it, E.A. Shevardnadze commented positively on the principles contained in it of the stage-by-stage nature of German unification and of its synchronization with the pan-European process and the establishment of new European security structures. That coincides fully with the Soviet position.

The initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR, the minister continued, is very well-timed. It reflects the understanding of the need for energetic efforts aimed at a reliable international legal settlement of the external aspects of the construction of German unity which meets the interests of peace and security in Europe. The task of the 'six', and subsequently of the CSCE summit, cannot come down to the simple adoption, 'rubber-stamping' of everything that may be put forward as a result of the preliminary agreement of two, three, or four participants of this group. The Soviet Union takes a most serious attitude to the rights and responsibilities of the four powers in German affairs, to the need to guarantee within the framework of a German peace settlement the legitimate interests both of Germany's neighbors, and of all other states in Europe and beyond its boundaries.

Yakovlev Holds Meeting With GDR's Boehme

LD2802192890 Moscow TASS in English 1845 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—Topical matters concerning international development, primarily on the European Continent, and prospects for relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany were discussed today during a meeting between Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo member and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, and Ibrahim Boehme, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (GDR).

The two officials emphasised the importance of Soviet-East German relations, which have been taking shape for decades, for further development of cooperation.

The Social Democrats in the GDR regard with understanding the Soviet Union's position on these matters, Boehme said.

Commentary Views Boehme Visit

LD2802202590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Excerpts] At the recent congress of the GDR Social Democratic Party, where Boehme became its chairman, Willi Brandt, who was leader of the [West] German Social Democratic party [SPD] for many years, was elected honorary chairman of the party. There has already been talk about a merger between the Social Democratic parties of the two German states, but even if this may be seen as rather moving ahead of the development of events I would say that close contacts and spiritual closeness between them are obvious.

We have solid relations with the German Social Democratic Party which have passed the test of time. A solid construction has arisen on the foundation which was, first and foremost, laid from the West German side by Willi Brandt, and it is on the strength of this that I see

Ibrahim Boehme's arrival in Moscow as a perfectly logical development of the CPSU's foreign political course.

I believe that heed has been taken of the fact that the GDR SDP has in a short period of time become a very notable force on the political stage of the German Democratic Repubic. [passage omitted]

The SDP's policy and its program directives sound very authoritative, and we naturally have no grounds for departing from our exchange of opinions, especially on those problems which touch upon our basic interests. By this I mean the German problem and the international aspects of the unification of the two German states.

There has already been in-depth discussion on these subjects in Moscow with Hans Modrow, chairman of the GDR Government, and with Gregor Gysi, chairman of the Party for Democratic Socialism. Now, talks are being held with Ibrahim Boehme and I would not be at all surprised if an exchange of opinions is also held with other GDR political figures. After all, political pluralism in the GDR has become a reality, and one cannot help but take realities into consideration. When they are ignored, and wishful thinking is employed, politics enter a blind alley. This is true of both foreign and domestic policy, and, alas, we have found this out from our own bitter experience.

The new political thinking, which is at the basis of the Soviet Union's foreign-political activity, is notable first and foremost for the fact that it proceeds from an acceptance of realities. And although this gives rise to a reaction which is far from elementary political culture among some of our fellow citizens, even those who occupy high posts, there is no other sensible way.

GDR's Modrow States Position on Reunification

PM2202174090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 6, 6-12 Feb 90 p 3

[Untitled article by GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow under the rubric "Highlight of the Week"]

[Text] The maintenance and further promotion of ties between the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union is of prime importance to us. It is not only a matter of security, but also an immense volume of economic cooperation. Our relationship goes beyond the bounds of bilateral cooperation. It is very important for European stability and peace.

During my talk with Mikhail Gorbachev much attention was given to the situation in Central Europe and relations between the two German states. We hope that the development of events would not lead to an upsurge of nationalism capable of arousing serious apprehensions in the neighbouring countries. We also stressed our mutual responsibility for the maintenance of peace, stability, and the development of a European process. It is this process which ensures a purposeful rapprochement between two Germanys, filled with a sense of responsibility and within the bounds of a contractual community.

Reunification of the German states, which belong to different military and political alliances, is a question of the European process in its entirety. I assess the rapprochement and reunification and the G.D.R.'s role in the building of a common European home on the basis of the approach worked out by our government last November. We have taken a serious approach to the question of our common fatherland. The concept of a contractual community envisages a gradual rapprochement between the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. on a confederative basis. It is only the first and most responsible stage. After that we can think about other stages determined by the character of relations within a confederation.

Berlin Rally Urges Caution on Unification

PM2802160990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Berlin Rally"]

[Text] Berlin, 27 Feb—Those who are calling for the immediate unification of Germany must realize that Germany must become a demilitarized, progressive, and democratic country. This statement was made by G. Gysi, chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism, at a rally in Berlin. More than 50,000 of the capital's inhabitants assembled in Lustgarten Square to oppose the dismantling of social gains in the republic.

The rally participants expressed their anxiety at the development of events. Their demand was that the opinion of GDR citizens should be heeded. Speakers talked about the need to consider what kind of future their children can expect, and they stressed the need to preserve the GDR people's social gains. Tens of thousands of people applauded Gysi's call for resolute opposition to any intentions to annex the GDR, which would destroy citizens' legal, political, and social rights.

The rally participants stressed the urgent need to preserve GDR sovereignty, prevent the country from being automatically absorbed by the FRG, and oppose the acceleration of currency reform. The social achievements attained through the labor of several generations of GDR citizens must be preserved; no one has the right to jeopardize citizens' democratic freedoms.

PDS Assessed Ahead of Its First Congress

PM2702151990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by V. Lapskiy and B. Rodionov: "New Goals, New Methods. PDS Congress Opens in Berlin"]

[Text] Someone who has not been following the development of events in the GDR recently would probably

think that it is a question of a new party convening its first congress. Such parties have now appeared in the republic like mushrooms after rain. This both is and is not the case. The PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] acquired this name only recently, for it was until recently called the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] and was the ruling party. However, it has been totally restructured and renewed since its extraordinary congress in December.

Without absolving itself of responsibility for the mistakes of the past, the party has firmly decided to travel a new path and to use new methods to try to achieve its goals. A thoroughly reworked program and statutes will be adopted at this congress. This congress—and this is why it is the first and not the 12th or 13th—will begin a new era in the history of the PDS, a modern socialist party.

Will the PDS make it its aim, as before, to build a particular social system in the country? No, it has rejected this. Its program, whose draft has been discussed over the past 10 days, proposes areas of development and defines the party's political and social tasks.

Today NEUES DEUTSCHLAND published replies by PDS Chairman G. Gysi to questions from the newspaper's correspondent. One question was this: "The PDS speaks chiefly of the need to preserve existing values and everything good that has been achieved. Is the PDS a conservative party, and does it foster fear of the future in people in order to secure their votes in the elections?" No, Gysi said, we are not a conservative party in the sense that we want to hinder progress. Precisely the reverse, we advocate a more radical democratization of social relations and also economic relations. Our party can only be called conservative in the sense that we are struggling, for example, against the destruction of the social security network, the perversion of the GDR's history, and the distortion of its citizens' achievements.

We would also like to cite an appeal by the PDS Central Electoral Bureau. It states: "We are embarking on a critical reworking of our own history. This is an admission of our guilt, an apology to the people for the mistakes made, and a turn toward truth, tolerance, democracy, and competence. The former SED leadership has been expelled from the party. The PDS has rid itself of everything connected with the monopoly on power. It has resolutely broken with Stalinism and with the spirit, structure, and methods of the party's old bureaucratic apparatus. It is being renewed from below: It is a question of new forms of primary party organizations, new young members, and the election to leading posts of people with knowledge and with democratic political culture. We are capable of learning—human warmth in contacts with each other instead of a 'master-servant' relationship. We favor the culture of political argument with dissidents, as well as among like-minded people. The PDS has advanced fresh ideas on European policy, economic policy, environmental conservation, municipal policy, youth questions, the women's movement, and scientific policy. We are marching to the future with a new political function—constructive opposition."

To give it its due, the PDS takes a sober view of things: Although it remains the largest party in the GDR, it is not counting on victory in the March elections. And its calculations are confirmed by a recently conducted public opinion poll: It was preferred by 12 percent of those polled. The party, as G. Gysi announced recently, has 700,000 members (last October there were 2.3 million). The party's membership has fallen sharply, the PDS chairman said, if only because it has renounced the monopoly on power. You no longer absolutely have to be a member of it in order to hold a post. On the contrary, it is difficult to join the party or to remain a member of it today, because you have to be an idealist and believe in an idea—today it is precisely the PDS that is being subjected to the greatest attacks from all sides.

The PDS Congress is opening under very complex political conditions. We are convinced that not only the party's friends but also its opponents will follow its work attentively. A great deal has to be decided during these days.

IZVESTIYA Reports on First PDS Congress

PM2702123590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[V. Lapskiy and B. Rodionov report under the rubric "Panorama of International Events": "Change of Direction, Style, and Priority. IZVESTIYA Special Correspondents Report From First Congress of Party of Democratic Socialism"]

[Text] One of us happened to report on the work of a Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] congress at the beginning of the 1980's. And here we are today at the First Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] Congress. The contrast is, of course, striking. Then, there was an "areopagus of immortals" in the presidium (Honecker, Stoph, Suslov, and others), a report lasting many hours which had been checked out on all floors of the Central Committee building and which was replete with pompous declarations, and a group of chanting young people wearing the blue uniforms of the Union of Free German Youth. Now there are no external effects, no distinguishing line between the hall and the presidium, and the emphasis is on a rather dry style and laconism in everything. The only exception was that at the very beginning, Wolfgang Pohl, who opened the congress, announced that it was the birthday that day of one of the congress participants and went down into the hall to present her with a bouquet of flowers to applause from the delegates.

At the first session the congress delegates ratified the new PDS program and statutes. Democratic socialism is defined in the program as the entry into "a peace-loving, solid society of freely developing individuals who have

equal access to economic, political, spiritual, and cultural life." This is not something closed, it is not a social system that "we will soon have, but a constant task and challenge," the program says. It is proclaimed that the PDS is not a class party, it is open to all forces of the people who desire a society of social justice and solid human relations.

As we can see, the PDS has broken with the dogmas that were characteristic of the SED, which called itself the party of the working class but was in reality hostile to the republic's working people. The new program says that the party is particularly sensitive to the interests of the working people, but adds: It does not intend to be the vanguard of a class or a social stratum. In other words, the PDS intends to take its place among the other political parties and movements in the GDR and to fight alongside them at the upcoming parliamentary elections for its policy aims and ideals.

Naturally, particular interest was provoked by the section of the program which deals with the GDR's economy—how the PDS sees the future of the economy. The party will aim for the creation of a market economy with a clearly defined social and ecological emphasis, which will be intended to stimulate productive labor and economic initiative in any form. How should this be understood?

People must work diligently and efficiently, our German interlocutors, PDS members, answer. To work and at the same time to enjoy proprietary rights in a cooperative, for instance—whether in the city or the countryside. In a trade workshop. But you can also become an owner by working in a national enterprise as long as its collective wishes to own property. We were told: We do not believe that the failed administrative-economic system has only one alternative—the pursuit of capitalist profits. In the opinion of our interlocutors, "a third way" is quite possible—healthy competition, competition among the state enterprise, the cooperative, and the private or mixed enterprise. Why ever not? In this way, many working people will be able to become free owners. And the more free owners there are, the more reliable the social protection of society as a whole. The party supports a multiplicity of forms of ownership.

This naturally also applies to agriculture. The program declares that the PDS is against revising the results of the land reform and against speculation in land.

The foreign policy section of the program stresses that the PDS' aim is a demilitarized Europe in all its national, social, cultural, and regional diversity. If we do not want to destroy stability on the continent, the program says, the prospects for peaceful cooperation, and the interests of European and non-European peoples and states, as well as the national interests of Germans in both German states, then the resolution of the German question must take place within the framework of the all-European process. The PDS supports the fusion of the two German states, whose citizens are bound by many ties within the context of the historically formed nation. But it is opposed to declaring the GDR to be West Germany.

In the afternoon G. Gysi, chairman of the party, delivered the report "The PDS Election Program Prior to the Elections to the Volkskammer and the Party's Tasks in the Election Campaign." A debate ensued.

SPD's Leipzig Election Congress Examined

PM2802151790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under the rubric "GDR Before the Elections": "In the Quest for Partners"]

[Text] Two of the many political events in the GDR last weekend attracted the most attention. The Social Democratic Party [SPD] and Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] preelection congresses in Leipzig and Berlin. Both parties' main task is to elaborate their programs once and for all and elect the main candidates who will take the parties to the elections.

It is by no means level pegging for the SPD (GDR) and the PDS. There are approximately 100,000 people in all in the Social Democrats' ranks, but they are nevertheless considered the favorites among all the parties and movements operating in the GDR. This was also borne out by the results of a recent public opinion poll of the republic's citizens. Almost 53 percent of those who will go to the polls 18 March intend to give their vote to the SPD (GDR). At the same time the PDS, which is the largest party pro forma, numbering, according to Gregor Gysi's figures, between 650,000 and 750,000 members, can, as this poll showed, only count on 12 percent of the vote, allowing the Christian Democrats, who have 1 percent more on the popularity scale, into second place.

Such a powerful expression of public support would seem to be a cause for celebration at the SPD (GDR) Congress in Leipzig; however, it seemed to me that people were trying not to mention it in the "Agra" exhibition complex hall where it was being staged. Maybe so as not to tempt fate on the eve of the elections; and maybe the Social Democrats themselves have a more modest opinion of their chances. At any rate, a week before the delegates came to Leipzig a statement by Ibrahim Boehme, leader of the SPD (GDR), to the effect that the party is prepared to set up a broad coalition with other democratic parties and movements in the GDR did not go unremarked. This statement voiced doubt that the Social Democrats will succeed in sustaining the pace of the election race to the end and reach the finishing line 18 March way ahead of the others. Incidentally, some congress delegates have already confirmed this hunch during conversations in Leipzig. The party, they said, is working actively to seek potential partners. Only the extreme left and the extreme right, along with the PDS, are ruled out.

It must be acknowledged that the SPD made quite a respectable showing at the congress in Leipzig. In the opinion of Hans-Ulrich Klose, former mayor of Hamburg, now treasurer of the SPD (FRG), who is attentively following the development of social democracy in the GDR, the party has taken a large qualitative step forward over the last two months. He noted that it has acquired a finished structure, has determined its positions on important questions, and now has prestigious figures at its disposal.

In the hall of the "Agra" exhibition complex it was sometimes hard to realize which party congress you were attending. Hans-Ulrich Klose was only one member of the large SPD assault force which landed in Leipzig at this time, headed by Brandt, Vogel, and Lafontaine. Willy Brandt became the honorary chairman of the SPD (GDR) here.

What is the party taking to the elections and what does it promise the GDR population? While by and large advocating an "ecologically oriented social democracy" and a market economy, the GDR's Social Democrats enshrined in their election program that "only in conjunction with our neighbors and allies (in the anti-Hitler coalition—author's note) will a federal German state with a democratic constitution emerge in accordance with European antifascist traditions." The allies' rights with regard to Germany as a single whole and Berlin must be replaced by a peace treaty which will at the same time be "the foundation stone in the edifice of a peaceful European order" that acknowledges the inviolability of Poland's western border.

The currency union is still one of the main domestic policy issues around which the SPD (GDR) election struggle revolves. The party is afraid, I was told in Leipzig, that the FRG Government and the federal chancellor may venture to introduce the West German mark into the GDR before 18 March, which would result in the GDR's being swallowed up. For its part, nor would the SPD (GDR) want to delay resolving the currency union issue. Boehme designated this July, but it must not be a question of anschluss but of the reunification of two sovereign states.

Genscher Censures Aide's NATO, GDR Remarks

PM2002103390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Minister Condemns Minister"]

[Text] Bonn, 18 Feb—FRG Foreign Minister H.D. Genscher condemned the views of Defense Minister G. Stoltenberg, who, at a press conference in Bonn, had again advocated a future single German state's membership of NATO and asserted that "the defense guarantees of the Western alliance must extend to the whole of Germany and not just to the Federal Republic."

In order to realize this idea, the head of the West German military department proposed that, in the event of the formation of a single German state, troops be stationed on what is currently GDR territory—but they would not, however, come under NATO command.

In this connection, in an interview with the Westdeutsche Rundfunk radio station Genscher stated, inter alia: The defense minister's proposal in fact signifies extending the sphere of activity of the North Atlantic alliance to GDR territory, while the Western countries are—according to him—"unanimous in the opinion that the NATO zone must not move eastward if Germany unites." In Genscher's opinion, the security of people on GDR territory must be guaranteed by agreements between East and West; the expansion of NATO "is not necessary and is not on the agenda."

The foreign minister stated that Stoltenberg's statements are his personal opinion and do not reflect the government's position, which has not yet been elaborated.

Commander Cited on Troop Withdrawal From CSSR

PM2802162190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Dispatch by own correspondent L. Kornilov: "CSSR: Soviet Troops Leave for Home"]

[Text] Prague—The first trains and truck convoys carrying subunits of the Soviet tank division stationed in North Moravia Kray set off on the journey home on Monday, 26 February.

On the eve of this event around 150 journalists arrived at the Milovice military garrison (40 kilometers from Prague), where the Central Group of Soviet Forces command and staff are situated.

At the location of a guards tank regiment, its 36-year-old commander, Lieutenant Colonel N.V. Tsvetkov, found time to show equipment, the barracks, and the mess hall and give energetic and cheerful answers to dozens of questions:

"Will the regiment be maintained after departure or will it be disbanded?"

"It will be maintained."

This decorated regiment has a glorious history. It was formed in Gorkiy in 1941 and underwent its baptism of fire near Moscow in October of that same year. It ended the war in the environs of Berlin. It has been named Idritskiy after the place of one of its victories.

"With what kind of feeling will you be leaving?"

"One of satisfaction."

Speaking to journalists, Colonel General E.A. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces, reported that 73,500 men, 1,260 tanks, 2,505 combat vehicles, 1,218 artillery pieces with a barrel diameter over 100 millimeters, 77 combat aircraft, 146 helicopters, other equipment and armaments, and various property are

currently stationed in 64 garrisons on Czechoslovak territory. The cost of military facilities built since 1968 to the present day by the Soviet side is equivalent to 237.9 million rubles [R] and by the Czechoslovak side R255 million. However, these figures will be further refined.

The first stage of troop withdrawal will be completed by 31 May, a substantial part of the Central Group of Forces, above all tanks and aviation and missile units, will leave for home; military camps in 12 population centers will be completely vacated; 4,000 apartments (including 2,000 built at the Soviet Union's expense) and 13 hostels with more than 1,000 places will be handed over to local organs of power and the Czechoslovak People's Army.

The second stage will extend to the end of the year, and the third stage will be completed in 1991.

Responding to rumors current here that the "Central Group of Forces has been living at Czechoslovakia's expense," E.A. Vorobyev said:

"I assure you that this is not so. Of the 17,600 apartments occupied 7,700 were built by the Soviet Union and the rest are leased. There are 9 square meters of floor space per person, so no one is spoiled. Every year the USSR pays 25 million korunas to lease military premises, 19 million for municipal services, 1.5 million for housing, and 2.5 million goes to compensate for various kinds of damage.

"As commander," Colonel general E.A. Vorobyev said, "I am doing my utmost to ensure that our troops' agreed departure schedules are thoroughly observed."

...On the same day a group of Soviet journalists was courteously received in Prague by CSSR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier.

"We in no way wish to create the impression that we are pressing or exerting pressure," the minister said. A result through mutual accord, not a result at any cost, is needed."

Asked about the objective of President Havel's visit to Moscow, which begins Monday, Jiri Dienstbier, who is part of the Czechoslovak delegation, said:

"I will be very brief, our main objective is to restore the friendly relations which we used to have and to overcome the barriers of the past."

CSSR State Security Service Restructured

PM2002151790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "CSSR State Security Apparatus Reorganized"]

[Text] A totally new structure has been created for the CSSR Ministry of the Interior's state security apparatus, CTK [CZECKOSLOVAK NEWS AGENCY] has reported, citing I. Prusa, first deputy minister of internal affairs. Describing the former state security system as senseless, he announced that such state security subunits as directorates, kraj and district investigation administrations, and the special-purpose department have now been eliminated,. There are plans to reorganize the Visas and Registration of Foreigners Administration. Personnel from the relevant subunits have been transferred to the reserve and the question of their future service will be resolved in the course of further checks.

As for the new structure of the Ministry of the Interior state security service, Prusa pointed out that the Ministry of the Interior investigation service will take over its tasks. The Ministry of the Interior's Protection of the Constitution and Democracy Administration will combat foreign intelligence services on Czechoslovak territory and international terrorism and expose anticonstitutional activity directed against the integrity of the state.

Husak Reportedly Expelled From Ranks of CPCZ

PM2302085190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent dispatch: "Expelled from the Party"]

[Excerpts] Prague—A CPCZ Central Committee plenum met in session in Prague a few days ago. L. Adamec, chairman of the CPCZ Central Committee, presented the principal speech. [passage omitted]

The plenum discussed the conclusions of the commission to assess political responsibility for the development of the crisis in the party and society. [passage omitted]

The degree of G. Husak's political responsibility was examined in particular. It is well known, the plenum decision stresses, that he made a large contribution to the national liberation struggle and the construction of the bases of socialist society. In the 1950's he was the victim of illegal trials and was imprisoned. As first secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, he tried to block severe recriminations against those who participated in the elaboration of policies in 1968-1969. However, he later let intraparty democracy be suppressed. Instead, attitudes and methods of work spread that led to a growth in the unlimited power of a group of functionaries, the alienation of the CPCZ from society, and inability to solve acute sociopolitical problems. The extent of his blame for the current profound crisis in the party and society is considerable. That is why, despite his undoubted merits, on account of his general responsibility for political development, particularly in the last 10 years, the plenum expelled him from the ranks of the CPCZ.

CSSR Political Opinion Poll Results Detailed

PM2802163190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Czechoslovakia: Citizens' Opinions"]

[Text] Prague, 26 Feb—In an opinion poll conducted here, 60 percent of those questioned considered President Havel the country's most trustworthy politician. A long way behind Havel came M. Calfa, premier of the CSSR Government (eight percent), A. Dubcek (chairman of the Federal Assembly (seven percent), and V. Komarek, first deputy premier of the government, and L. Adamec, chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (five percent each). These figures are given by the CTK news agency, citing the latest public opinion poll held in the CSSR this month.

The poll's findings show that 17 percent of citizens are "moderately optimistic" about Czechoslovakia's future in the next 6 months and 13 percent have "absolutely no misgivings" about it. Some 26 percent are "quite gloomy" about the next 6 months while 4 percent see the future as "completely bad."

People's hopes, the agency claims, are pinned primarily on the political movements "Civic Forum" and "Public Against Violence." Some 71 percent opted for them. The second most popular party is the "greens." The present federal government is supported by 85 percent of those polled. The agency did not give figures on the popularity of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

There has also been a poll on the population's views on private ownership. Some 24 percent voted for a return to the private ownership of industrial enterprises and 17 percent favored the private ownership of agro-industrial enterprises. According to the results of the study, over 20 percent of those questioned, mainly inhabitants of small population centers, would like to work in private enterprise.

CSSR Representative Details Trade Protocol

LD2102202490 Prague CTK in English 1740 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow Feb 21 (CTK correspondent)—In 1990, the volume of Czechoslovak-Soviet trade exchange will reach, according to the protocol on exchange of goods and services for 1990, 10,280 million roubles, which is roughly by 1,000 million more than in 1989, head of the Czechoslovak commercial representation to Moscow Jan Machaj said at a press conference here today.

Czechoslovak exports to the Soviet Union should reach 5,314 million roubles and Czechoslovak imports from the USSR 4,966 million roubles, Jan Machaj stated, adding that by mid-February, contracts for 81 per cent of the Czechoslovak exports to the USSR and 87 per cent of the Czechoslovak imports from the Soviet Union that have been set by the protocol had been signed. According to the protocol, the Soviet Union is to deliver 16,6 million tonnes of oil to Czechoslovakia this year, Jan Machaj said.

Bulgaria's Lukanov Messages Gratitude to USSR

PM2202125590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Message of thanks from Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, to USSR Council of Ministers]

[Text] To the USSR Council of Ministers

Esteemed comrades,

Accept my gratitude and thanks for your sincere congratulations and wishes on my election as chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers.

I perceive with satisfaction and wholly share the interest you expressed in continuing to fruitfully develop comprehensive Bulgarian-Soviet cooperation and collaboration in the interests of our peoples, peace, and progress throughout the world.

In fulfilling its national tasks, our government will be loyal to its alliance commitments to the USSR and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, which guarantees Bulgaria's national security and territorial integrity.

[Signed] Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers

BCP's Lilov Cables Gorbachev With Thanks

PM2002160190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[BCP Chairman Lilov thanks Gorbachev for congratulations; undated]

[Text] To CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

Esteemed Comrade Gorbachev!

I cordially thank you for your congratulations on my election as chairman of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Supreme Council.

I accept your congratulations as particularly valuable support at such a difficult and crucial time for the BCP, when it is embarking on the path of radical perestroyka and its transformation into a modern Marxist party of a new type. The BCP has mapped out and is implementing a course of peaceful transition to democratic socialism, a humane, rule-of-law state, and a civilized civilian society in Bulgaria.

I will take this opportunity of expressing the BCP's firm resolve to consistently work in the new conditions to develop and strengthen fraternal friendship and collaboration between our parties and countries.

I sincerely wish you, esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich, good health and success in further implementing perestroyka in the Soviet Union, being of historic significance for socialism, for peace, and for disarmament and security in today's world.

[Signed] Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the BCP Supreme Party Council Presidium

Bulgaria's Mladenov Confers With State Leaders

PM2302102190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Kapralov dispatch: "Meeting With Party Leaders"]

[Text] Sofia—P. Mladenov, chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, has begun consultations with the leaders of the main political parties and social forces in the country. The talks are centering on the political and economic situation, ways out of that situation, and further democratic transformations.

The meetings and talks with the chairman of the State Council, without superseding the "roundtable talks," will act as a parallel dialogue. The first people with whom the head of state talked were A. Lilov, chairman of the Bulgarian Communist Party Higher Party Council Presidium; and A. Dimitrov, secretary of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BNAU].

After the meeting Lilov said in an interview with RABOTNICHESKO DELO that such gatherings could accelerate the democratization process begun after 10 November. Of course, a short way has been traveled, but it has been characterized by an unprecedented political upsurge. We must ensure the peaceful development of democratization processes, Lilov continued. A different version would be a tragedy for the people. We must not lose our way—there could even be clashes if things reached the point where relations between parties and political forces were exacerbated or if the situation got out of control. We still have a long and hard road to travel toward a truly humane and democratic socialist society and rule-of-law power, Lilov noted.

Welcoming the initiative to hold consultations as important and timely, BNAU Secretary A. Dimitrov stressed that the main thing today is to rally all political forces around the "roundtable" in a search for a way out of the position.

During the talks with Mladenov, Dimitrov devoted particular attention to the state of the Bulgarian countryside.

In this connection I would also like to mention the recently adopted Bulgarian Council of Ministers resolution on providing incentives for individual and private initiative in agriculture. The resolution notes that private farmers should be provided with conditions of equal status with other forms of ownership. They will be rented land with no restriction on size, along with installations, animals, and so forth, and will be entitled to bequeath them to their heirs. For a payment in leva private farms will receive fertilizer, small machines, and agricultural equipment bought with foreign currency. A special bank is being set up to issue appropriately guaranteed loans for terms of up to 10 years at an interest rate of 2.5 percent. It is also planned to provide foreign-currency loans.

PRAVDA on Bulgarian Interparty Consultations

PM0103090190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent L. Zhmyrev dispatch under the rubric "From the Scene of Events": "Chairman in the Role of Mediator"]

[Text] Sofia—The past week in Bulgaria's political life was marked by the initiative of P. Mladenov, chairman of the Bulgarian State Council. I am referring to his proposal to hold political consultations with the leaders of both "traditional" and opposition political forces.

Incidentally, according to the findings of a sociological study held in February, Petur Mladenov currently tops the list of political figures in the country in whom people have most confidence.

The three-day consultations with the chairman of the State Council were attended on the one side by leaders of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party], the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], the DKMS [Dimitrov Communist Youth Union], independent (syndicalist) trade unions, the Fatherland Front, and the Democratic Women's Union; and on the opposition side by leaders of the Union of Democratic Forces, the "Nikola Petkov" BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], and the Social Democratic Party.

What was the reason for the initiative taken by the chairman of the State Council? After several months of rapid democratic transformations, a stalemate set in in February. The "roundtable" where the BCP held talks with the opposition ran into an impasse. The implementation of the anticrisis program put forward by the new government ground to a halt. In this situation P. Mladenov assumed the initiative. Topics of discussion during the consultations included: the political and economic situation in the country; ways of resolving problems; and methods of participation by various parties and movements in the process of democratic transformations.

Already the first consultation between the chairman of the State Council and A. Lilov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme BCP Party Council, showed to many people that the Communists are by no means as "pig-headed" as some people are trying to portray them. The times are now such, A. Lilov stated, that it is necessary to place national interests above party interests. The leader of the Bulgarian Communists expressed himself in favor of the earliest possible resumption of the work of the "roundtable." As for the opposition's

demands that party organizations be disbanded at places of work, the Communists take a broader view of this problem: Production enterprises must under no circumstances be turned into an arena of political struggle.

The BCP favors the enhancement of the role of the "roundtable" and its transformation into a permanently functioning general political forum for the joint discussion of key questions concerning the political and socioeconomic sphere. The party is seeking to achieve national accord and create safeguards for a peaceful transition to a democratic political system by nonviolent, bloodless, and civilized methods.

The Supreme Party Council has voted for holding free elections to the National Assembly in June, rather than May as planned originally. In order to avoid all kind of speculation around the election campaign, it has been decided to invite representatives of the parliaments of the USSR, the United States, and other countries and also the Council of Europe and the European Parliament to Bulgaria as guests.

The Communist chairman of the State Council also had to listen to criticism leveled at the BCP. In the course of the consultations, Zh. Zhelev, the opposition leader, claimed that the BCP is to blame for the impasse at the "roundtable." In his opinion, the official authorities intend to hold up the solution of key questions in order to deprive the opposition of the possibility of discussing in advance the draft laws which are to be passed, including amendments to the constitution, and legislation on political parties, ownership, the disbanding of workplace party organizations, and others.

In this dispute the chairman of the State Council assumed the role of a mediator. In calm, good-natured discussions subtle differences of approach and ways of achieving a possible consensus were sought.

On the whole the consultations revealed that there are quite a few uniting factors in the different political blocs and that possibly there is more that unites them than disunites them. The sides agreed in the assessment that the alarming political and economic situation in the country calls for an acceleration of the implementation of the anticrisis program put forward by the government. What is needed is a peaceful and lawful transition to a democratic society, but at a faster pace than up to now.

The most significant difference which came to light during the consultations was the timing of the elections to the National Assembly. The chairman of the State Council, the BCP, the BZNS, and the DKSM insisted that the elections be held at the end of May. While the opposition forces, pleading unreadiness for the election campaign, proposed that the elections be postponed until the end of the year.

After the consultations P. Mladenov made a statement in which he described these meetings as unprecedented in the political life of the country. The idea of holding the consultations, he added, arose in the search for various forms of dialogue with a view to bringing the positions of the various sociopolitical forces closer together.

Moscow TV Interviews Bulgarian Oppositionist

LD2802141590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2125 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] We are getting used to having a respectful regard for the existence of influential non-communist forces in the countries of Eastern Europe. In the past, we hastened to stigmatize the Czechoslovak Charter 77; today its founder, Vaclav Havel, is the country's president. We used words of vile abuse against Polish Solidarity, and today its representatives are heading the government. For many years we considered that Bulgaria's sociopolitical life coincided with our own in many respects. So as not to make fresh mistakes, let's strive to obtain information at first hand. One may agree or not, but let's try and understand.

[Begin recording] [L. Parfenov, correspondent, interviewing man captioned as Zhelyu Zhelev, chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces of Bulgaria] Zhelyu Zhelav, chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces, is 55 years old. He is a doctor of philosophy. Because of his activities under Zhivkov, he was arrested, sacked from his work and exiled from Sofia. This is the first interview the leader of the Bulgarian opposition has given to Soviet Television.

[Zhelev in Bulgarian with superimposed Russian translation] The Union of Democratic Forces is now made up of a total of 13 independent public organizations, with a national structure, and five political parties.

[Parfenov] These are very diverse parties and diverse political movements. What unites them in one union?

[Zhelev] A common democratic platform, the aim of which is to bring the country out of the state of totalitarianism and turn it into a democratic system. This involves first and foremost the necessity of disbanding the primary party organizations in the workplace. For it is precisely these organizations that are the fibers, the cells of the totalitarian system. The party organizations create a sort of political apartheid right at the grass roots, in the labor collective, an apartheid that divides the population into two groups; the privileged party members decide the destiny of the majority, the non-party people.

[Parfenov] You are in opposition to the communist party, and yet I was astonished to read in a newspaper interview you gave: "I regard myself as a Marxist".

[Zhelev] All of us begin our own personal political evolution from some point. I was a member of the communist party. In 1965 I was expelled. I once believed in these ideals, and then myself came up against their falsity, and I repudiated them. What has remained within me ever since is my conviction that historical materialism can be effective for scientific analysis,

including for explanation of present-day processes in our country. Scientific materialism in general magnificently explains the necessity and the inevitability of the collapse of our communist system, insofar as there are contradictions in Marx himself: on the one hand communist utopia and on the other hand, science. The utopia was to disintegrate, and it did so, collapsing before our very eyes. What was left was historical materialism, which explains this collapse of utopia. This is why I regard myself as a Marxist. [end recording]

I shall add to this that Zhelyu Zhelev is currently the leader of the opposition forces in Bulgaria. Today's telegram from Sofia says that the Bulgarian Communist Party is prepared to withdraw its primary party organizations from enterprises.

Opposition Destroys Communist Daily in Bulgaria

PM2202154590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Newspaper Battles"]

[Text] A picture which does not evoke the most happy associations could be seen Tuesday in Slaveykov Square in the center of Sofia.

In the middle of a crowd comprising several dozen people there was a table, and on it a pile of fresh issues of the newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO. Next to it there was a cardboard box for money. The crowd watched with interest as two girls diligently tore up the unread newspapers. A group of young people were loudly appealing to the people assembled: "Buy and tear up today's issue of the Communist newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO." "Help the Union of Democratic Forces and the newspaper DEMOKRATIYA." "RABOTNICHESKO DELO for recycling!" Unfortunately, the writer of a letter sent to the editorial office of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] organ notes, there were many people who wanted to take part in this action...

The Union of Democratic Forces [UDF] is an association of opposition groups and organizations recently formed in Bulgaria. DEMOKRATIYA is the UDF newspaper, which has just appeared. It has a print run of 70,000 and is in great demand. The print run of RABOTNICHESKO DELO is tens times higher. And, according to BTA, the aim of the action by DEMOKRATIYA's supporters is to get paper in short supply by handing in "waste paper" received in this way for recycling. It should be said that DEMOKRATIYA itself disagreed with the means of "expressing sympathy" described.

Commenting on events in Slaveykov Square, RABOTNICHESKO DELO notes that there are also other examples of a disrespectful attitude to printed output.

Bulgarian Central Authority Chided Over Turks

PM2802142990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report under the general heading heading "In the East European Countries: Preelection Struggle": "Bulgaria"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Unless the Bulgarian State Council and Council of Ministers take measures to restore the constitutional rights to work, housing, the freedom to choose a name, freedom of conscience and belief—rights which have been violated—there is the danger that interethnic hostility will become worse in the country. This was stated by the Committee for National Reconciliation in an open letter to P. Mladenov, chairman of the Bulgarian State Council.

The letter stressed that the Bulgarian Government's decision of 14 December 1989 on limiting the aftereffects of the campaign to evict the Turkish minority from the country is not being put into practice. In many regions, local authorities are preventing the solution of the property and labor problems of Bulgarian citizens who have left or intend to leave for Turkey. The conflict situation created by the erroneous ethnic policy is deepening. It is noted that the central authorities, afraid of losing prestige on the eve of the elections, have placed the development of events under the control of local organs. This is the reason for the passivity of the government, which has still not created the commission it promised to remove tension in connection with the ethnic strife.

The letter stresses that "in the prevailing situation the inaction of the central organs of power may lead the country to the brink of a new catastrophe and a recurrence of international isolation." To prevent that the Bulgarian National Assembly must urgently adopt a truly democratic law on the names of non-Bulgarian citizens of the People's Republic, which would restore to "people what was criminally taken away from them."

Levin Comments on Changes in East Europe

LD2402175290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Foreign policy commentator Viktor Levin commentary, from the "Point of View" program]

[Text] The processes taking place in Eastern Europe, turbulent processes brimming with emotional outburts, and sometimes worse, raise a very large number of questions. And one of them is in what direction events there are developing and what this portends for the Soviet Union's national security. We have got used to regarding these countries as our loyal friends and reliable allies. We are united by the Warsaw Pact military and political organization. And now processes appear to be taking place that are destroying our fraternity and our ideological unity, of which we talk so much.

Of course, there is food for thought and argument here. But let us first deal with the essence of these events. A collapse of socialism in its Stalinist interpretation has occurred in the European socialist countries. This is the demise of the command-administrative system. And inasmuch as—to speak frankly and honestly—this system was actively introduced by the Soviet Union, the excesses which take the form of certain anti-Soviet actions should not, in my view, be considered in isolation from this phenomenon. Today we are already openly admitting that the despatch of troops to Czechoslovakia in 1968 was quite unjustified. We also admit that in imposing order in Hungary in 1956 we were also stifling a desire to find a national identity. And regrettably actions like this—far from solitary actions—did absolutely nothing to strengthen friendly sentiments toward the Soviet Union on the part of the peoples of these countries.

Yes, in the slogans everything appeared to be fine. Slogans saying "With the Soviet Union forever more" were displayed throughout Czechoslovakia. In the GDR you could meet the slogan "Learn from the Soviet Union—learn to triumph" at every street corner. I must admit that after 1985 these slogans for some reason began to disappear and to be gradually diluted, and by last summer you couldn't see a single such slogan in the GDR.

Here we encounter a different phenomenon—the rejection of our restructuring on the part of the former leaders of the GDR, rejection of the desire to transform socialism and to restructure it along genuinely scientific lines free of Stalinist distortions.

If we speak today of changes in the socialist countries, it has to be said frankly that these changes were the product of not just internal causes, but also of the restructuring processes within the Soviet Union. In commencing our restructuring, in commencing to take socialism out of the impasse of Stalinist deformations, we gave an example that was warmly received by the public in the Eastern European countries. Our restructuring provided a spur for the transformation of socialism. It created very important conditions for the implementation of democratic changes in the countries of Eastern Europe. And to be more specific, one of the most important conditions is our recognition of the principle that every people has the right to determine its own destiny and recognition of these countries' full sovereignty. We have discarded the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of the limited sovereignty of the socialist countries, which was essentially the doctrine we used to arrogate to ourselves the right to interfere in the affairs of the other countries. Our new policy has given a spur to healthy processes.

And that is not just an attempt to put a brave face on things. There is no doubt that our national interests, our historical and even day-to-day interests, are served by neighboring states being stable and prosperous. We can only gain from that. If the peoples of those countries are on their knees, those states can be neither stable nor prosperous.

Admittedly, one can sometimes hear remarks to the effect that we are losing those countries, we are losing a buffer zone which we managed to establish after World War II at the cost of the blood spilt by our soldiers on that soil.

As far as talk of a buffer zone is concerned, it is in the same category as the theory of limited sovereignty, and in my view it is shameful even to talk about it. The blood spilt by our soldiers is another matter. I recently read a letter from a woman who wrote: Why did we shed our blood on the fields of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia? We should have stopped on our border and we would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Emotionally, this sounds like an impressive argument, but if you think about it, if we had stopped on the border we would have allowed the Hitlerite aggressors to amass fresh forces and begin fighting all over again. We were not just liberating Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Our task was to destroy German fascism, destroy it in its very lair. This task was accomplished, and whether a soldier died near the Klyazma or near Prague does not alter the fact that he died for his country, for the Soviet Union. And it is also inexcusable to forget that victory was achieved through the common efforts of the whole of the anti-Hitler coalition, and Czechoslovak and Polish servicemen—who fought, as the Poles used to say then, for your freedom and ours—lie on our soil.

It is asked: what is now taking place in the Warsaw Pact Organization? In fact, nothing is taking place. Admittedly, in Czechoslovakia and Hungary the issue of our pulling out our troops has been raised. And we have found common ground on this and we are coming to an agreement.

Please note, by the way, that at exactly the same time, but not in connection with these processes, U.S. President Bush is proposing to the Soviet Union that the Soviet and U.S. troops in Central Europe should be reduced to the level of 195,000. If you argue according to the stereotypes of the recent past, the Americans should have been sitting pretty, gleeful that the Russians are pulling the troops out Czechoslovakia and Hungary, that they've nowhere to go, while we Americans are staying, and the balance of forces is going more our way as a result. That is the logic by which we lived for many, many years, the logic of confrontation and military stand-off. And suddenly we are withdrawing our troops because that is what the peoples of Czechoslovakia and Hungary want, and we have no objections, we respect their wishes. And the Americans are proposing to reduce their own troops in parallel. Think about it. It reflects the new elements in the present-day international situation. It testifies once again to the fact that the changes taking place in Eastern Europe are not failing to leave their mark on Western Europe and on NATO. We are cutting our troops unilaterally. I have in mind the Soviet

Union's decision, dictated by a desire eloquently to confirm our defensive doctrine and to bring out troop strengths into line with this defensive doctrine.

But these processses are, in some degree or other, not just quantitatively but also qualitatively, giving rise to a commensurate reaction in the West. The Americans, as I said, are proposing to reduce their troops in parallel with ours. The Belgians are saying, we shall gradually begin to pull our troops out of the FRG. The Netherlanders are talking of the same thing. And even in the West German Bundeswehr the issue of reducing troop strengths is already entering a practical footing.

Of course, it is an unpleasant and unseemly thing to see slogans saying "Ivan Go Home!" during demonstrations on Wenceslas Sqaure. But let's be honest about this and remind ourselves once again when and why our troops ended up in Czechoslovakia. Having rendered genuine internationalist aid to the peoples of Czechoslovakia in the liberation of their country from the Hitlerite invaders in 1945, our troops soon left. They appeared there again in 1968 when the progressive reforms that the then leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was attempting to implement were stifled. That leadership was removed. Other people came in, who discredited the party in the eyes of the public, and our friends in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia are now finding it very difficult. And the blame for this, incidentally, lies with this policy of ours, too.

So let's approach what is taking place by at least attempting to understand the other side and attempting to understand in our minds why it is taking place. I agree it's unpleasant, I agree it's bad. But it seems to me all the same that when we begin to restructure our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, restructure them on a new basis of respect for their sovereignty and of full recognition of their national interests, these relations will in the very near future be put on a sound footing, they will be divested of their ideological appendages, they will be divested of the perhaps vivid but essentially—as we know from our own experience, too—empty slogans full of wishful thinking. And cleared of all their foam, our relations will become much stronger.

It is apparent even now that, for instance, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the head of the Polish government, a man who has never been a member of the Communist Party, adheres to a very clear policy of friendship and all-round development of cooperaiton with our country. The same applies to President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, who spent many years in opposition to the Communist Party and the then regime, and who even suffered persecution—he spent five years in prison. But he is not guided by a sense of malice or revenge as a politician. He understands Czechoslvoakia's national interests and these interests coincide in very large measure with the Soviet Union's interests. And it is important to note that this choice has been made not just be Mazowiecki or Havel, but also by the people. They have done so in line with their own wishes and out of their own national interests. And when the choice is made by the people, there can be no doubt of the stability of relations.

Does this not in fact reflect our interests? In my view, it reflects them fully. That is what I think.

Historian Views Developments in East Europe

PM2202172490 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 5, 4 Feb 90 p 12

[Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev article: "On the Threshold of a European Home. Reviewing the Changes in Eastern Europe"]

[Text] Many see the popular revolution in Eastern and Central Europe as a bolt from the blue. Some of my compatriots have been following these developments rapturously. Others take them for funeral bells. "The entire geopolitical structure of Eastern Europe, the building of which cost our country dearly, tumbled down overnight. The balance of European forces has been destroyed, and the consequences are unpredictable. The sentimental theory of 'our common European home' has brought about the collapse of Eastern Europe's communist parties, a change in the state structures, and imminent reunification of the two Germanys. By the end of this century, the German industrial giant wil tower over Europe—full of energy, inspired by Pan-Germanic ideas, and attracting traditionally German lands into its gravitation field. As the colours and contours of Europe's politicl map are changing, the bones of Russian infantrymen stir in their unknown graves."

The above is from Aleksandr Prokhanov's article, "The Tragedy of Centralism", published in the January Literaturnaya Rossiya. Such is allegedly the foreign policy price paid for perestroika, the new political thinking and the "destruction of centralism". Charges like this are too serious and too frequent to be ignored—especially since less informed readers may take such allegations on trust. How trustworthy are they really?

Question 1: Was "Eastern Europe's geopolitical structure" and the "balance of European forces" (established by Stalin and his followers who saw Soviet dominance in Eastern and Central Europe as the pre-eminent feature of their European policies) in the USSR's national interests?

The answer, I think, is unambiguous. If the structure and the balance had not begun to crumble, they would eventually have proved ruinous to the Soviet Union, because they would force the USSR to continue to oppose the united front of all Western powers with their enormous economic, scientific and technical potential. This is what we have been doing for the last 30 years. As a result, by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union found itself in a grave international situation, the likes had not been seen since, perhaps, June 22, 1941. A confrontation which on several occasions brought the world to the

brink of war, ruined the Soviet economy and brought about all our present-day hardships as well as the notorious command systems.

Such were the fruits of ill-informed views on foreign policy issues and a distorted understanding of our national interests. Both international and domestic realities demanded that the Stalinist "geopolitical structure of Eastern Europe" be dismantled, claims to hegemony in the region renounced, and "imperial thinking" overcome. Our foreign policy makers have been and are busy doing exactly that—for the benefit of our own and other European peoples.

Question 2: Was it possible to preserve and reinforce the postwar status quo in Europe which, in fact, was the main objective of the Stalinist and Brezhnevite leaderships?

Yes, for a time, provided we were prepared to take the consequences, which had been building up for years.

The two "whales" on which the status quo rested were the military and the bureaucratic pseudosocialism "exported" to Eastern Europe. Enormous military contingents had to be stationed there; Soviet economy and social consciousness had to be militarized. The USSR became Europe's bugbear. Everything was done to preserve the order imposed on Eastern Europe. Any attempt to deviate from it was mercilessly curbed. By and by, Eastern Europe ceased perceiving the USSR as its liberator from fascist tyranny and began to see it as conservative force preventing their free evolution. For them, Stalin's "socialism" began to be associated, not without reason with the suppression of individual freedom, with inefficiency of production, economic and technological backwardness, moral degradation, with the tyrannical dictatorship of individual leaders or a party oligarchy, with lawlessness and arbitrary rule.

The Soviet Union, which suffered from the same evils, gradually lost its political, ideological and economic influence in Eastern Europe. The great power which was at one time widely admired for its contribution to routing Hitlerism, and whose prestige stood very high—if only for a short time—turned into a languishing monster. In a situation like this the postwar status quo was doomed—with unpredictable (for our country) consequences.

What is the good of blaming perestroika for what is in fact one of the greatest achievements: i.e., initiative in undertaking the long-overdue changes to shape a new status quo to meet the vital interests of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, or rather all of Europe?

Question 3: Are the consequences of the "destruction of the balance of European forces" as unpredictable as they are alleged to be?

The postwar status quo is known to have rested on: a) the split of Europe and Germany; b) the confrontation of two military-political and economic blocs; and c) the confrontation of Western democracy and Eastern totalitarianism. The situation was characterized by structural incompatibility of Western Europe's market economy with Eastern Europe's bureaucratic command economy—the incompatibility that created almost unsurmountable barriers for economic cooperation between the two halves of the European continent. That was an unnatural situation relying exlusively on force, and the balance of nuclear fear. Such a situation was, in my opinion, more dangerous than the Treaty of Versailles. Everybody was a loser, including the Soviet Union, perhaps, the greatest loser of all.

The situation today is changing radically. I would not dare predict that Europe's future under the qualitatively new status quo will be cloudless. But as long as the USSR's perestroika and Eastern Europe's revolutionary changes promise to overcome the split of Europe on the basis of common European values (including the values accrued by the socialist theory and practice) and common European institutions, Europe's future is becoming less unpredictable. In fact current tendencies have introduced predictability into European and world politics. Today, one can confidently predict that unification and cooperation will supercede rifts and enmity, that a balance of interests will replace the balance of fear, that the security of individual states will replace bloc security, while freedom of development and tolerance will supercede hegemony and ideological Messianism.

Question 4: Are we to fear the "inevitable reunification of Germany"? Is the revival of dangerous Pan-Germanism possible?

In answering the first of the two questions, I would like to recall that the postwar division of Germany affected the USSR's national interests. The division resulted in the formation of NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the beginning of the cold war and a dangerous military confrontation which squeezed our country dry of its vital resources. Today, there is a way out of this situation. On the way to this objective, the people of the GDR and West Germany may have to restore a single German state, provided the people of both German states agree and the reunification does not pose a threat to European security.

What about Pan-Germanism? After the trauma inflicted on Germany's national consciousness by the catastrophic results of Hitlerism, I don't think it could revive as an influential force in German politics. A continuing split of the German nation is more likely to generate and stimulate Pan-Germanism. From this point of view, the continued adherence to the artificial structure of the two German states propped up by external forces is more likely to generate a serious threat to European security.

Also, Pan-Germanism cannot become the banner of German policy because its comeback, after the past tragedies, would bring about a unification of other European states interested in their continent's security against Germany.

It should be added, too, that the governments and peoples of both Germanys are well aware of the difficulties involved in resolving the "German question". Therefore, they have tried not to act impulsively for fear of damaging the interests of neighbouring states, as well as the interests of European security and stability.

Question 5: What about "Russian infantrymen" and their "unknown graves"?

Indeed, Russia bore the brunt of World War II. But didn't the war hurt other peoples and other Soviet nationalities? Did our soldiers fight and give their lives for the sake of establishing a Stalinist "geopolitical structure" in Eastern Europe? They went west and died on foreign soil for the sake of routing fascism, saving the Soviet people from Nazi slavery, and liberating all European nations.

What use Stalin and his retinue made of the victory is another matter. Now that we are getting rid of the Stalinist legacy, we could do better than to bemoan the "structure" dismantled by nations following our example.

West Europe

Shevardnadze Meets With FRG SPD Leaders

LD2802182590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1725 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb (TASS)—Today, Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of foreign affairs, received leading Social Democratic Party [SPD] figures, E. Bahr, member of the Presidium of the Executive of the party, K. Voigt, member of the Executive, and also W. Stoehr, specialist of the SPD group in the Bundestag. During the conversation, questions relating to the situation which has evolved in German affairs and above all, the external aspects of the construction of German unity, were touched upon. In this context, particular attention was paid to the prospects of the creation of new security structures in Europe.

Yakovlev Meets FRG SPD Officials

LD2702210690 Moscow TASS in English 1735 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—Member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Aleksandr Yakovlev met member of the Presidium of the board of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) Egon Bahr.

They focussed on the situation in Central Europe.

Also present were member of the board of the Social Democratic Party of Germany Karsten Voigt, the SPD expert in Bundestag Uwe Steer and head of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Valentin Falin.

Commentary on FRG Expert's Proposal on Germany

LD2802184290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1120 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Commentary by Albert Balebanov, TASS Political Observer: "Unification of Germany: within the framework of the all-European framework."—TASS headline]

[Text] [no dateline as received]—The process of rapprochement of the two Germans states is gathering in tempo, and at the same time the debates about the future of a united Germany are becoming more active. The debates have, in particular, been caused by the natural fears that a united Germany could once again represent a threat to peace in Europe at some point.

There are more than sufficient grounds for such fears. Just take the results of a recent survey conducted among young people in the FRG, who revealed a growing trend toward support for neo-Nazi views. Can one rule out a future where people with neo-Nazi attitudes come to power in Germany?

What, then, does the world community need to do to prevent such a development of events? The United States and a number of West European countries are in favor of a future united Germany being part of NATO. This is unacceptable for the USSR, the GDR, and other countries in Eastern Europe which are in favor of maintaining the Warsaw Treaty's role in the system of strengthening European security. Attempts by the West to insist on getting its own way are fraught with the appearance of grave difficulties. On the other hand, the West is refusing to accept the proposal by a number of countries in Eastern Europe for making a future united German state neutral.

It is obvious that the way out of the situation which is developing can only lie along a path of seeking a mutually acceptable option. Here one should clearly proceed from well-founded forecasts of the foreseeable future, and to bear in mind that a whole series of international negotiations lie ahead, above all with the "two plus four" formula—the two German states plus the four great victorious powers: the USSR, the United States, France, and Great Britain. Since the foundations are already being laid for cooperation with a future united Germany, what is clearly needed are not ultimatums, not the imposition of standpoints that have previously been agreed by a narrow circle but which would be unacceptable to the other side; but instead painstaking negotiations, the renunciation of any form of public or clandestine pressure, and consideration of the realities of Europe's postwar structures. Nor, I think, should one shun the rational ideas now being voiced in various parts of Europe.

Bearing in mind that the problem of the unification of Germany is closely bound up with the security of the national boundaries which were formed in Europe after World War II, Poland's proposal that separate treaties should be concluded with the two German states, treaties

which would guarantee the permanent and final nature of the Oder-Neisse border, deserves to be studied, for example. The treaties could be initialled in Bonn and Berlin, and then ratified by a future common German state.

An idea which has been voiced by Hans-Joachim Schmidt, an expert at the Hessen Society for Peace and Conflict Research, is an interesting one. He proposes that the reduced army of a future united Germany be included in the structure of collective European security. To this end, considers Schmidt, it is necessary to set up a "military council for Europe," to which representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO would initially belong. The council must be open to each of the 35 participant states in the Helsinki Conference and Cooperation in Europe.

In my view, Schmidt's initiative is one of the possible ways of solving the security problem in connection with the process of unification of Germany. No one is asserting that it is necessary to go along precisely the path that he has proposed, but it is possible to discuss it within the framework of negotiations.

In other words,in such an important matter as the unfication of Germany, one must not either rush forward or disregard the interests of the neighbors of the GDR and the FRG. One should move forward with caution, while scrupulously observing the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the strategic inteests of the great powers and of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. Only in that case, it seems, will it be possible to ensure stability in Europe, and to guarantee a solution to the German issue which corresponds to the strictest yardstick of security and which would assist in deepening the all-European process and in the construction of a common European home in which the German state would not only be a respected partner but also a friendly neighbor.

Albert Balebanov, TASS political observer.

Commentary Focuses on Kohl, German Unification

LD2702223190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Today FRG Foreign Minister Genscher arrived in the Netherlands on a working visit. Beforehand, he visited Italy. And in the next few days he intends to pay a visit to Denmark. Here is a commentary; our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver is at the microphone:

[Zholkver] The heightened level of activity of the head of the FRG's foreign policy department is evidently connected with the stepping up in the discussion on problems of the unification of Germany. At the Netherlands parliament rather turbulent debates just took place. Its participants noted that their country, as Germany's neighbor and in the past a victim of its aggression, is vitally interested in taking direct part in considering the question of German unity. At the same time a direct link of this question with ensuring security in Europe was stressed. The prime ministers of Great Britain and Belgium, foreign ministers of Italy and Yugoslavia are pointing to this link. And in the course of the current Soviet-Czechoslovak talks in Moscow it was stressed that the tackling of the German question must take into account the lawful interests of the security of both the GDR and the FRG's neighbors and of other European states. A broad discussion on these problems is being unfolded in France, too. In recent days those taking part in it were President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Rocard, and Cresson, the minister of European affairs. It is remarkable that all of them are pointing especially to the need to recognize the inviolability of the present borders in Europe. History is teaching us to be cautious, Edith Cresson noted.

I cannot but agree with this remark. What is more, indeed the position of official Bonn in this matter cannot but be an object of concern. Everyone—and not only in France—is now paying attention to the fact that the head of the Bonn government persists in not wanting to publicly recognize the borders of Poland along the Oder and Neisse. In an attempt to justify its position, Chancellor Kohl is referring to the fact that the question of the borders is a prerogative, as it were, of the future all-German government. However, at the same time, even now before such a government is set up, he keeps repeating tirelessly that unified Germany must definitely be a NATO member. Such defiance, to put it mildly, of elementary logic has not passed unnoticed in the FRG itself, let alone sharp criticisms on the part of the opposition Social Democratic Party. But even prominent politicians of the party and of the government coalition, including Suessmuth, the Bundestag president, are pointing out the need to fully recognize even now the invoilability of the borders of all the neighbors of Germany, and above all Poland.

On the eve of his visit to the Netherlands today, the FRG foreign minister stated that he has nothing to hide from the neighbors and that nothing will happen behind their back. However, I myself find it difficult to rid myself of the impression that in this most important issue, differing voices can be heard in Bonn.

PRAVDA Reports Mitterrand-Kohl Meeting

PM2102142590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own Vladimir Bolshakov: "Making Haste Slowly"]

[Text] Paris, 16 Feb—The meeting between French President F. Mitterrand and FRG Chancellor H. Kohl has ended. It was devoted mainly to the problem of Germany's unification. As is well known, until recently people in France expressed themselves with great caution on this score and in any case were against forcing on the unification of the two Germanies.

H. Kohl arrived in Paris after he had been criticized in the bundestag by the opposition for his attempts to

swallow up the GDR as rapidly as possible. In the GDR itself the chancellor was also warned that the introduction of a single currency for the two German states still does not mean their unification with which, in accordance with the ancient proverb, they should "make haste slowly."

In France this is the wisdom to which many people adhere. And not only here. The possibility of the creation of a "single Germany" means for Paris the prospect of losing leadership in Western Europe because it will be difficult to compete with such an economically powerful state. For the "Common Market" countries, where the question of introducing a single currency by 1992 is particularly acute, the unification of the FRG and the GDR has become a kind of signal to transform the EEC "dozen" into an "unlucky thirteen." And in that case will Bonn not shift the brunt of its financial commitments to provide for the citizens who have come to the FRG from the GDR and also other expenses connected with the unification onto the shoulders of its "Common Market" partners? This question will probably also arise at the intergovernment conference of EEC countries on currency problems planned for the end of this year.

What will a united Germany be like in the military respect—will it be neutral, which the GDR advocates, or will it join NATO? All these problems were discussed by F. Mitterrand and H. Kohl. The sides concluded that "Germany's unification should proceed in parallel with Europe's unification."

As for Paris' position with regard to the actual unification of Germany, F. Mitterrand rejected the idea of its neutrality, accepting H. Kohl's position. The French president set as a condition here the conservation of present European borders East of the GDR and said that their inviolability should be confirmed in the event of Germany's unification. H. Kohl avoided specific promises on this score, stating that the border question will be resolved by the common parliament and government of a united Germany.

The FRG chancellor, however, agreed that the German question concerns not only Germans in the FRG and GDR. He accepted Ireland's proposal to convene a summit meeting of the EEC countries on this question in the very near future. At this conference Bonn will obviously insist that Germany's unification take place this year, before the creation of a "single Europe." If far from all Germans agree with this, the members of the "Common Market" will hardly agree to make haste either.

West German Book Hails Gorbachev FRG Visit

PM2702162190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Reflection of Changes"]

[Text] Bonn, 21 Feb—"Gorbachev in Our Country" is the title of a book published in the Russian language by the West German publishing house "Braus" about M.S. Gorbachev's June 1989 visit to the FRG, which opened a new chapter in relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic.

Dozens of color photographs reflect the landmarks of this event. The illustrations are accompanied by statements by the Soviet leader, West German figures, and ordinary Germans, as well as the text of the joint USSR-FRG statement which laid the foundations of a qualitatively new stage in cooperation between the two countries. The book was earlier published in the German language and presented at a book fair.

Never since the times of J. Kennedy and de Gaulle has a foreign statesman been welcomed by the German public with such enthusiasm as the Soviet leader, the book's preface says. Analyzing the reasons for his exceptional popularity in the FRG, the authors of the preface write: In addition to Gorbachev's personal qualities, this is primarily the effect of sympathy for a statesman marching along a new path and wanting a better life for his compatriots.

The book's German edition aroused great interest among the FRG public. The new edition is meant for Russian readers. "The unforgettable pictures from the June visit," the newspaper RHEIN-NECKAR-ZEITUNG wrote in its review, "reflect the historic changes occurring in Europe. Citizens of the Federal Republic who witnessed the events could not have failed to sense the hope and desire for changes radiating from this man who came to draw a line beneath the postwar period."

Latin America & Caribbean

PRAVDA Cites Castro on Rectification Process

PM2302122990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Moiseyev dispatch: "Leader of Parliament Elected"]

[Excerpts] Havana, 21 Feb—An extraordinary session of the National Assembly of the People's Government was held in the Cuban capital. There was just one item on the parliamentary forum's agenda—the election of its president.

This honorary office of state had been vacant for rather a long time following the death of Flavio Bravo, eminent Cuban public and political figure. The duties were temporarily performed by Severo Aguirre del Cristo, 78-year-old vice president of the National Assembly of the People's Government.

Juan Escalona Reguera was elected as the new president of the republic's supreme organ of state power by an overwhelming majority. Cubans are quite familiar with his name—he headed the country's Ministry of Justice for the last six years. [passage omitted]

The initial statements by the new president of the parliament lead to the conclusion that this organ intends to significantly step up its activity through democratization of the system of people's power and to expand interparliamentary ties, mainly with Latin American countries.

The country's leader, Fidel Castro, delivered a speech at the closing of the session, assuring those assembled that Cuban Communists will never reject the leading role of the party which launched and is pursuing rectification in the country—the process of correcting mistakes and overcoming negative trends. But work methods must constantly change and improve, Cuba's political leader said. He also noted the importance of the unity of Cuban revolutionaries, without which any further successful advance toward the victory of socialism would be impossible. The essence of our rectification, Fidel Castro declared, is to consolidate and deepen the Cuban revolution.

Plenum Confirms Commitment to Rectification

PM2202155190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by PRAVDA and TASS correspondents A. Moiseyev and S. Sereda: "Extraordinary Plenum"]

[Text] Havana, 17 Feb—An extraordinary plenum of the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC] was held in Havana.

The plenum participants were briefed on the Politburo's analysis of the series of tasks and problems due to be extensively discussed at the forthcoming fourth congress of Cuban Communists. An appraisal was made of the process of rectification now under way in the country—the correction of past mistakes and the overcoming of negative trends in the economic, social, and political spheres of the republic's life.

The plenum examined questions of improving the entire structure of organs of people's power and the work of the Council of Ministers Executive Committee and of the country's mass public organizations.

A critical examination of the tasks facing the party does not raise any doubts about the fundamental principles of its activity. It is just a matter of improving the work of the party, which is defined as a party of the Leninist type guided by the principles of democratic centralism. The onward development and viability of the Cuban revolution, it was noted at the plenum, determine not only the republic's sovereignty but also the nation's very existence and the future of its just cause.

Plenum participants confirmed their resolve to reject the copying and transplantation to Cuban soil of other countries' experience which is "alien to the Cubans' traditions, history, and national character." They pointed out that, in the face of the general crisis of socialism, U.S. imperialism maintains its pursuit of a hostile policy toward Cuba. In this context they emphasized the need to build up efforts to consolidate the country's defense capability.

The plenum was informed about a decision by the PCC Central Committee Politburo to set up working groups which would be assigned the task of elaborating measures to improve the party's structure and its methods and style of work. And this work must begin with the Central Committee apparatus. The task of these groups also includes enhancing the efficiency of the organs of people's power and of mass public organizations like, for example, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Cuban Women's Federation. It was also decided to change the structure of the National Commission for Monitoring the Implementation of the Economic Management System, and this will be tackled by a specially selected group of specialists. Special mention was made of the fact that these measures will be implemented with active participation by the people's masses.

The plenum examined organizational questions. The extraordinary PCC Central Committee plenum resolved to convene the fourth party congress in the first half of 1991.

The plenum's decisions testify to the desire to further rally the Cuban leadership around the country's political vanguard headed by revolution leader Fidel Castro and to continue the PCC's course of deepening the rectification process. There is an ongoing and persistent quest for solutions within the framework of shaping Cuba's own model of socialism in line with the Cuban nation's history, traditions, and specific national features. A model in which a decisive role is played by self-reliance. The Cuban Communists expressed yet again the hope that they would manage to successfully withstand the existing difficulties and to continue their advance along the path of the building of socialism.

Cuba Fears Growing 'U.S. Military Threat'

LD1902125490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Correspondent Viktor Gorbachev report from Havana]

[Excerpts] In Cuba it is customary to formulate major tasks in brief slogans. One major slogan is: Socialism or death. Cubans now consider that the U.S. military threat to their country has grown. Cubans count on smashing U.S. interventionists without outside help. [passage omitted]

In the opinion of the Cuban leadership, the U.S. military threat to their country has significantly increased. This is connected mainly with changes in Eastern Europe. The main arguments are that the socialist camp no longer exists. Peace is being threatened by the hegemony of U.S. imperialism. The United States, assessing that communism has suffered an historic defeat, is in a state of euphoria. While negotiating on disarmament with the Soviet Union, the United States is at the same time

becoming more aggressive toward Third World countries. The intervention against Panama was perceived in Cuba unequivocally as confirmation of this. The argument that in 1983, when monolithic unity existed in the socialist camp, the United States made short work of the Grenada revolution, is not discussed here. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that over 30 years the Cuban revolution remains the object of hostile acts on the part of the United States. Cubans have no security guarantee, and they are forced to prepare for the worst.

Defense Plan Against U.S. Reported

LD1902201190 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Report by Havana correspondent Viktor Gorbachev]

[Text] A major slogan in Cuba today is: Socialism or death. The Cubans believe that at the moment the United States war threat to their country has heightened. Our Havana correspondent, Viktor Gorbachev, describes how the Cuban people are getting prepared to rebuff the possible aggression.

The Cubans hope to crush U.S. invaders without outside aid. Since the regular army will not be in a position to defeat U.S. Armed Forces for the obvious reasons, Cuba is making preparations for its defense on the basis of a national war doctrine. The people's militia has become, along with the regular army units, a major military force. Defense days are held once a month and on those days militiamen, wearing blue shirts, can be seen in all parts of the country. Their regiments are equipped not only with firearms but also with antiaircraft weapons, mortars, artillery pieces, and even tanks.

Lieutenant Colonel (Ruben Cabrera), militia chief of staff in the city of Cienfuegos, believes that despite outdated military equipment his tank battalions are superior to the regular army battalions in some respect.

None of the troops on the active list did their internationalist duty outside of their country, said (Ruben Cabrera). They haven't been engaged in fighting, they haven't seen the enemy. Meanwhile in the militia all [word indistinct] have served in the army. Almost all of them did their internationalist duty fighting in Angola or in the Ethiopian deserts.

In Cienfuegos, 94 percent of both men and women older than 16 and fit for military service are on the militia list. Adults who do not belong to these lists for one reason or another are members of defense production teams. They'll fight or work at their facilities depending on the circumstances.

Article Examines Soviet-Cuban Economic Ties

PM2802191290 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 8, 20-26 Feb 90 pp 12-13

[Vitaliy Sobolev article: "Mutual Liabilities"]

[Text] Friendship with Cuba costs the Soviet Union $5-6 billion a year. Although quoted by the CIA, these statistics are sometimes mentioned in this country as well. We have tried to finalize them using the so-called alternative sources.

I wouldn't undertake to discover the exact hard-currency figure. Perhaps none among the Soviet professional economists might venture to, either, because no available data assessment criteria are sufficiently reliable. However, the ruble sum is easy to compute: for this, ending, five-year period, the total cost of Soviet imports to Cuba is going to be 4 billion rubles higher than the Soviet exports from Cuba (24 billion against 20 billion).

However, the ruble is a very special currency, as we know. Moreover, the Soviet-Cuban trade prices have always been influenced by the political factor. All that makes the criteria of establishing the ruble prices for individual trading items indeed hard to understand.

Oil and sugar

Of course, it's always possible to compare these ruble prices against international hard-currency prices, but this approach involves a great risk of making a mistake, just for the simple reason that there are no stable and unified prices in the world. Besides, it's impossible to determine the prices of certain Soviet products (like machinery and other equipment which account for 20 per cent of the Soviet exports to Cuba) otherwise than in rubles, because these items are simply not salable for hard currency.

Perhaps we'll get an idea of what we are talking about here if we examine just two trade items: mineral oil and sugar. It's no longer a secret in Cuba that about half of Soviet annual exports there (in terms of cost) is 13.5 million tons of oil at 168 rubles per ton. The U.S.S.R. annually imports about 4.5 million tons of sugar at 850 rubles per ton (which accounts for over two thirds of the entire Soviet imports from Cuba).

The above-quoted figures easily lend themselves to comparison. In terms of cost, one ton of sugar equals five tons of oil, as we can easily see. In volumes, the sugar-oil ratio is 1:3. In the current world prices, a ton of sugar costs as much as three and a half tons of oil: $300 plus against $100. A simple computation will show that with this "payment" with oil for sugar the Soviet Union comes a much more generous buyer than Western companies, paying about 50 per cent more, and that 70 per cent of Cuban exports "equal" only half of Soviet exports, proceeding from free international prices.

This is not an absolutely correct result, though. I can easily predict lots of objections and corrections coming from experts. For example: a considerable portion of sugar purchased by the Soviet Union from Cuba comes from third countries. Apparently, Cuba can't produce enough sugar to meet its commitments, because the sugar production rate falls behind the planned figure.

Besides, payments to third countries even more complicate the account-settling pattern between Cuba and the U.S.S.R.

Trade Mathematics

But let us not go into the complex matter of mutual accounts involving hundreds upon hundreds of export-import items. It is already clear that the barter trade between the two countries is out of balance, and Cuba needs Soviet interest-free credit to the tune of about one billion rubles annually to pay for its imports. It is also clear that a calculation of prices in any other currency would only aggravate the disbalance. We know that the matter of transfer to hard currency as a means of payment within the CMEA has been discussed at a recent session of that organization in Sofia, Bulgaria. But as far as Cuba (and Mongolia and Vietnam, for that matter) are concerned, this transition is deemed possible only in a distant future.

Is this fair? Personally, I would regard it unworthy of us should we forget, for the sake of crude rules of trade balance, our obligations to Cuba, including our responsibility, to a large extent, for the present state of affairs there. The Island's national economy is too much dependent on the Soviet Union. Whereas two decades ago only a half of Cuba's foreign trade turnover was accounted for by trade with the Soviet Union, the present figure is 70 per cent. Simultaneously, the share of trade turnover with countries of the hard-curency zone has dropped to a mere 12 per cent. Cuba's hard-currency gains have shrunk by 50 per cent. During a few recent years alone, in the past, Cuba managed to net up to half a billion dollars annually for the reexport of Soviet oil alone. The corresponding figure today is 200 million at best.

But let's return to our computations. We must decide upon our attitude towards the figure supplied by the CIA. From what we know about the Soviet exports to Cuba follows that the entire Soviet exports (counted in U.S. dollars) doesn't reach even a half of the quoted figure, while the trade overpayment is approximately 800 million. However, the preferential prices can be considered an economic aid only through a very strained interpretation. Free education for students from Cuba, and some similar expenditures can hardly change the overall picture. True, there also exists some military aid, the extent of which I cannot assess even approximately (incidentally, this data must be declassified and published, so that we would have no need to resort to CIA-supplied figures).

Though they always emphasize that they are sincerely grateful for the Soviet aid, I think Cubans regard relations between the two countries in the economic sphere as cooperation between a developed and a developing country, rather than as economic aid. It's impossible to disagree with this opinion in principle. However, one provision should be made: as far as social benefits are concerned, we cannot compete even with Cuba, let alone certain develped countries. For example, average life expectancy is about ten years higher, and infant mortality is several times lower in Cuba than in Soviet Central Asia.

To complete our approximate analysis of the issue raised at the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet session, we must discuss Soviet credits to Cuba to pay for technological assistance. These credits used to rise with each new five-year-plan period. If the current level of these is merely maintained, they will be enough barely to pay for the completion of the construction projects already under way: an atomic power station, a large oil refinery, a new port, to name just a few. The cost of Soviet supplies for these projects on the world market cannot be assessed, owing to the reasons mentioned above.

I would rather not discuss whether it is economically efficient to continue these projects. I saw quite a few completed Soviet-Cuban joint projects, which operate at only 50 per cent, or less of their capacity. Projects of the same nature as the Soviet Baykal-Amur Railway (BAM) can also be found in Cuba. I can only reiterate the need for stepping up the effectiveness of cooperation, something which has been emphaszied more than once by both sides.

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Closed Session on Transcaucasus

LD0103071890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] The joint session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities is starting this minute at the USSR Supreme Soviet. Our correspondents will be unable to attend the session: It will be behind closed doors.

It is intended to complete discussion of the situation that has developed in Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Supreme Soviet Examines Draft Law on Secession

LD2802122990 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] We continue our Soviet chronicle with materials prepared by the INTERFAX Independent Information Agency.

The INTERFAX parliamentary correspondent has reported that the draft law on the procedure for resolving issues connected with a union republic's secession from the USSR has been submitted for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet session.

The draft says that it is only an all-republican referendum that can decide on the question of seceding from the USSR. This can be held at the decision of the republican supreme soviet or at the demand of one third of its inhabitants who are at least 18 years old. The referendum is to be held not earlier than six months following adoption of the decision to raise the question of seceding from the USSR. The referendum is legally valid if no less than three quarters of the republic's inhabitants who are over 18 years of age take part in it.

The results of the referendum and the position taken with regard to this question by the highest bodies of state authorities of other union republics are to be examined, to begin with, by the USSR Supreme Soviet and, subsequently, by a Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Taking into account the domestic and external political consequences for the USSR and other union republics connected with the withdrawal of one of them, they will adopt a preliminary decision concerning secession of a given union republic from the USSR.

In connection with adopting such a decision, the Congress of People's Deputies is to establish a period of transition lasting no less than five years prior to the adoption of a final decision to withdraw from the USSR. During this period problems connected with the defense of the USSR and with ensuring the USSR's security should be solved and a new state frontier should be established. Subsequently, the government of the USSR and the government of the republic involved, will decide on questions concerning material assets and finances.

The draft notes that the fate of assets belonging to the union as a whole will be debated first. They can be bought out by the republic or leased to it. They can be dismantled and taken to the territory of the USSR or they can be preserved on the republic's territory, with the USSR having the right to dispose of them on a contractual basis.

Payments involving the USSR budget must be settled, as must mutual relations among banks.

The final decision on a republic withdrawing from the USSR is to be adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies after agreement has been reached concerning, on the one hand, the interests and claims of the republic that is withdrawing, and the interests and claims of the USSR and other union republics on the other hand.

Decisions are made by a majority of two-thirds of votes by the USSR people's deputies.

Moscow TV Carries 28 Feb Supreme Soviet Session

Nikonov Discusses Draft Law on Land

LD2802191690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1715 GMT on 28 February begins broadcasting a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 28 February at the Kremlin in Moscow. The session is chaired by Anatoliy Lukyanov.

Lukyanov greets the deputies and asks the Supreme Soviet members to register; 420 members are present, which is a quorum. Lukyanov asks how the Supreme Soviet will proceed today. Many members want the draft law on land to be adopted. Some memebrs worked during the night on the decisions concerning Azerbaijan and Armenia. Many deputies express their desire to return home for 2-4 March, when elections will be held; which is possible if work is adjourned tomorrow until 5 March.

At 1719 GMT Lukyanov says that the draft law on land has been amended in committees and commissions following the 16 and 20 February debates.

At 1720 GMT A.A. Nikonov, chairman of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenn, reports on the work in committees and commissions on the draft law on land. Many proposals were made and all these proposals were considered and decisions made. The end result is a product of consensus. Nikonov says that most comments and proposals concerned property and land administration. The problem of Stalin's instructions concerning lands in the past was discussed. The committees thoroughly examined this matter.

At 1729 GMT Nikonov asks the deputies not to try to impose their own individual views on the issue of property. Regarding land administration, some proposed that local soviets alone should administer land. This did not seem correct to the committees, because

there are cases when higher soviets must have an interest in land administration and the draft law must allow for this. Nikonov says that such institutions as botanical gardens which do not produce anything must also be covered in the draft law on land.

Nikonov goes on to say that the formula for land ownership by Soviet citizens evoked lively discussion. Some people talked about the amount of land which individuals might own: That must come under the competence of union republics rather than the USSR Supreme Soviet. The procedure for land allocation was also discussed, and it was decided that this is the domain of local bodies of power. The deputies decided that ecologically pure foodstuffs are much needed by the population and a corresponding provision was made. Nikonov says that republican laws should be made to correspond to this need.

At 1739 GMT Nikonov says that there is a great need for the draft law on land to be passed. The people are awaiting it. Once it is passed, a year of land reform can be held, with the USSR Supreme Soviet monitoring the progress of the implementation of the law on land and making suitable adjustments. Nikonov calls on the deputies to pass the draft law.

At 1740 GMT Lukyanov says that notes have come in from deputies.

At 1741 GMT Nikonov reads out the notes on procedural matters. He says that all kinds of land ownership are envisaged in the draft law. He answers other procedural points concerning irrational use of land, the choice of wording in the articles of the draft law, and the reasons for the rejection of some deputies' proposals.

At 1748 GMT Nikonov says that he has answered all the written questions. A deputy asks a question about the allocation of land. Nikonov says that this has been reflected in the draft law.

At 1750 GMT a female deputy asks about the role of village soviets in administering land. Nikonov responds that the role of local soviets is most important in matters of land. He then responds to a written question about dispossessing kulaks and says that the lessons of the past have been learned and there will be no repeat of past mistakes.

At 1752 GMT an unidentified deputy says that his point concerning irrational use of land has been misunderstood. It is importart that land should be utilized rationally. Nikonov says that the amended version of the draft law may satisfy the deputies. An unidentified female deputy then asks when centralized administration of land will be allowed. Nikonov says that there are cases when land must be administered on a centralized basis. An unidentified male deputy makes proposals about changes in the wording of the draft law to make three articles more specific.

At 1757 GMT Nikonov says that the question of confiscation of land was discussed. However, some issues of this nature may be better tackled in different laws. As for the issue of local soviets owning land, Nikonov says that the word local was omitted in some articles so as to allow the law to be broader.

Deputies Offer Amendments

LD2802194390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1759 GMT on 28 February continues broadcasting a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 28 February at the Kremlin in Moscow. Anatoliy Lukyanov, who is chairing the session, says that a vote on the draft law on land must be made today.

At 1800 GMT Deputy Yusupov asks about the rights of collective farms and state farms. Nikonov says that state farms should be encouraged to go over to lease-contracting, but should not be compelled to do so. Nikonov clarifies a point concerning experimental works on the land.

At 1803 GMT Lukyanov proposes a vote on the law, article by article.

At 1804 GMT an unidentified deputy says that the clauses in the draft law on ownership are longwinded. Both Lukyanov and Nikonov object, because this remark concerns a different draft law.

At 1806 GMT an unidentified deputy proposes that people should have the right to work the land that historically belonged to them. Nikonov says that such an issue was debated in the committees and it was decided that this is something which can not be included in the law on land.

At 1807 GMT Lukyanov reads out proposals from deputies concerning the voting procedure. A deputy from Kazakhstan demands that the law must be passed immediately. Lukyanov says that the fastest way to get through voting is to vote on each article of the draft law separately; 375 say yes to this, five oppose, and six abstain.

At 1811 GMT Lukyanov says that a Pakistan parliamentary delegation is present. The video shows the Pakistan delegation in the balcony.

At 1812 GMT Lukyanov asks for proposals on the first secton of the law. At 1813 GMT Deputy Rogatin asks for a word to be added in the clause concerning nature conservation areas.

At 1815 GMT Kucherenko of the budget committee confirms that it is very costly to try to make amendments in draft laws on the basis of verbal proposals at the Supreme Soviet. Lukyanov emphasizes the latter point. Lukyanov then says that the deputies must decide about whether to refer Rogatin's proposed amendment back to the committee. It is decided to take a vote on an

amendment to make sporting institutions free of charge for land use; 49 vote for, 287 against, and 36 abstain.

At 1821 GMT Deputy Bunich says that the clause about a right of every citizen to have an allotment of land sounds fine, but may be hard to implement. He proposes that the current owners of land should have priority. A deputy from the agrarian committee says that this has already been considered in a clause.

At 1824 GMT Lukyanov asks Nikonov to point out the clause in which this was mentioned. The deputy from the committee reads out the clause.

At 1826 GMT Bunich then makes a proposal concerning payments for use of land. No payments should be due for poor allotments of land. Bunich asks whether the Supreme Soviet is being asked to rubber-stamp such clauses. Lukyanov says that there has been plenty of opportunity for deputies to make proposals and that the decisions of the committees and commissions should be respected.

At 1830 GMT Deputy Ivashko expresses his support for Bunich's point of view on payments for land.

At 1831 GMT Lukyanov announces that there will soon be a 30 minute interval in which a proposal will be formulated and later voted on.

At 1832 GMT a deputy notes that a proposal that had been worked on for a long period in commission was rejected, so suggestions made from the floor have little chance. He suggests a procedure for accelerating the voting on the draft.

At 1835 GMT Lukyanov reminds deputies of the standing orders and says that deputies should not keep repeating proposals which have been rejected. The work of the committees should be respected.

A deputy then points out that some deputies have clearly not read the draft before the session. It is unlikely that a consensus will be reached even if the vote is postponed so it should be voted on as soon as possible.

Several Amendments Rejected

LD2802205290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1838 GMT on 28 February continues broadcasting a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 28 February at the Kremlin in Moscow. Anatoliy Lukyanov, who is chairing the session, asks if there are any complaints about the first section of the draft law on land being debated.

A deputy asks a question on a particular article. A commission member explains why the wording is as it is in the draft. At 1840 GMT Deputy Bisher offers an opinion on the matter.

At 1841 GMT Deputy Kirillov says that the article giving all people the right to own a piece of land is just a political slogan and should be dropped. Another deputy says that details should be worked out locally. The draft should be voted on as a whole, he says, and peasants need to get on with the sowing.

At 1845 GMT Lukyanov says that Kirillov is insisting on his proposal being put to the vote; 15 vote for, 334 against, and 16 abstain. The proposal is thus rejected.

At 1849 GMT a deputy proposes dropping the point on removing land from those who do not use it rationally. He insists on putting this to the vote. A commission member then gives the official point of view. Lukyanov puts the proposal to the vote; 59 vote for, 274 against, and 30 abstain. The proposal is thus defeated.

At 1852 GMT a deputy proposes dropping another point of the draft on taking an allotment away for misuse. The commission member explains the need for it. The deputy insists on a vote; 38 vote for, 283 against, and 29 abstain. It is also defeated.

At 1857 GMT a female deputy says that the creation of nature reserves should be subject to local opinion polls. The commission member explains why the wording is as it is. She does not insist on a vote. Lukyanov explains that the law cannot cover everything.

At 1900 GMT Deputy Bocharov raises the issue of property. Under a market economy this law is irrelevant. He proposes a change to paragraph four on page nine, because it is a matter for the local authorities, so it should be dropped. The commission member explains the reason for it. Bocharov insists on its being put to the vote; 65 vote for; 268 against; 30 abstain.

At 1906 GMT a deputy calls for another vote on an article which has already been voted on. Lukyanov says they cannot go on voting on the same article. The deputy disagrees. A vote is refused.

At 1908 GMT Deputy Stadnik links Article 3 of the law on land with the law on property. Lukyanov says the matter has already been voted on.

At 1912 GMT a deputy says that the discussion should be ended and the law voted on. Lukyanov says that the discussion will be ended and that a vote will be taken after a 20-minute interval.

Vote Proceeds Article by Article

LD2802214190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1914 GMT on 28 February continues broadcasting a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 28 February at the Kremlin in Moscow. Anatoliy Lukyanov, who is chairing the session, opens the afternoon session. He says that the session lacks a quorom, even after a 30-minute break instead of the announced 20-minute break. Lukyanov says that deputies must act

responsibly and turn up for the sessions. He calls for registration and notes that there are 15 less than at the start.

At 1918 GMT Deputy Korshunov comments on the procedure of examining the draft. It should now be simply voted on, article by article, without further discussion.

At 1920 GMT Lukyanov calls for another registration, because more deputies have arrived. After this, Korshunov's proposal will be put to the vote. There are 393 deputies present. Korshunov's proposal is put to the vote; 357 vote for, 14 against, and 12 abstain.

At 1923 GMT Nikonov gives the results of the discussion during the interval of the issue of differentiated rents. He details the new wording which incorporates Bunich's proposal.

At 1925 GMT Lukyanov calls again for registration, otherwise newly arrived deputies' votes cannot be counted; 401 deputies are now present. The Bunich proposal is then put to the vote; 371 vote for; nine against; and nine abstain. The proposal is passed. Lukyanov moves on to the second section on the rights and deputies of land users, which he puts to the vote; 387 vote for, five against, and four abstain. Lukyanov then puts Section 3 to the vote; 377 vote for; five against; and three abstain. Lukyanov puts Section 4 to the vote; 386 vote for; four against; and two abstain.

At 1933 GMT Lukyanov puts Section 5 to the vote. A deputy voices an objection that local soviets do not have sufficient powers in the matter. People have to wait years for a decision. The deputy proposes a change to Article 28 dealing with rural soviets. Another deputy proposes a change to Article 28 dealing with rural soviets. Another deputy says Article 13 already covers the point. A deputy from the floor complains about inconsistency in the draft on the rural soviet issue. Another deputy says the draft is as it is; Article 13 has already been passed anyway. A Moldavian deputy is worried about urban encroachments on farmland. Sobchak says there is a danger that rayon and even oblast soviets might be dealing with matters which should be the province of rural soviets. Another deputy says the draft as drawn up by the committee is fine as it is. A deputy describes his own experience with allotments.

At 1948 GMT Nikonov returns to the rostrum and says he thinks a distinction does not have to be drawn between rural and settlement soviets. Another deputy says Article 13 is fine as it is. Lukyanov puts Section 5, incorporating the amendment proposed from the floor, to the vote; 355 vote for, 23 against, and eight abstain.

At 1952 GMT Lukyanov then puts Section 6 to the vote; 383 vote for, two against, and four abstain. Section 7 is put to the vote; 380 vote for, one against, and one abstains.

At 1954 GMT a member of the heritage commission says the question of cemeteries is neglected in the draft. Nikonov approaches the rostrum to say that something on this could be put in Article 35. Deputy Kisin denies that the Likhachev works is built on a cemetery. Further debate on how to define a cemetery. Deputy Gamzatov wants a special law on preservation of monuments and burial places. Will burial places in Udmurtia be covered?

At 2006 GMT Lukyanov calls for a vote on the amendment; 350 vote for, five against, and 12 abstain. Lukyanov then puts Section 8 to the vote; 388 vote for, two against, and one abstains. Section 9 is then voted on; 384 for, none against, and four abstain.

At 2009 GMT there is a debate on Article 42 dealing with leaseholders. Lukyanov puts Section 10 to the vote; 835 vote for, one against, and zero abstensions.

Draft Law on Land Approved

LD2802220990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2013 GMT on 28 February continues broadcasting a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 28 February at the Kremlin in Moscow. Anatoliy Lukyanov, who is chairing the session, continues to put various articles of the draft land law to the vote:

On Section 11 378 vote for, five against, and four abstain; on Section 12 on land registry 381 vote for, three against, and three abstain; on Section 13 375 vote for, four against, and two abstain.

At 2018 GMT Lukyanov puts Section 14 on resolving land disputes to the vote. There is some discussion on an amendment on chemical and radioactive contamination. Then 387 vote for, none against, and three abstain.

At 2026 GMT Lukyanov puts Section 15 on international agreements to the vote. He says let's leave the republics for the moment. Primakov and Sobchak comment on the definition of an international treaty. There is more discussion. Let's leave USSR in the wording, as suggested by the committees, says Lukyanov. The vote shows 371 for, nine against, and nine abstentions.

AT 2036 a deputy proposes that the law be entitled the Law of the USSR, Union Republics and Autonomous Republics About Land. Lukyanov says that there are instructions in the procedural rules that the law should not be entitled in such a way. He would also like to hear legal experts' views on this matter. A commission member says that the current name of the draft law should be preserved.

At 2039 GMT Lukyanov puts the title of the law to the vote.

At 2040 GMT Sobchak says that an article in the Constitution prohibits adding the autonomous republics to the title of the draft law. Another deputy disagrees with this view of legal experts.

At 2042 GMT Lukyanov says that the Constitution should be respected. He puts the entire draft law to the vote. Belov proposes voting by name. Lukyanov agrees with this. A deputy disagrees with the view that the inclusion of autonomous republics would contradict the Constitution.

At 2046 GMT Sobchak says that if autonomous republics are included in the draft law, then autonomous republics will be put on much the same level as union republics, which will cause a constitutional problem. Lukyanov then calls for deputies not to let their emotions carry them away. It is important for the rights of union republics to be respected. A deputy says that the rights of autonomous republics also must be respected. It is necessary to return to this issue separately. Lukyanov agrees with this, saying that there will be discussion of a draft law on autonomy at a later date. A deputy says that the issue of autonomous republics is an important one and that the eyes of the entire world are upon the Supreme Soviet proceedings.

At 2053 GMT Lukyanov calls for a vote by name on the entire draft law on land. The deputies are asked to register; 400 are present. In the vote, 349 vote for, seven against, and 12 abstain.

Implementation of Law Discussed

LD2802222690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2056 GMT on 28 February continues broadcasting a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 28 february at the Kremlin in Moscow. Anatoliy Lukyanov, who is chairing the session, calls for a count of the vote on the law on land by the chambers; 209 vote for, two against in the Soviet of the Union. Of the 189 present from the Soviet of Nationalities, 144 vote for, five against, and nine abstain. There is a quorum in both chambers. The law on land is thereby passed by both chambers.

At 2058 GMT Lukyanov asks for comments on the procedure for implementing the law on land, which was formulated by the committees and commissions. Sobchak proposes that three additional points be added to this procedure for implementing of the law.

At 2100 GMT Lukyanov proposes that the procedure should include Sobchak's points. A vote is taken to pass the procedure, incorporating Sobchak's proposals in an amendment which the committees and commissions will elaborate; 369 vote for, three against, and 10 abstain. Lukyanov then asks for comments on the proposed changes to the Constitution in connection with the passing of the law on land. This measure will also need to be passed by the Congress of People's Deputies later.

At 2107 GMT Lukyanov proposes that this draft document should be sent back to the committees and commissions for further refinement; 366 vote for, one against, and four abstain.

At 2108 GMT Nikonov thanks everybody for such hearty participation.

At 2109 GMT Lukyanov asks for all the committees and commissions to examine the issue of the presidency thoroughly over the next few days. Tomorrow, only USSR people's deputies and government representatives will take part in a closed sitting about Azerbaijan and Armenia. Lukyanov asks the Armenian and Azerbaijani deputies to take proper approach to that debate. It is planned to conclude the vote by noon tomorrow. The video shows Primakov on Lukyanov's left and Nishanov on his right at the platform.

At 2111 GMT the recorded broadcast concludes.

TASS Outlines Provisions of Land Law

LD2802144290 Moscow TASS in English 1355 GMT 28 Feb 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—The basic principles of legislation on land in the USSR and union republics were passed by Soviet Parliament today.

The law will be used by each union republic to draw up its own law on land in consideration of local specificity.

The basic principles of the legislation on land, to come into effect on March 15, is one of the basic documents of the Soviet economic reform. Land now belongs to the people residing on a given territory. The powers to dispose of it have been vested with local government bodies, but not central departments, as was previously the case.

In accordance with the document, land plots can receive the status of inheritable property. Peasants will thereby be able to choose between being a collective farm member or an individual farm owner. This is actually the right to land as property, however the land cannot be sold, granted or mortgaged.

The current opinion in society is that the new law will not lead to the disbandment of collective and state farms, at least in most of the republics. Collective labour from traditions are strong in the country and there are many profitable collective farms.

The law passed today envisages the transfer of land to collective and state farms as a permanent possession (they had user rights before), creating conditions for higher profits.

The law was passed by 349 votes, with 7 against and 12 abstentions.

The parliament will continue its work in committees and commissions this evening.

The USSR Supreme Soviet will have a closed door meeting on Thursday to continue the discussion of the state of affairs in Transcaucasia, which began on February 19.

Deputy Nikonov on Land Law Procedures

LD2802115690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 28 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The main event of the day is the session of the country's Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

The session is continuing discussion of the land law. Over to our parliamentary correspondent.

[V. Tsygankov] Let us recall that this document has already undergone very thorough discussion at the session in two readings and that it has been published in the press. The Supreme Soviet instructed two committees—the committee on agrarian issues and the committee on issues of legislation and legality—to analyze and sum up the results of the debate which had been held and to take into consideration all remarks on and additions to the land law. Speaking on the results of this work of many months, one of its participants, Nikonov, Academy of Agricultural Sciences president, said:

[Begin Nikonov recording] More than 40 percent of all the proposals and remarks, approximately half of the deputies' proposals were dictated by a wish to elaborate in detail on proposals that had already been formulated. They are constructive and merit attention, but most of them relate more to the land rules of the union and autonomous republics. We considered everything in good faith. Bearing in mind that we are now speaking of the basis, we cannot take all of this into account and record it, but a great deal of material has been considered and we will send it to the union and autonomous republics for their use, because the multiplicity of the conditions of our country do not allow us to state how everything should be for everyone.

In their refined version, the draft basis represents a quite balanced juridical structure. The main provisions of the bill are undoubtedly the result of a consensus which was achieved with difficulty but, it would appear, was achieved. The necessary logical connection has now been attained among the various sections and articles on the basis of the concept which has been adopted. [end recording]

[Tsygankov] The session has begun article-by-article discussion of the bill and amendments to individual sections of it which are being proposed by deputies.

Economist Bunich Interviewed on Land Law

LD2802144690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1130 GMT on 28 February carries an eight-minute report by correspondent Andrey Nikiforov from the Kremlin on the USSR Supreme Soviet adoption of the USSR land law.

Nikiforov asks economist Pavel Bunich, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet committee on issues of the economic reform, to comment on this law.

The first important point, Bunich says, is that land will be paid for. The second point is that someone who wants to leave a collective farm to set up as a private farmer will be able to do so.

The fact that local soviets will be responsible for leasing out land will mean that the corresponding ministries may no longer be needed.

Another important point, he says, is that the law states that the land of a particular territory belongs to the people living on that territory have the right to use it. This means all the people who live there, rather than just the indigenous ethnic group, he adds.

Bunich goes on to discuss ways of ensuring that all farmers get a fair chance of being allotted a piece of land of suitable quality and in the area where they live.

Further Reportage of Presidency Debate

Baltic Deputies Abstain

LD2802130290 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Excerpts] The People's Deputies from the Baltics refused to take part in debates on the presidential status at the Supreme Soviet of the USSR session currently underway in Moscow. They also refused to participate in the voting procedure of the session. Egidijus Bickauskas, a jurist by profession and a People's Deputy, has informed us from Moscow that a mutual statement signed by the People's Deputies from the Baltics was handed in to the Supreme Soviet on the reasons for the refusal. [passage omitted]

Mikhail Gorbachev reacted angrily to the statement and suggested to exclude the Lithuanian delegation from the voting quorum. However, this would have been a rough violation of the Soviet Constitution and the regulations. According to Egidijus Bickauskas, this would mean the rejection of a Soviet republic by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR itself. [passage omitted]

Egidijus Bickauskas said the passing of this law demonstated once again the complete disregard for the point of view of the republic. The bill was not debated in the House of Nationalities seperately. In case it were, most probably it would not have got enough votes.

Ivashko Stresses Convening Congress

LD2802145590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2018 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Speech by Deputy Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukraine Communist Central Committee, from the recorded relay of the USSR Supreme Soviet evening session on 27 February chaired by M.S. Gorbachev at the Kremlin in Moscow]

[Text] Esteemed comrades, no additional details can add to the description of the picture of the situation in the country, a situation of which everyone is well aware. It is obvious that laws, including those that have been adopted by our Supreme Soviet, nearly always fail to be fulfilled. Contractual discipline has collapsed, like a house of cards. Law and order are very quickly getting worse. In my view, the perestroyka, begun in April 1980, is under threat. We now still have a chance to move away from a spontaneous development of events, having preserved the power of the people that is gaining a foothold and the development of democracy. I think that the proposals of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium create the necessary basis for this. One must make use of this opportunity without wasting time. The question has come to a head. The situation, in the economy in particular, is such that our republic is compelled, already at this stage, to take measures on its own in order to protect economically its own interests both from the arbitrariness of departments and from our unobliging partners in other regions of the country. This is not us shouting: Save yourselves in any way you can—it is, unfortunately, severe reality.

There is now an opportunity to implement in practice a sensible combination of political and economic sovereignty of union republics which wish to live within the composition of the renewed Soviet federation on the basis of a new union treaty, a federation that guarantees that there will be no arbitrariness whatsoever on the part of the central authorities. This combination is, in my view, the main thing. In order not to let our control over the situation slip away from us completely, speedy action is needed, not only in the provinces, but also in the center. In this context, changes within the structure and functions of the highest bodies of state power in the country are, in my view, inevitable and obligatory.

Very diverse views have today been heard from this rostrum. Despite their wide gamut and even polarity, in my view they contain one thing which has been voiced by, at least, many people: These changes are essential. This, surely, is the main thing. In this context I think that it is necessary to alter the very approach toward tackling this question.

First of all, taking account of the exceptional importance of everything we have been talking about today, it is necessary to single out the question of convening the congress. Points of view on the functions of this institution do change, indeed, but I completely disagree that we now have a right to block out the views of more than 1,500 people's deputies who are now absent from here: The congress must be convened.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the appropriate committees and commissions will have to eliminate, through the congress, the shortcomings in the documents mentioned in the speeches made by comrades. Should the need arise, alternative variants of specific provisions can be submitted to the USSR people's deputies by the congress. I share the comrades' view that the Supreme Soviet Presidium should immediately publish the drafts. This will make it possible to take into account the views of a greater number of people. But, in any case, tackling the questions concerning raising the effectiveness of state power in the country must not be postponed.

Deputies Voice Opinions

PM2802153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[PRAVDA parliamentary correspondent Yu. Ursov's record of "USSR People's Deputies' Opinions": "Concerning the Presidency"]

[Text] A keen and vigorous discussion of the possibility of establishing a presidential form of rule in the country is taking place in USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions. The PRAVDA editorial office asked a number of USSR people's deputies to give their views.

Yu. Blokhin (Kishinev).

What will the introduction of presidential rule do? To answer this question let us consider recent events, which have made this issue more topical. Increasing public tension, interethnic conflicts, polarization of social forces, new contenders for power.... Moreover, the amendment of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and the party's reorientation to purely political activity are effectively a foregone conclusion. As a result an executive power vacuum has to some extent formed. This necessitates a discussion of the institution of the presidency.

But will we be able to resolve all the acute problems overnight, by immediately introducing this key post? The haste with which many people want to effect this major change in the political system is worrying. In fact, any reform, any innovation needs, of course, to be carefully analyzed. **Certainly, in my view, the personality of the only really undisputed presidential candidate—M.S. Gorbachev—exercises a considerable influence on deputies. However I believe we should not create the post in the image of a particular person, but so that any politician, on assuming it, is orientated by the entire system of power towards democracy, which is able to protect him and the country's citizens. Irrespective of the president's personal qualities.** It is not clear either what kind of relationship there would be between the president and the USSR Supreme Soviet, what role its chairman would have.

These are very important issues, as is the general structure of the institution of the presidency. In the United States, for example, there is a governor in each state. What would we have in union and autonomous republics, krays and oblasts? Who would carry out the function of supreme executive authority there, considering the pressing need to decide the future political structure of the federation?

Convincing answers must be sought to these questions. One should not be afraid of objections concerning the presidency. A reasoned analysis of them can only strengthen the idea that it is expedient to introduce the post. Not only among us deputies, but also among voters, which is much more important.

V. Yarin (Nizhniy Tagil)

Recently I met with some Muscovites. An elderly woman with callused hands told me: "People are tired. I want to be able to go out into the street confident that nothing is going to happen to me. No less frightening than the rampant crime rate are, for me, the appeals made at rallies by alleged democrats, who do not realize to what they might lead the people." What did I learn from these words?

That there is an obvious need to strengthen executive authority. Why? On the one hand, the USSR Supreme Soviet is engaged in devising fundamental laws. Sometimes it is simply not in a position to react quickly to very alarming changes in the country. On the other hand, the state apparatus is being subjected to offensive criticism and demands of the "open fire on the headquarters" type are being made. People are opening fire in the literal and figurative sense. As a result, the authorities' actions to maintain order are ineffective. In many places executive organs are totally paralyzed.

It is no secret either that various very important decisions designed to maintain stability and prevent conflicts and bloodshed are often delayed. **Influential forces with their own interpretation of democracy, regarding it as a manifestation of weakness on the part of the state apparatus, have grown stronger. This is tempting certain people to seize power by unconstitutional means.**

Therefore, I believe the introduction of the post of president with the relevant monitoring mechanism could guarantee the protection of the interests of the majority of citizens. **A strong, viable democracy is impossible without strong executive authority. This combination—and not only for the solution of the acute problems of the moment—would be guaranteed with the introduction of the institution of the presidency.** It is also necessary to provide for a rigid monitoring mechanism and maximum glasnost when discussing the procedure for electing the president.

I believe that the establishment of a presidency could give executive authority the extra strength that is lacking at the moment when it comes to implementing laws successfully. This is an undoubted advantage of this form of rule. There are counterarguments, of course. They must be carefully analyzed, otherwise people may get the impression that in the end it will merely be a change of title for top officials.

G. Komarov (Frunze)

Many of my colleagues were rather surprised by the proposal to introduce presidential rule. But why surprised? It has been discussed for a long time. It is clear from the logic of events that a president is needed. But there are still strong memories of our difficult history, when unlimited power became the basis for lawlessness. In my view, these considerations are at the center of many arguments against the presidency. But should we be looking back all the time if we are heading toward a renewed socialism, a renewed political system? As for the doubts.... When talking about the presidency it is necessary to analyze in detail and enshrine in legislation juridical norms that guarantee against voluntary or involuntary abuse of power. This is all the more necessary in our society, which, alas, lacks strong civic traditions.

Of course, the presidency in itself is no panacea. Its introduction will not strengthen authority unless the corresponding executive mechanism is reinforced. Therefore, the presidential post should not be an end in itself, solely a reaction to an acute moment in time. We must also envisage a future in which, I am sure, our state will be a rule-of-law state. The post of president is an essential and important element of it. Therefore, we should be using the experience of developed democracies in our study of the functioning and legislative regulation of the activity of the presidency. We should not forget that the introduction of the actual presidency will have a practical influence on the formation of legislative, executive, and legal authority.

Privileges, Health Facilities Reexamined

90US0552A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 15 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent S.Ivanov: "The Directorate 'Lost Half Its Weight'"]

[Text] On 13 February a regular meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges was chaired by V.M. Primakov. What has been done to eliminate unjustified privileges? Among other things, a memorandum prepared by the commission said:

"The USSR Council of Ministers resolution dated 28 December 1989 determined that official cars for the heads of ministries and departments will be provided in the future on the basis of a conveyer system, within specified time limits, without assigning the cars to organizations but rather on contract, through dispatchers.

"By virtue of the USSR Council of Ministers instruction dated 1 February 1990, the distribution of goods from Enterprise No 208 to party, soviet, economic, and other

organizations has been discontinued. The products are channeled to day-care facilities and the trade establishments of consumer cooperatives. The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers dated 8 February of this year abolished the system of allocation of state dachas administered by the USSR KGB, the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs, and the USSR Council of Ministers for services to members of the Politburo, secretaries and heads of departments of the CPSU Central Committee, and members of the government. All of them will operate as boarding facilities. The 24 state dachas which have been vacated will be transferred to the health care system. Material and household services to former leaders of the party and the state have been abolished (a system of state dachas, transportation services, foodstuffs deliveries, servants)."

The last meeting discussed issues associated with the elimination of the Fourth Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health. What substantive accomplishments have there been in this matter? At the request of our correspondent, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.P. Biryukova comments:

"One-half of all the establishments of the former directorate have been transferred to the Ministry of Health. They have been used to set up diagnostic centers which will serve hundreds of thousands of people every year. All equipment has been transferred completely, down to the last screw. The sanatoriums and resort facilities will become rehabilitation centers for the handicapped and participants in the Great Patriotic War, labor veterans, people who have suffered from the Chernobyl accident, mothers of many children.... The budget of the former Fourth Main Directorate amounted to R130 million whereas funding for the entire health care system came to R28 billion. Therefore, the additional contribution amounts to a fraction of a percentage point.

"It may be more important that social justice is being restored.

"A treatment and prevention association will serve the functionaries of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, members of the Supreme Soviet, and all major events such as the congresses of people's deputies. In keeping with international protocol, we must provide medical support meeting world standards for members of government delegations visiting the USSR. One of the sanatoriums of the former Fourth Directorate will remain in the association for the specific purpose of serving foreigners on a commercial basis. Drugs and medical equipment will be purchased with the hard currency generated.

"Taking advantage of the fact that I am giving an interview to RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, I will refer to the article 'The Kremlin Hospital' in the 11 February issue. The article is correct. However, one fact is objectionable—that the wife of Sushkov, former deputy minister of foreign trade, was treated in the 'Kremlin hospital' after she was convicted. We looked into this, and it is not so. Perhaps, the correspondent used incorrect information. Sushkova is serving time, and there was no way for her to see Moscow physicians."

Soviet of Nationalities Agenda Viewed

90UN0960A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Report on interview with B.I. Oleynik, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by S. Karkhanin: "Priority of Accord"]

[Text] Just one week in the month of February separates the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet Third Session, which begins on Wednesday. Aside from the well-known bills of the "economic package," the people's deputies also have to examine a number of other most important documents, including legislative instruments concerning the federative arrangement of the Soviet Union, interethnic relations and public associations. These issues largely echo those discussed at the Central Committee Plenum. Our political correspondent interviewed B.I. Oleynik, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on the session agenda.

[Karkhanin] Boris Ilich, many events have occurred in the country in the short time since the Second Congress testifying to its quickened political pulse. How would you describe the situation which had taken shape on the eve of the Central Committee Plenum?

[Oleynik] The situation had become aggravated on all parameters—economic, national and, I would say, moral-ethical. Some universal exasperation was sensed in society. This can be felt at every step, even in contacts with one's own colleagues. The vibration of all structures, uncertainty about the future.... Such uncertainty has been given impetus, it seems to me, by the refugee problem. Whether we acknowledge this term or not, there are refugees. And not only from the Transcaucasus: Anxious movement, particularly among the Russian-speaking population, in line of ascent, what is more, has begun in some other republics also.

Not having modeled the development of events, we were caught unaware. Having concentrated our gaze on particular regions, we forgot about refugees like Russians, Ukrainians.... But they also have felt more than uncomfortable. This forgetfulness of ours could cost us dear for we have been taking in refugees from other regions, and the letters are coming: "For whom are you abandoning us Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians living outside of our republic?" The more so in that some of them left their native areas not of their own volition but because of assignments following higher educational institutions and because of organized recruitment for work. Are we casting them to the whim of fate?

This is why it is planned to include on the agenda of the upcoming session a discussion of a legislative instrument concerning people of nonindigenous nationalities residing in the republics. Reality suggests that such a law is needed and at once, what is more.

[Karkhanin] It is also planned to give a second reading to the draft Language Act. We recall the stormy debate on this document at the previous session. You, a poet who is well known in the country, know of the problems of language in detail, and I would like to know your assessment?

[Oleynik] I do not absolve from blame the people who went to take up permanent residence in another republic and who failed to study its language. But this is their misfortune also. Such was the general line, profoundly mistaken, and the costs of the "merger theory," but the Russian people, I would note, had absolutely no part in this. They also have suffered considerably in their own linguistic sphere. Russian is being eroded by the so-called "Russian of the outskirts," which is penetrating the press also.... I would add that conditions for learning the language of the indigenous nationality have not been created in many republics. This also is not only the fault but also the misfortune of the republics: Were I, a Ukrainian, to propose that Russian newcomers compulsorily study Ukrainian, I would immediately be accused of nationalism.

So let us share our misfortunes equally without heaping them onto some one people. The more so in that the policy of language leveling was pursued basically by "theorists" not of Russian nationality, Suslov included....

We all know the character of the Russian: He wears his heart on his sleeve, as they say, and will share with you his last crust. Who was it that bore the burdens of de-peasantization, de-kulakization, de-Cossackization—the Russians were in the forefront here. How is it possible to call them "occupiers," including in this phrase Russians and Ukrainians and, generally, all who speak Russian!

We entered the misfortune all together, so let us emerge from it fraternally, supporting one another, otherwise we will achieve nothing.

[Karkhanin] The future Federation Act providing for actual sovereignty for the republics is closely connected with this formulation of the question also. But on the draft agenda the document is only listed at the start of the second dozen items.

[Oleynik] I am convinced that it should have been inserted among the priority items. The roots of many troubles are to be found in the legislative vagaries concerning sovereignty. Yes, we have almost empty counters in the stores, but they will be completely empty unless we start from a solution of problems of federation. Hitherto the republics have been generally no more than "oblasts" of the center, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic not excluded. The sooner the republics are given real sovereignty, the better they will unite. Only free peoples may become real friends with one another.

Although I strongly advocate each republic having its official language, opportunities to study the language of the indigenous population must be afforded. But ignorance of this national language should not, in my opinion, be considered a pretext for an infringement of rights. If someone, auspicious conditions having been created, has no wish to learn, he should in the last resort hire an interpreter....

[Karkhanin] Strenuous work has been under way in recent weeks in the Supreme Soviet commissions and committees on the bills to be discussed at the session. At the same time, however, when blood was being shed in the Transcaucasus, leaders of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies were declaring that at a time of tragic events parliament remained on vacation, preferring not to interfere. Can this criticism be called justified?

[Oleynik] I do not know who was on vacation, but the Soviet of Nationalities has been working nonstop. Whether we are still keeping the public inadequately informed is another matter, but everyone knows what we have been involved in and when. Representatives of the commissions and committees have been involved practically daily with problems of interethnic relations, the situation in the Transcaucasus in particular. I myself have received refugees and met with a delegation of soldiers' mothers from Krasnodar—their sons were in the subdivisions transferred to Azerbaijan. Many of us have traveled to the "flash points" themselves, and I myself returned from Yerevan only recently. Generally, we have done what we could, although not everything has been successful, of course. All of us, I myself primarily, are still only learning state approaches.

[Karkhanin] The bill on public associations, following the decision on Article 6 of the constitution adopted at the Central Committee Plenum, will certainly give rise to tense debate. At the previous session you voted against the question of Article 6 being discussed at the second congress. What explains your position?

[Oleynik] Yes, I voted against it at that time, and I really came in for it for this in the Ukraine from certain publications.... But even now I am convinced that I acted correctly. The initiative pertaining to Article 6 should, in my opinion, have been taken by the party itself, so it could confirm that it is really in a state of renewal. This is what in fact happened. I am sure that this is only to the party's benefit.

Returning to the question of public associations, I would like to say this. If there is some time in our country a multiparty system, let there be among the first of the new parties an agrarian party, there are such in East European countries, incidentally. It is well known that the peasant will never strike because it is a great sin if the grain begins to fail. But how long can we speculate on the

nobility of the farmers? If the countryside were suddenly to go on strike, incidentally, everyone would very quickly see for himself that no messiah would convert a piece of anthracite into a hunk of bread. Yet the "debt to the countryside" formula has once again in some marvelous way been transformed with us into its opposite: "the debt of the countryside...." Generally, only the rural dwellers themselves can defend their interests, operating through public, and in the future possibly, political, associations. So I am unequivocally for the creation of an agrarian party, the more so in that it already has a healthy nucleus from the ranks of the agrarian specialist deputies.

[Karkhanin] What in this connection are your thoughts in connection with the land act?

[Oleynik] There are strong farms that should be left alone, the weak ones helped. At the same time, however, we should give the land to those who wish to take it, but not to own but to possess. Otherwise it would not be those who would work on it who would be engaging in the resale of land. The rest would have to be farm laborers.

[Karkhanin] You have said that in the Ukraine both you and your colleagues are frequently criticized in the press. I would like to know your opinion of something in this connection. After a TASS correspondent had in a paragraph on a meeting in Manezhnaya Square commented critically on certain slogans and speeches, the organizers of the meeting immediately picketed the agency building. This could, furthermore, have created considerable difficulties in the work of reporters and the support services and even entailed material damage. The people who organized the picket like to talk about glasnost and pluralism and about the Press Act, which is also to be discussed at the session. However, does this conduct not remind you of "tyrannical radicalism," arm-twisting and the aggressive intolerance of dissidence?

[Oleynik] There is the term "tyranny of the majority," but it may also be assumed that there is a "tyranny of the minority...." I believe it is necessary to work on a parity basis and not pressure one another. Pressure is closely connected with authoritarianism, which, if it comes to that, all radicals in other countries are protesting.

Striking steps and words far from always achieve their intended goal. In the evaluation of the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Party Congress, say, I personally would not have resorted to such wording as "rupture" [razryv]. I have been to the Baltic and can imagine the situation in which the Lithuanian Communist Party has found itself. Perhaps its independence will not contribute to the republic's secession from our union. Although, of course, such actions by our Lithuanian colleagues do not, to put it mildly, contribute to party unity.

[Karkhanin] Boris Ilich, it is often heard that the difference in the pace of economic and political reform is creating a pair of "scissors," whose ends are moving further and further apart, and that society is feeling this keenly. A "package" of most important economic laws which have been submitted for public discussion is on the session agenda. Nonetheless, rebukes of the Supreme Soviet are heard incessantly: We are moving too slowly.

[Oleynik] Yes, in the speech category, perhaps, we are already in the latter half of the 21st century, but in the economy and in actual action, somewhere in the 1940's.... It is too easy restructuring in words, seeking authority by, one person having moved left, moving even further left. Many voters are being "bought" precisely with the vocal effect. If you curse the authorities, you are, consequently, a democrat and at the front of all those under the red or Andreyev or yellow and blue flag. So, from mass meeting to mass meeting—instead of picking up the trowel and building a home. There are groups to which the continuous mass meeting is profitable: They know only how to set others tasks and to demand an account the next day. Although it is not known who gave them the authority for this. But who will work?

In addition, somewhere people are working, but emissaries immediately come bustling about, inciting them to strike. Is this permissible?

[Karkhanin] There are 45 items on the draft agenda of the session. There is among them also the question of the fight against crime. Much has been said, and fairly, recently about the incomprehensible passiveness of the law enforcement authorities in the fight against those who are instigating interethnic conflicts, and not only in the Transcaucasus, what is more. The commissions and committees should, I believe, and could act more assertively.

[Oleynik] I agree. The instigators should be found and punished. If these are people blinded by national intolerance, the punishment should be strict. If, however, they are provocateurs deliberately endeavoring to compromise this people or the other and to sow distrust among them, they should, in my opinion, be punished even more strictly. A provocateur is, I believe, worse than a criminal.

Political & Social

Shishlin Explains 'Executive Presidency'

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[Text] Moscow, March 1 KYODO—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will be elected as president with expanded executive powers when the Congress of People's Deputies meets in mid-March, his aide predicted Wednesday.

Nikolay Shishlin, a Gorbachev aide and adviser to the Communist Party Central Committee, told KYODO NEWS SERVICE that the Congress of People's Deputies, the country's supreme legislature, will be certain to create the new post in its extraordinary session on March 12 and elect Gorbachev as the first executive president on March 13.

Shishlin said this as his personal view.

Creation of the new post received overwhelming support at a recent meeting of the Supreme Soviet, the inner parliament.

The executive president is to have sweeping powers, including the right to declare war in the case of armed attack on the country and propose to the Supreme Soviet the appointment and release from duties of the prime minister, Supreme Court chairman, and other top officials.

Shishlin also said a new post of vice presidency is expected to be created in the future and the Supreme Soviet presidency abolished.

He said the party in its convention in late June or early July will name Gorbachev to assume the new post of party president.

But Shishlin said that another person will be named in the near future to replace Gorbachev as party president.

The quick installation of the powerful executive presidency is required not only because of increasing social instability in the Soviet Union but also because of dangers inherent in the current democratic moves, Shishlin said, suggesting Gorbachev is determined to continue a top-down approach to perestroyka (reform).

He suggested that Gorbachev succeeded in creating the new party and executive presidencies by first conceding to majority conservatives and then accepting reformists' proposals such as a multiparty system.

Shishlin said the country has virtually moved to a multiparty system and that the Communist Party might be divided with some members leaving the organization.

He also said each Soviet republic has the right to be independent, but ruled out the possibility that a referendum in favor of cessation will mean immediate independence.

Any republic which has voted for independence should initiate talks with the federal government as well as with other republics to ensure that a cessation would not jeopardize the interest of the federation and individual republics, he said.

Political Scientist on Presidential System

PM2802114490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 1

[Interview with Professor A. Mishin, doctor of juridical sciences and political scientist, by observer L. Nikitinskiy under the rubric "On Parliamentary Debates": "Top Man"—date, place not given]

[Text] Professor A. Mishin, doctor of juridical sciences and political scientist, discusses the problems of presidential power in a conversation with our observer L. Nikitinskiy.

[Nikitinskiy] The CPSU Central Committee Plenum which has just finished put the question of establishing presidential power before the country's highest legislative organs. Literally any day now it will be discussed. Such a change came as a surprise to many....

[Mishin] Not to me. The whole logic of perestroyka's development has led us to the need for an individual presidency. There is just such a proposal in Andrey Sakharov's draft constitution. When a ship gets almost out of control in a raging storm the captain's role becomes decisive. Though in a calm sea too the captain still runs the ship, and not some "labor collective council."

The mistakes and abuses of our former leaders led to a situation where in the first stages of perestroyka and democratization the very idea of a presidency generally seemed odious. Only six months ago the Latvian delegation's proposal in the USSR Supreme Soviet to establish presidential power in the Baltic republics caused a shock in the hall. This, people said, contradicts the principle of full power for the soviets.

In actual fact if anything contradicts the full power of the soviets, it is the absolute power of the party apparatus. But the soviets, except the Supreme Soviet in the last year, have never enjoyed really full power. When we substitute a president openly elected by the people for a party leader who is actually appointed by a narrow Politburo group and who has highly ambiguous status as head of state, the soviets' authority will not be weakened but strengthened.

[Nikitinskiy] But who is this "president"? So far all we have heard of him is that he is a character who is in "someone else's" historical play.

[Mishin] The president is a figure who embodies and heads the executive authority in the state. In presidential republics he combines the functions of head of state and

prime minister. In the United States, for example, there is no government at all in the European sense of the word.

[Nikitinskiy] Sometimes the word "president" has been bandied about in our political lexicon too. Can it be said that we have experience of a presidency in our country?

[Mishin] It is necessary to distinguish clearly between the de jure and de facto aspects. If you imagine that in 50 years or so the archives were to contain no evidence other than the official text of the Constitutions of 1936 and 1977, then a future historian would decide in all innocence that the USSR "was" a parliamentary republic.

However de facto, examining the whole postrevolutionary period of the USSR's history, we find that power was always concentrated in the hands of one leader. Although more or less authoritarian, more or less authoritative, the leader always ruled as the sole commander. De facto until 1989 power belonged wholly, and even now still belongs to a considerable extent, to the party or more precisely to the party apparatus. I would not call it a ruling party. In conditions where nobody disputes its authority the party apparatus holds undivided sway over the country. The CPSU Central Committee general secretary was always a "dictator" by virtue of his powers, although in his use of power he could vary from cruel tyranny to relative liberalism. But at no time was this power ever under the people's control through their elected organs.

[Nikitinskiy] In that case why did the CPSU Central Committee Plenum officially come forward with the initiative to establish presidential power?

[Mishin] That can be fully explained. Look closely at the events taking place in the country. The revolution controlled from above, begun on the initiative of M.S. Gorbachev and the party circles supporting him, generated an uncontrolled revolution from below by approximately the middle of last year. The miners' strike was the first signal. After that the people swept away middle ranking party apparatchiks in Chernigov, Tyumen, Donetsk, Volgograd, and Sverdlovsk—and this process is continuing in other regions of the country.

For its part the party took a decisive, perhaps crucial, step toward democracy by renouncing Article 6 of the USSR Constitution at the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum and by declaring the possibility of implementing a multiparty system in the country. As a Communist, I warmly welcome this step. But these revolutions from above and below while inherently right are fraught with the risk of a crisis of anarchy. That is why the question of a president arose.

[Nikitinskiy] The main argument against establishing presidential power boils down to the danger of its rebirth as a dictatorship.

[Mishin] In the United States strong presidential power has existed for over 200 years, and there has not been any dictatorship there. Iosif Dzhugashvili, without occupying, as a rule, any of the prominent posts in legal state structures (the "presidents" of his time were people like Kalinin and Shvernik—completely useless figures), established a tyranny which was perhaps the bloodiest in the whole history of mankind. Incidentally, the structures which delivered the tyrant Stalin to power are preserved in their previous form and could be used by a new dictator.

I do not believe that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev could become that; his very personality, in a sense, is guaranteeing the country a democratic path of development. But Gorbachev's official position in the situation that has arisen is insecure.

The CPSU Central Committee has elected its protege and so can recall him from among the people's deputies. Is this a realistic possibility? When I read the Central Committee February Plenum speech I thought that it was. In that event Gorbachev would automatically lose the post of USSR Supreme Soviet chairman.

A political crisis against the background of an economic one is fraught with unpredictable consequences. However, one can forecast with a high degree of probability the restoration of totalitarian structures if Gorbachev resigns. A president lawfully elected by the people should avert such a crisis. He must become the guarantor against tyranny, against a return to the Stalinist model of a "firm hand."

[Nikitinskiy] A democratic version of a "firm hand"?

[Mishin] At this moment we need strong executive power. The USSR Supreme Soviet can pass the most ideal laws on property and land but there will be nobody to put them into practice. Party organs clinging to the vestiges of power in the provinces are not bound by laws. A precisely structured executive power has not been created in the country, judicial power is crushed and indecisive. Party, economic, and the so-called soviet organs in the provinces are capable of sabotaging new economic laws, as they are already sabotaging the Law on the Lease System which has been in force since 1 January.

The power that the party has given him is patently not enough for Gorbachev. The people's will must be the source of that power. The power of the party must be transformed into the power of the people by establishing a presidency and electing a president. He should be elected, I am convinced, by direct general elections. A presidential mandate received from the Congress of USSR People's Deputies will not permit the creation of a strong and independent executive power.

[Nikitinskiy] Are you talking with such certainty about Gorbachev as the future president?

[Mishin] I will vote for him.

Ryzhkov Interviewed on 'Current Difficulties'

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[Interview with Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, by Gostelradio correspondent Dmitriy Biryukov, following 23 February Council of Ministers session in Oval Hall—recorded]

[Text] [Biryukov] Nikolay Ivanovich, we are all concerned about the current difficulties. What do you think needs to be done at present, first and foremost, to gradually stabilize the situation in the country step by step?

[Ryzhkov] I think that the question you have just asked me is at present concerning all our country's citizens. It also concerns the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. I think that at the present time no one is indifferent to this question. Therefore, I would like to say the following. If one is to assess the situation in the country as a whole, I regard it as a most complex one, a very complex one, and it is necesary from such standpoints to examine both the situation and our further steps in the development of the economy and also the political stabilization of the state.

The restructuring processes have at the present time entered a stage when everything, in point of fact, has become bound up together—both the positive tendencies which have been and are taking place at present in society and everything that has begun in a negative way to accompany these positive phenomena. Precisely at the present time everything is interwoven and I think that every person and every citizen of our country should now stop for an instant, perhaps, ponder what is happening—there are causes after all—and look at and analyze all the processes that are taking place in the country. He should take a look around himself and make an analysis with a view to drawing the appropriate conclusions and, as they say, moving ahead which is what we have all the time been striving for in recent years. I think this is the main thing, that we, the whole of society, should have a very serious think about all the processes.

We can see how fast the democratic processes have been moving forward. This is a positive phenomenon. The country has long been ready for the democratic steps that have been made of late. It is a command of the times and a demand of the times, and it cannot be said that this is not a positive process. It is a positive process in society, and we have considered that we should continue on democratic foundations to construct all our relations and to construct the state and relations within the state.

We have plans of action worked out, but as far as the economy is concerned, you know that a program for our country's economic improvement has been adopted which encompasses the periods of both 1990 and the subsequent years. That is, we have something positive and programs which should, to a certain degree, be the pivot of all our steps forward.

Be that as it may, we sense that we are seeing a great deal of all kinds of destabilizing elements on the wave of democratization and on the wave of those transformations taking place today in society. Therefore, you see, the situation is now such that we must sort out the truth from the lies. Because today things are sometimes concealed by a slogan, a specious slogan. This is, Everyone is for perestroyka. But in the end, when you begin to get to the essence, then many slogans are, for the most part, far from perestroyka; on the contrary, they lead to the destruction of those principles and those premises which are incorporated in our restructuring process.

Therefore, today we should defend perestroyka. We should even defend those gains of recent years which we have made. Those same issues of democratization—we should defend them. But democratization should be organized, clear-cut, but it cannot be a destabilizing democratization. No society yet has ever developed normally if spontaneity [stikhiya] rages there. This is a law. This is elementary. Therefore, only a highly organized society, a democratic society can go forward, can achieve results, but by no means spontaneity nor anarchy. It will bring nothing to our country. It will cause destabilization. It will be a vicious circle, when destabilizing elements or destabilizing phenomena, as the saying goes, affect the economy. We start to work worse, to live worse, and it all comes back to destabilization again.

A kind of vicious circle comes about, from which one must eventually break out. So, I think that today we are exactly at that complex moment of our life and we must, as they say, get to the bottom of this business and society must eventually give an assessment of it: where there are positive elements and movements, and where there are destructive phenomena which are useful for the whole people.

If one is to speak of the economy, I want to remind you that two months ago the Second Congress of People's Deputies considered a program to improve the economy, which the government had submitted. You remember how earnestly this question was discussed at the Second congress. The discussion went on for five days. There were many speeches. In effect, the question was raised of a vote of no-confidence in the government. If the program is supported it means the government is trusted; if not then such a program or a similar one must be submitted for consideration by a different government. In this case the government received support because it seems the people's deputies still analyzed correctly the proposals that were made. And we think that this program of action is, in general, not even a governmental program. Perhaps it was a governmental program when we submitted it. But once it was adopted by the Second Congress of the People's Deputies it was already a program of the people.

We are convinced that today there is no alternative to that program. There is none. I am not saying it is ideal; I am not saying it requires no amendments. Life will always make corrections to it, especially on tactical matters. But it is a program that enables us to get out of that situation we are in and, most importantly, to move ahead.

It is from these positions that the program of actions, in our view, is a constructive element and I think that our task is exactly in making our society, all the people and all the working people, united around it. So we must all realize this: If we carry out what we have planned we will move ahead; but if we, as they say, do not put this program at the top of our agenda then what do we put there?

Of course, a large role is assigned in this program to 1990 and to the subsequent years. We have anlyzed the work of January. Of course, there are positive shifts. There are. Consumer-goods production is increasing, although I understand that people expect, of course, everything to appear a little quicker on shop shelves and so forth. This is natural, the natural desire of all people. But the process itself has started. Perhaps it is not of the scale which we planned for 1990, but, nonetheless, the month of January already gives justification for us to say that perestroyka, structural perestroyka of the economy—in the first place for us to procude goods for the population—this process has already started.

But if I were to speak frankly, we are not satisfied with the month of January. We are not satisfied because, all the same, the economy has been developing sluggishly, and not at the pace which we planned for 1990. To spell out figures, it works out that all output produced in the national economy is one percent lower in comparison with January of last year. This is for the most part a negative phenomenon, although we realize that since structural perestroyka is underway, certain industries have a lower rate than last year, some should be higher. But, be that as it may, this, of course, is an insufficient rate.

[Biryukov] Nikolay Ivanovich, forgive me, but, so that it is more comprehensible to viewers [as heard]: one percent seems so little. What does one percent mean on our scale?

[Ryzhkov] In January the country as a whole produced R75 billion worth of output. So you can imagine one hundredth of that, or one percent. In other words, one percent of the national economy is a very large amount, and of course with an economy on this scale each percent is felt immediately.

We have analyzed what is happening, and this is connected, of course, with the first part of my answer to your question, in which I mentioned the processes taking place in the country. For you cannot view the economy in isolation from the overall political situation in the country. You cannot. These two things are always mutually complementary. They develop in a single environment—both the political and the economic aspects. So if you think the economy will develop in a certain way in isolation from the evolving political situation, this is a very big mistake. These are organic processes, and they can only be regarded as a united whole.

So, in January, and indeed at the beginning of February, we have also had, of course, our usual shortcomings, which are characteristic both of the preperestroyka processes and the prestroyka processes—such as imbalance in the national economy, i.e. an imbalance somewhere, issues connected with labor discipline and our mismanagement which is literally ruining us everywhere. These are the usual causes, about which we talk a lot, but unfortunately do very little.

But I have to say that various other factors, ones that were not previously characteristic of our national economy, have appeared and begun to take a very serious toll. Causes that have not confronted us before.

Today they are beginning to have a very strong influence on the national economy. Consider: In January, we lost 4.5 million man-days—4.5 million. If you take that in terms of production, the direct losses are R400 million, the direct losses. But if you take into account that in our country each type of production is then transferred to other quality and other factories and so on, you have to count it in billions. We've been losing R2 or R3 billion solely because there are strike movements going on, strikes going on, and this worsening of interethnic relations, especially in the Transcauscasus. And this has dealt a direct blow to the national economy. So in Azerbaijan today the factories are not working. This of course cannot fail to affect work in the country as a whole. In Armenia the pace is far slower than it was even last January when the earthquake happened, when a vast economic potential was knocked out. So we're going lower than that point. Georgia's economic development is very weak. And, therefore, all these destabilizing interethnic blockades of all kinds, threats of all kinds—I have to say that recently the government has been receiving all the time —now from one quarter and now from another—demands, demands in categorical form, saying: Find a solution or else we'll strike.

That really won't do. How can the state work normally if there are constant threats of strikes? It can't. The national economy cannot function normally. And so these destabilizing factors are, of course, having a very strong influence on the economy. I am not speaking of the fact that labor discipline in our country has declined—contract discipline, industrial discipline. We can't go on like this. We simply cannot behave in the way we're behaving. And one could cite a great many further causes, of all kinds, that are very seriously affecting the economy today; and the upshot is that we all say the economy is the basis. It's the basis of society, of our development; and we're very casual today in our attitude to these processes that are taking place.

Or take the closure of factories. Today dozens and hundreds of works are being closed. We realize that we have a very great many problems. Ecologically, we have an exceedingly large number of problems. We are aware that 104 large towns in our country are in a very serious state from the ecological point of view. We know all this perfectly well and we are drawing up an action program. But these are measures which cannot be implemented in just a month or two. At the same time, all over the place, amidst a lot of fuss and clamor, so to speak, we are beginning to close down works. You will remember how controversial the question of medicines was at the First Congress of People's Deputies.

Last year, despite our very difficult hard currency situation, we were compelled to buy in R600 million worth of medicines abroad, R600 million. We have now carried out estimates, and the works associated with medicines which have either been closed down or are being closed down account for a loss of R600 million worth of capacity. That is, the capacities we are closing down amount to the amount we bought in. Take the Nairit works in Armenia. Three weeks ago I was forced to make a formal request to the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the Armenian republic that this works should not be closed down. The works is still not in operation, by the way. A total of 750 works are being brought to a halt by it, 750 works throughout our country. This amounts to R12 billion worth of output. And this includes medicines.

Thus, we think that together with the positive processes taking place both in the political system and in the democratic system and in the economy, we must now finally assess our position. The country needs order. Order is needed. And I am declaring on behalf of the government that we shall do everything we can to ensure that the working people can go about their lives normally.

We realize that today the working people are worried, worried that they cannot live normally, that they cannot go about their lives as they should be able to in a civilized society, what with violations of law and order, and so on. And we are not just worried, but we are taking, and will continue to take, very severe measures to impose order—within the framework of legality. Whatever the law lays down, everyone must answer for it. And we are firm on this point, and I am stating bluntly that we cannot continue, as it were, to put up with what is happening and what is causing very great alarm to the working people of our country. So that is, perhaps, how I would answer your question.

[Biryukov] I have a second question which might seem a little unusual to you, but when you mentioned slogans and whether they correspond to reality or not, I decided to ask the following question. When holding rallies and demonstrations, many movements and their organizers are now giving prominence to, among others, slogans like "Help Gorbachev," "Help Ryzhkov," and "Help Perestroyka," and one can predict that slogans like this will be proclaimed on 25 February as well. What do you think of these slogans?

[Ryzhkov] I have respect for such slogans only when they are rooted in reality, when they really are aimed at some sort of constructiveness. It is then that I respect these slogans, and not because they, say, help Comrade Gorbachev or Ryzhkov. In the end, it's not a matter of two personalities, but, I suppose, of the life of our society and our people.

When we were working out the economic recovery program which I mentioned earlier, I have to say that perhaps for the first time we took an unorthodox approach. We conducted that work in an unorthodox way. We knew there was a certain number of proposals of various sorts, including proposals from informal organizations. We sought out those people, organizations, and proposals and considered them all very closely. And some of them really were incorporated in the basis of our program, and we had nothing but gratitude toward those people with their, perhaps, even unorthodox way of thinking. We used everything that was positive.

As for the rest of the proposals at that time, we voiced our views about what we did not agree with, and spoke clearly about this at the Congress of People's Deputies—that the government had not agreed with one provision, did not agree, or that we had agreed with another provision and had laid the foundations, so to speak, for our plan of action.

I'm mentioning this to somehow reply to your question. We want any organization or person with any constructive proposals to put them forward. And, incidentally, we ourselves are seeking out such people. We call in a very large number of scientists and specialists, we receive very many letters, and we are indeed doing everything to avoid missing any serious proposals. Therefore, from the point of view of dialogue, the government is open to this. And I can state now that all proposals, constructive proposals that are voiced will, of course, definitely be thoroughly studied. We shall conduct a dialogue. We shall consider them.

That is, there is no point in dividing things up. We must find solutions that will, in the end, help us to progress, that will help us to overcome the difficulties which we have come up against today. For this reason we are not dividing things into those that were contributed by the government and those contributed by others. For this reason we, the government, is open, open for constructive dialogue. But I would like to say that this dialogue must be a constructive one, the proposals must be specific ones, because simply putting forward slogans, things in the nature of slogans that are not, however, backed up by any serious substance—such slogans are only for rallies. But we have to sit down at the table, sit down at the table and examine and look at these proposals. The government is open to that kind of dialogue.

and we shall hold any discussions. Everything that is aimed at improving the state of affairs we shall receive with great gratitude.

Finally, I would like to say that in life there is both politics and politicking. There are the genuine interests of human beings, of the people, and there are emotions and personal ambitions. This is something that should not be forgotten where political decisions and other political campaigns are concerned. Behind all this lies the destiny of our great people, the destiny of our great motherland.

Slyunkov Opens Scientific Management Forum

LD1902144190 Moscow TASS in English 1244 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—Soviet Communist Party Politburo member Nikolay Slyunkov has called for forming a new system of scientific and technological management rather than restructuring the old one.

"So far, we have failed to achieve a breakthrough in science and technology development rates," he said, opening an all-union conference on scientific and technological management here today.

Slyunkov noted that progress in science and technology was inseparable from the socio-economic development of the country. He underlined the need to ensure enterprises' economic interest in producing high-tech and competitive products, and to create effective systems to plan and finance scientific projects.

The conference will discuss a plan to enhance the effectiveness of the work of various scientific organisations and apply more extensively advances in science and technology in the economy.

Decisions by participants in the forum should form the basis of the legislation regulating scientific and technical activity in the country at the present stage.

Delivering the key report at the conference, Academician Nikolay Laverov, deputy premier of the USSR and chairman of the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology, noted that de-centralising management, democratising it on a sound legal foundation and using methods of economic regualtion are the salient features of the new system of scientific and technological management.

The three-day conference attracted about a thousand Soviet scientists, leading specialists, representatives of ministries and agencies, the people's deputies of the USSR.

The forum was organised by the USSR Committee on Science and Technology.

Probe of Gorbachev, Yazov Activities Urged

LD2802181190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 28 Feb 90

[From the press review, presented by Algirdas Usas]

[Text] [Usas] I would think that Page 7 of ATGIMIMAS [Sajudis newspaper published in Vilnius] would be most interesting to those who read this paper. Here an abridged version of an article from GOLOS IZBIRATELYA, a newspaper published and confiscated here in Vilnius, has been republished by ATGIMIMAS. The publications are Telman Gdlyan's speech on 9 January to the voters of Tushino Rayon and the editor-in-chief of GOLOS IZBIRATELYA (Shemayev's) interview with N. Ivanov.

Here are several excerpts from which you will understand what this is all about. It's all about supreme power and Mikhail Gorbachev.

[Announcer Sigita Stankeviciute] So, T. Gdlyan makes the accusation: As a lawyer, I demand that criminal proceedings be issued against the president on the basis of Article 170 Part Two. The investigation of this case should be handed over to an independent prosecutor. If the conscience and the hands of the general secretary are clean, then he has nothing to be afraid of. Presidents of the United States, France, Latin America, and others are being checked.

Raisa Maksimovna and Defense Minister Yazov were chief managers of a great construction project in Yalta. One can imagine the amount of building material, technical equipment, and soldiers mobilized by them for the construction of this installation, while they abused their official positions. I do not even know how much money was taken from the party funds.

While in the post of first secretary of the Stavropol Kray party committee, Mikhail Gorbachev took money from people who worked in trade organizations. It would be right to ask the following question. Why have these allegations, this material not yet been verified?

Many people know about these facts; these facts need to be investigated; there should be an objective and fundamental investigation. It has to be proved whether he is innocent or the relevant assessment should be given to his actions.

I demand that a quorum of lawyers be convened.

[Usas] Meanwhile, N. Ivanov answered questions posed by Shemayev, the editor. The editorial office of our paper would like to present the very subtle one, which is: Is Gorbachev really the patron of the mafia? This is what Gdlyan asked publicly on 9 January. And this is what Ivanov had to say.

[Stankeviciute] I can also confirm what is indisputable to us. No one else but Gorbachev is the chief patron of the mafia in this country. I can make further comment on

this statement on the basis of specific situations which are connected with the investigation of the Kremlin-Uzbekistan case.

[Usas] Of course, we do not take any responsibility for the objectivity and authenticity of these statements.

Defense Ministry Dachas Criticized

PM2302180490 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 18 Feb 90 p 4

[Gleb Pyanykh article: "Too Much for General, Too Little for Children"—last two paragraphs are editorial afterword]

[Text] The article "How Nice It Is To Be a General" (MN No. 1,1990) mentioned 30 impressive dachas near Moscow for the defence department leaders. They were built by the Defence Ministry next to an unfinished hospital building and hostels for the medical staff. To date MN has received only one written response to that article—a personal letter from Konstantin Kochetov, First Deputy Minister of Defence.

"I deem it necessary to make the question clear.

"The construction of the state service dacha mentioned in your paper was done on the same basis as the other dachas of the Defence Ministry—according to a 1981 resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers.

"The choice of site and designing of it were done in 1988. I couldn't take part in the solution of these questions, because at the time I was the CO of the troops in the Transcaucasian Military Area and then—of the Moscow Military Area.

"The construction started in March, 1989. To date I haven't visited this dacha under construction and I don't intend to occupy it. The Defence Ministry has decided to turn it into a kindergarten.

[Signed] General of the Army K. Kochetov"

A Koshkin, chief of the administrative-economic department of the Defence Ministry, informed us that in 1981, the Council of Ministers ordered the construction of 34 dachas because at that time there had been a lot of individual decision taken to offer service dachas to high-ranking Generals, and because there were not enough houses ready. The decision was, in the main, fulfilled by the construction of the 29 dachas mentioned in the article. According to A. Koshkin, one of the dachas was intended for K. Kochetov.

Before the dacha can be transferred to children, it must be substantially reconstructed. A bedroom will be made out of two rooms, a kitchen and a toilet will be rebuilt and the furniture will be changed. The leaders and staff of the hospital, for whose children the kindergarten has been proposed, are afraid that the reconstruction of this house, in which hardly more than 60 children will be able to live, may slow down the construction of a kindergarten for 240-300 children which is planned to be completed in the next two years.

From the editors: So, the situation is clear for one of the 29 dachas. And what will happen to the rest? Will their present or planned occupants follow the example of First Deputy Minister Kochetov? The question remains open—in the six weeks since the aforementioned publication in MN No.1 the Defence Ministry has failed to give any other replies. But, then, this isn't the first time they have failed to do so. Maybe this is so that, after the next analysis of how the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of April 29, 1989 ("On Central Press Coverage of Life and Activities in the Soviet Armed Forces"), is fulfilled, they can note, as was already done last November 30, that... "a number of mass media organizations continue their biased coverage of the USSR Armed Forces..."?

We think that the State-Law and Ideology Departments of the CPSU Central Committee would win greater credibility if they'd ask the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy (with whom they cooperate closely) to start a more responsible dialogue with the mass.

Abolition of Food Privileges Discussed

PM1602100590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Sergey Kolesnikov under "Viewpoint" rubric: "Requiem for 'Ration' or Once More About Special Privileges"]

[Text] First a little history. That date—1 September 1988—deserves to be written into the annals of the history of perestroyka, but for some reason it has gone unnoticed. On that day, the "therapeutic nutrition canteen" on Moscow's Granovskiy Street closed down. Some 5,500 people—the top echelon of management—no longer could enjoy the preferential "ration" at reduced rates. It is true that this category of leaders still had its weekly orders at their work places, but the range of food was considerably reduced and they paid full price, although medicinal sausage from the "special shop" shown not so long ago on Central Television was occasionally discovered in the twenty-ruble shopping bags. On the other hand, other goods in short supply no longer found their way there.

I am describing in such detail the changes in the menu of a small group of management workers merely to introduce clarity to the extremely confused "ration" issue, although I understand the degree of risk: Involvement in a theme painfully inflamed in the public awareness as a rule gives rise to an immediate and, most important, unambiguous reaction. But we must still look into the matter.

Of course, the measures which have been taken have not increased the amount of caviar or sausage in the stores,

nor has the main aim of the elimination of the "special service" on Granovskiy Street been achieved: allaying passions and satisfying the sense of social justice. First, because our untrusting public opinion discerned in the decision which was taken the latest "machinations of an apparatus clinging to its privileges." But I think that there was also another and weightier reason here: After all, the workers of local organs in many of the country's oblasts continued to enjoy semilegal or totally illegal benefits in food supplies before people's eyes. As is well known, it was this which sometimes served as the tiny spark from which there was kindled the violent flame of mass indignation and then even the content of the trunk of the executive committee Volga automobile became the detonator for a change in the oblast leadership.

But today we are nonetheless talking about something else. About the theme of the "party apparatus' privileges," which has recently come to the fore. Here is a quotation from a letter by Ulyanovsk inhabitant A. Oparin printed in PRAVDA's "Debating Sheet" on Page 5: "I do not object to hign wages for party workers. But we are all against the institutions with the 'special' prefix created for them, with goods and services in short supply. And truly arguments in defense of this system sound unconvincing today. All this is sometimes too blatant. And an end must be put to it."

I shall not venture to judge Ulyanovsk, but if we take, for instance, the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, the picture will be somewhat different. For instance, you find that there is not so much as a trace of any "special stores." There are none of the bargain sales of imported and Soviet items in short supply so popular today. Even the notorious State Department Store "section" about which so much has been written in recent years has long been peacefully selling matryeshka dolls for foreign delegations.

Incidentally, I shall cite one figure to give a specific idea. Of the slightly more than 5,500 people attached in previous years to the ration system whom we mentioned above, there were about 500 party workers. They are the leaders of various subdivisions of the Central Committee apparatus and advisers. The majority of responsible workers, not to mention technical workers, did not have these benefits.

A recent news item: In late January, the Central Committee apparatus party organization decided that workers who used to have the right to weekly orders would now no longer receive them. What gave rise to this decision? After all, the system of food orders is not god knows what kind of "privilege," there are many labor collectives where they are more expensive and richer. But I think in the present situation the decision is the correct one. The selection of dishes in the official canteen looks far more modest now and it is in no way reminiscent of what were frankly restaurant-style menus, which were printed by some publications.

But how do matters stand in other organizations? On 1 February a government ruling was issued providing for the repeal of the system for the supply of foodstuffs for party, soviet, economic, and public organizations. The so-called 208th base, which used to supply about 400 organizations—from the Council of Ministers to "Mosfilm" and the society of hunters and fishermen—with high-quality food has been switched to a different speciality. Henceforth 26 boarding schools, 12 children's homes, the hospital named for Botkin (and the entire hospital, not just its "privileged" block), the Sklifosovskiy institute, sanatoria, and children's medical institutions have been attached to it. The canteens and buffets of the ministries, departments, and union and republican organizations are being removed from the "special supplies." A small quantity of food is being sent to service state receptions and for representation purposes but in a considerably smaller quantity than in the past. The union republic councils of ministers have been instructed to take relevant decisions. A few days ago this had already been done in the Russian Federation.

It is true that I should like to warn against one thing: Against the struggle against "sausage privileges" becoming a struggle... against sausage itself. After all, voices have been heard and are still being heard demanding the complete eradication of "special shops" which produce, to be honest, not "special food" at all but simply normal food of which there should be not less but more. And I also take the view that in the fervor of redistribution no new "sausage elites" should form, this time not on the basis of posts held but on the basis of different, behind the scenes opportunities for machination. It is essential also to close channels to theft. Alas, practice gives grounds for these fears.

Of course, there is no need to simplify the problem of "privileges," it does not come down to "rations" alone although with the present food shortages it is inequality in the most elementary thing, in basic food, which is perceived most painfully. A USSR Supreme Soviet commission is studying the entire package of benefits and privileges existing in our state for various categories of citizens. These problems are being keenly discussed in society. But it seems to me that in talk about this frankly painful subject we are quite unable to rise to the level of elementary common sense. Of course, it is difficult to demand calm against the background of empty store shelves and lines waiting in the polyclinics (incidentally, with regard to polyclinics too, after the abolition of the fourth main administration of the USSR Ministry of Health it was decided to reorganize the combined hospital and polyclinic on Michurinskiy Avenue, where Central Committee members, ministers, and other big leaders were treated, into the all-union diagnostic center, where patients will be sent from all over the country). But nonetheless we cannot fail to note that much still has to be done to implement the task set at the first congress of people's deputies—studying and "carrying out an inventory" of the entire multilevel system of benefits with its deep "roots" and spreading "crown"—both

those benefits which are indeed necessary and those whose origins go back to the distant times of "war communism" and "shock distributors." Benefits which are enjoyed "by the academician and the hero, the seaman and the carpenter" (true, if this carpenter works not at a local industry enterprise but at a departmental economic administration). Nor can we leave aside regional privileges, so to speak, the right to which is given by lucky registration backed up in addition today by homegrown "visiting cards" and other certificates of "geographical loyalty."

In brief, a profound, truly scientific economic and sociological analysis of all these urgent problems is needed. Decisions are needed which accord with people's moral sense and common sense.

AUCCTU Protests Auction of Consumer Goods

LD1702214390 Moscow TASS in English 2133 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 18 TASS—The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) sent a strong protest to the government concerning plans to develop auction trade and trade at non-fixed prices with consumer goods.

TASS learnt at the AUCCTU press centre that the trade union protest was prompted by a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers to organise in 1990 auction trade with goods which are in greater demand among the population: colour tv sets of the fourth generation, fridges, Volga cars and some other goods.

The trade unions also negatively responded to an intention of the USSR State Committee for supplies to begin this year auction sales to population of industrial goods which are handed over to its regional bodies by industrial enterprises and amalgamations from their above-the-plan stocks of commodities and raw materials.

The AUCCTU believes that under the conditions of dire shortage of consumer goods and galloping inflation, such trade will aggravate still more the tense situation on the consumer market and will provoke greater discontent among working people.

Many goods which will be sold at commercial shops, where prices will top two or five times retail prices, will be virtually unaccessible for millions of people—especially for people with low incomes (pensioners, students, new and large families).

Scarce goods will be purchased mostly by "shadow" economy dealers and not by ordinary workers.

The AUCCTU demanded that the government immediately examine the protest.

Union of Cooperatives Meets 17 Feb in Moscow

LD1702205990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] There was an extraordinary conference of the country's Union of Associated Cooperatives in Moscow today. The urgency of its convocation was dictated by a number of circumstances: the numerous departmental directives that contradict the Law on the Cooperative Movement; the ill-considered amendments to this law; and much, much more. According to the Union of Cooperatives, if all these directives are confirmed, then one might expect almost 40 percent of production facilities currently operating to have closed by the spring. And if one takes into account that almost 4.5 million people are employed in the cooperative movement, then one can well imagine the social tension that this will cause. But, that is just one of the issues that require urgent resolution. The conference examined very many of these. I shall ask our correspondent Oleg Aksenov, who attended the conference, to speak about this in more detail:

[Aksenov] It was a very stormy day today, as totally opposing points of view and opinions clashed at the conference. Some demanded the creation of their own party; others said that this was premature, and that the existing radical movements ought to be supported. There was a major discussion of how the cooperatrive movement should model itself, and in which directions it should develop.

And now, for a somewhat unexpected view of this conference and of the problems of the cooperative movement, here is Arkadiy Murashev, a USSR people's deputy and a participant in this conference.

[Begin recording] [Murashev] I believe that somewhere in the depths of our still misshapen, monopolistic economy an organically free economy has been born, one that is developing normally. For the time being, of course, it is largely operating on a closed circuit. This conference has been convened because a quite terrible lawlessness is abroad in the country at the moment. Cooperative members are being subjected to arrest, to searches, and expropriation. And all this is being perpetrated with the sanction of the local authorities. Their official decisions totally flout the Law on the Cooperative Movement as it currently operates. I hope that after the elections, the situation might largely lose its acuteness, specifically because people who generally support the cooperative movement will come to power in many areas, and hopefully particularly in Moscow, people who will control its development not by draconian means, but by normal, economic methods and taxation. And I expect this acuteness that has today brought cooperative members together from all over the Soviet Union to be on the wane after the elections. I would like to believe that.

[Aksenov] You parliamentary group has drawn up a clear and wide-ranging program to lead the country out

of its crisis, as well as paths for its development. To what extent does the cooperative movement fit in with this program?

[Murashev] It fits in with it 100 percent. The aim of our program is to extend the cooperative movement to all the remaining aspects of ownership and all the remainng means of production, to make labor free not just in the sphere of the cooperative movement. but in state-run enterprises, as well, in lease-run enterprises, and in enterprises that come under collective ownership. That, in fact, is our objective. [end recording]

Prosecutor's Office Seeks To Improve Methods

PM2702161790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "At USSR Prosecutor's Office"]

[Text] At the USSR Prosecutor's Office an enlarged session of the collegium chaired by USSR Prosecutor General A.Ya. Sukharev has examined the state of and measures to fundamentally improve prosecutor's office supervision of investigations and inquiries in the country.

It was noted that in the light of the increased demands regarding the observance of legality and the protection of citizens' constitutional rights during the investigation of crimes, a number of practical measures have been taken by prosecutors to ensure the legality of the institution of criminal proceedings, detentions, arrests, and the indictment of citizens. Special attention was devoted to observance of the principle of presumption of innocence. Last year prosecutors quashed over 5,000 unjustified decisions to institute criminal actions and around 2,000 cases were terminated as unlawful. A considerable number of judicial errors were rectified after appeals from prosecutors. Measures were also taken to ensure the inevitability of punishment for crimes.

The collegium seriously criticized omissions in prosecutor's office supervision. It was noted that some prosecutors are not showing due principledness in preventing the unjustified institution of criminal proceedings and the detention, arrest, and searching of citizens. Instances of official crime against the legal system were revealed. It was stressed that one of the main reasons for this situation is the accusatory bias and oversimplified approach to the observance of procedural guarantees which became rooted in past years in the consciousness of many investigators, investigation workers, and prosecutors.

At the same time, the collegium sharply condemned the actions of those prosecutors who show a lack of determination in preventing manifestations of crime and who shirk the fulfillment of their professional duties in applying the full force of Soviet laws in the struggle against dangerous crimes, malicious speculators, violators of social order, and extremist elements who incite ethnic strife.

The collegium outlined measures to intensify the prosecutor's supervision of investigations and inquiries so that it fully meets the tasks of protecting citizens' rights and legitimate interests and at the same time ensures an uncompromising struggle against violations of law and order.

A decision was taken on the institution of criminal proceedings and of disciplinary action against prosecutors who committed crude violations of legality and showed criminal negligence in supervising the examination of specific criminal cases, in particular with regard to bribery in Uzbekistan.

The collegium also held a concerned and frank discussion on the fact that Article 14 of the fundamentals of USSR and union republic legislation on judicial administration, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, which relates to defense attorneys' access from the moment of detention, arrest, or indictment, has not been backed up by the provision of legal staff, which has created serious problems today in meeting the requirements of criminal procedural law. The USSR Prosecutor's Office Collegium has adopted a decision to submit the necessary proposals on this question to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Democratic Platform's Program Viewed

90UN0982A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 7, 17-23 Feb 90 p 8

[Response to a letter to the editor]

[Text] **Could you talk about the program of party clubs operating within the framework of the CPSU under the name "Democratic Platform"? [signed] L. Fokina, Moscow**

A conference of party clubs was held 20-21 January 1990, attended by 455 delegates from 102 cities representing 13 union republics, 59,133 CPSU members, and 61 party clubs.

As is indicated in the declaration adopted by the conference participants, the Democratic Platform is being advanced in the situation of the profound ideological polarization that has taken place. Here are some of the principles and demands of the platform:

—transfer of all power from the party apparatus to democratically elected soviets;

—submission to the CPSU a legislative initiative on repealing Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and preparing a Law on Political Parties;

—adoption of the concept of democratic socialism signifying the priority of universal values over class values, pluralism of forms of ownership and a market economy controlled by society instead of a class struggle, and establishment of standards of morality and social justice instead of a system of privileges of top-level governmental positions [nomenklatura];

—rejection of the principle of democratic centralism and its replacement with universal principles;

—removal of the organs of party control and party mass media from under the subordination of the party's executive bodies and making them accountable only to the congress or conference;

—abolition of political bodies in the armed forces, the KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other state organizations.

It also recommends adding the following points to the Party Rules:

—introduce direct, alternative elections of secretaries of primary party organizations, raykoms, and gorkoms, party committee members, and delegates to party forums, by platforms and with secret ballot with free nomination of candidates;

—return to the freedom of factions, groups, and ideological trends, repealing Resolution 10 of the Congress of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) "On Unity of the Party;"

—eliminate special privileges and benefits for the elected aktiv and apparatus, which undermine the prestige of the party.

The resolution adopted by the conference proposes that all regional party clubs and party organizations sign the declaration. An appeal was also adopted to create associations of communists supporting the Democratic Platform.

Moscow City Political Alignment Poll

90UN0982B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 7 17-23 Feb 90 p 6

[Article by L. Byzov and G. Gurevich, candidates of economic sciences: "Changes in Political Consciousness"]

[Text] In December 1989, the "Nauka" Center of Applied Sociological Studies in Moscow conducted a series of polls by telephone according to a multistage sampling. The purpose of the survey was to discover the general alignment of political forces in Moscow on the eve of nominating candidates for people's deputy. Some 900 people were surveyed. Over the last 2 years, similar surveys were conducted repeatedly both in Moscow and in other cities. A typology of political consciousness was developed based on these surveys. It included the following:

—**Westernists**, unconditionally oriented on values of Western (primarily American) experience, establishing a market economy, introducing competition, and economic and political freedoms;

—**Left-wing populists** (renewalists), oriented on "socialism with a human face" and individual humanism. On many points, the Left-wing populists join the Westernists, but stop at rigid economic relations;

—**Right-wing populists** (renewalists), professing not individual but class populism. Above all, this pertains to the class of "the common working people"—workers and minor office workers who "produce public wealth." Anti-bureaucracy, a distrustful attitude toward the intelligentsia, and criticism of authority mainly for corruptness (but not for ineffective leadership) are typical of Right-wing populists;

—**Stateists**, valuing in our post-revolution history, above all, the military successes and a strong and powerful state with firm discipline and public order;

—**Ecologists** (Greens), orienting themselves on "pacifist-Greens ideas." The Westernists and national patriots fight for this group;

—**National patriots**, oriented on the struggle against foreigners and cosmopolitans and for the originality of Russia.

This survey revealed the following typology of political consciousness in Moscow (in percent)

Category	Youth (under 30)	Middle age (30-50)	Older (over 50)	Workers	Intelligentsia	Moscow as a whole
"Westernists"	34	23	11	19	17	15
"Stateists"	18	20	23	20	16	27
"Right-wing populists"	17	19	26	25	17	25
"Left-wing populists"	16	25	26	18	34	17
"National patriots"	1	6	4	8	3	5

Population's Attitude Toward Various Organizations (on a 5-point scale)

Organization	CPSU Members	Workers	Intelligentsia	Average Rating
1. CPSU	4.2	4.0	3.8	3.9
2. Komsomol	3.1	3.2	2.8	3.0
3. All-Union Central Trade Union Council	3.0	3.5	3.0	3.3

Population's Attitude Toward Various Organizations (on a 5-point scale)

Organization	CPSU Members	Workers	Intelligentsia	Average Rating
4. Inter-regional Group	3.8	4.0	4.0	~ 0
5. DS	2.7	3.1	3.1	3.1
6. Pamyat	3.1	3.6	3.1	3.3
7. MNF	3.2	3.5	3.7	3.6
8. OFT	3.5	3.3	3.1	3.2
9. Baltic Independence Movement	3.3	3.0	3.8	3.3
10. Karabakh Reunification Movement	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.6
11. Moscow Voters Association	3.7	3.9	4.1	4.0
12. Social Democrats	2.6	3.0	3.3	3.1

If you reduce the table to a traditional alignment of "right-wing" and "left-wing", the "right-wing" bloc represents 57 percent of the voters, and the "left-wing" represents 32 percent.

The Right-wing populists dominate among workers. The Westernists are more often encountered among the intelligentsia and trade personnel.

Poll Indicates 90 Million Worshippers

LD1902113190 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Soviet experts have come to the conclusion that there are up to 90 million worshippers of various religions in this country. The conclusion is based on a poll. Up till now it has been unknown how many people believe in God in the USSR. Since the church has been separated from the state there has been no registration at all. The poll was conducted in preparation for the forthcoming parliamentary debates on the new freedom of conscience bill in this country. Most respondents spoke in favor of giving more rights to the congregations, enabling them to put out their own periodicals and setting up Sunday schools.

Committee Discusses Anti-Semitism

PM2702134990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Opposed To Kindling National Discord. Anti-Zionist Committee Session"]

[Text] Groups with anti-Semitic, Zionist overtones propagandizing ideas of national exclusivity and isolation, which have stepped up their activity recently, are creating fertile soil for kindling national discord. This was noted 19 February at an enlarged session of the Soviet Public Anti-Zionist Committee Presidium.

Provocative actions demonstrating intolerance toward Jews serve as a convenient pretext for the leaders of the Zionist organization "Irgun Tsioni," the "Independent Jewish Movement," and all who are trying—with the participation of the World Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress—to legalize the Zionist movement in our country, to the accompaniment of a propaganda campaign against "anti-Semitism in Soviet society." In this situation, what is needed is the ability to foresee the consequences of this development of events and quash any racist, chauvinist trends in good time.

Representatives of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry and Moscow Prosecutor's Office who addressed the session informed the participants of measures being taken by law enforcement organs to stop extremist, nationalist demonstrations.

It was stressed that it is quite intolerable to spread provocative rumors and conjectures. In a number of cases the mass media have relayed unverified information on "forthcoming Jewish pogroms" and even ones which have allegedly "already taken place," which excites the public and exacerbates the situation every time.

Voicing its solidarity with the Palestinian Arab people's struggle against Zionist colonization, the Soviet Public Anti-Zionist Committee Presidium stressed that the political practice of Zionism, designed to suppress the national liberation movement, is now a foolish and dangerous anachronism.

Broadcasting Restrictions on Deputies Investigated

PM2302182290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 18 Feb 90 p 14

[Andrey Borodenkov article: "Limits for Deputies"]

[Text] Several people's deputies of the USSR have been denied an unlimited access to television by the Soviet broadcasting authorities. They include: Nikolay Teravkin, Vladimir Tikhonov, Yevgeniy, Yevtushenko, Svyatoslav Fedorov, and Yuriy Karyakin.

A month ago, they came to the Moscow House of Cinema Workers to see and discuss a film about the famous head of the gold-mining cooperative association Pechora Vadim Tumanov. The film's title is "Fighting On". It was not an exclusive showing. Among the audience were many people who knew about Tumanov's

hotly controversial career and could appreciate Tumanov's personal qualities which can make a man free even during a period of history notorious for having strangled individual freedom.

The discussion was poignant and scenic, which made it worthwhile for such a broad audience. A television crew videorecorded the entire discussion. After some time, the daily Moskovskaya Pravda and the govorit i pokazyvayet Moskva weekly publication - a guide of the national TV and radio broadcasts, announced the discussion during the February 1 Good Evening, Moscow daily television programme. However, the programme didn't appear on the announced date and time.

The video crew which had made the recording were dumbfounded: the story was approved for showing. It was edited and included into the plan. Yet, shortly before it was to go on the air, it was removed from the programme by First Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Main Department of TV and Radio Broadcasting for Moscow, Vladimir Troyepolskiy. Strangely enough, Troyepolskiy made his decision without even seeing the actual material.

"He learned about the content of the story from what I told him," said production subeditor Feliks Nyusser. "As I understand it, the matter was decided not because of the content. The veto arose only after Troyepolskiy discovered the names of Travkin, Fedorov and others in the list of participants."

I heard about the existence of a certain "black list" of people's deputies who are to be shown on television only for a strictly limited time.

Vladimir Troyepolskiy, however, resolutely dismissed the rumour about the existence of the "black list" as he himself explained the reason for his vetoing the TV story: "Of course, we have no such 'black list.' The truth is that these people appear too often everywhere, including on the TV screen. Other people's deputies and our managers are displeased with us for giving the floor only to the left-wing radicals. They demand equal time."

True, there is a difference between an actual "black list" and an oral order to "blacklist" certain people. But in adopting a position proposing "equal time," why can't it be achieved by giving right-wing radical representatives more time on the air?

"That's the fault of journalists," argues Troyepolskiy. "They find the left-wing activists to be easier to work with: the latter are more eloquent and original in their reasoning. However, we're going to fight our present shortcoming."

Troyepolskiy surely had in mind the personal attitudes of his subordinates towards individual politicians. Nevertheless, certain questions remain unanswered. Why should Soviet television discriminate between people's deputies and introduce air-time quotas for them? What about the constitutional guarantees concerning deputies' rights? Who will be held responsible for the infringement of these rights?

Plans To Ease Travel Procedures Outlined

PM06020921 90 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister B.N. Chaplin by diplomatic correspondent M. Yusin; date, place not given: "About Visas, Dual Citizenship, and 'Exclusion Zones'"]

[Text] [Yusin] Boris Nikolayevich, a new law on travel in and out of our country will soon be adopted. These procedures will be substantially simplified—there will be a swelling flow of people crossing the state border in both directions. The following fear is being expressed: Will the consular service—whose work is frequently the subject of complaints—manage to cope with the new conditions, when its work will become that much more intensive?

[Chaplin] I understand your doubts. Indeed, in years past, the consular service earned itself quite a few criticisms. Having surrounded themselves with instructions, many of which were adopted way back in Stalin's time, our consular workers lost effective contact with people and had no idea of their needs and interests.

It is necessary to radically restructure the work of consular links to ensure that they do not lag behind the demands of the time, that they promote the renewal processes within the country, the economic reform, and the expansion of cooperation with foreign partners. Priority in our work must be given to protecting the rights and interests of Soviet citizens abroad rather than to elaborating countless prohibitions and regulations, as in the past.

We are now working on renewal of Soviet legislation, on bringing it in line with international norms. The draft law on travel in and out of the country, which you mentioned, can be described as an important breakthrough. The law has passed its first reading in the Supreme Soviet, and we hope that it will be adopted at the next session. New regulations have come into force, which significantly simplify the procedure for processing applications for official travel abroad, passports for travel abroad, and foreign visas. Work on a new USSR Consular Statute is almost completed. Union republic ministries of foreign affairs are being given broader rights and powers in deciding consular questions....

Amendments have been introduced to visa regulations. Persons traveling to our country for purposes of trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation are issued visas within 48 hours. Visa-free travel into the country has been introduced for crew members of certain foreign airlines. A consular office to provide visa services for transit passengers has opened at Sheremetyevo-2 Airport.

[Yusin] You spoke about protecting the rights and interests of Soviet citizens abroad. What form will this take?

[Chaplin] Simultaneously with the entry into force of the new law on travel in and out of the country, it will be necessary to adopt several acts to back up this law by ensuring social protection for our citizens abroad. It is, for example, necessary to develop a mechanism for providing material assistance to Soviet people finding themselves in an emergency situation abroad. Imagine the following case. While abroad, a compatriot of ours loses his money, or his effects are stolen, or he has to urgently return home and has no money to buy a return ticket. He finds himself in a hopeless situation. It would be useful to set up a centralized fund which would be used to make payments to people encountering misfortune abroad. One effective way of doing so would be to provide insurance for all Soviet citizens traveling abroad. Three U.S. insurance companies have already offered us cooperation in this sphere.

Another important aspect is the provision of medical assistance. Work is now being done on the question of our country's joining the European agreement on medical services for persons temporarily abroad. This agreement will provide the legal basis to conclude bilateral and multilateral treaties between interested countries.

[Yusin] So far we have not mentioned Soviet citizens who are permanent residents abroad....

[Chaplin] There are several hundred thousand of them. For years on end our consular services ignored these people, and positive changes have occurred only recently. Last year, for example, Soviet citizens who are permanent residents in 42 countries were given for the first time an opportunity to participate in elections. Travel to the USSR by these people and their foreign relatives has been simplified. Unfortunately, some groundless restrictions still remain in force. To obtain permission to travel to the motherland, Soviet citizens living abroad have to apply to the embassy or consulate on every occasion....

[Yusin] The Soviet Union still does not recognize the institution of dual citizenship. What is your opinion on this question?

[Chaplin] The legislation of many states is much more liberal. Dual citizenship is recognized by the FRG, Greece, Poland, Bulgaria, Israel, and other countries. I think that our approach to this question is too rigid. We cannot disregard the interests of specific people who are our compatriots. After all, many countries apply restrictions to people who do not have that country's citizenship—in employment, for example. This is why people who leave the USSR have no option but to take the citizenship of their country of permanent residence. In this process, however, and in conformity with our laws, they are forced to lose their Soviet citizenship even though many would like to retain it.

I am convinced that, when the Supreme Soviet examines amendments to the Law "On Citizenship of the USSR," there should be a study of international experience, and a more flexible and more human approach should be elaborated.

[Yusin] What other amendments to Soviet legislations are suggested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Chaplin] It is necessary to expand the list of documents allowed to be taken abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already submitted appropriate proposals to the government. Their essence is to give USSR citizens the right to take out of the country their birth certificates, documents relating to their education, academic degrees, war service and injuries, awards, and pensions, their driver's license... . This is by no means the full list.

[Yusin] Is it really forbidden to take these documents out of the country to this day? What secret information could be contained in a certificate about a wound or someone's work career?

[Chaplin] That is the point. From the viewpoint of today's position, all these prohibitions seem absurd, but they nonetheless remain in force. Fortunately, the ice is beginning to break.

[Yusin] I understand that new passports for travel abroad will soon appear in the Soviet Union. How will they differ from the ones now in use?

[Chaplin] Following the government's instructions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working on sample new computer-readable passports for travel abroad and visa slips meeting international standards. It is planned to introduce them in the next few years, and this will go a long way toward speeding up border control procedures which will become very simple. The passport is inserted for a few second in a special machine, a scanning device reads the information entered in it, and that will be all the control. International airports will no longer have two lines—one comprising citizens of foreign states who get through passport control with the minimum of delay, and another comprising Soviet people whose document verification takes additional time and effort.

[Yusin] In many states, it is sufficient to present just a passport or some other means of identification to cross the border—not even visas are required. When will we reach that stage?

[Chaplin] The Soviet Union has proposed to Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Mongolia the introduction of exactly such a regime—possession of a passport would be sufficient for crossing the border. There would be no need for invitations, official travel certificates, references, and other documents confirming the purpose of the trip. Moreover, this would apply not only to residents of border regions but to all USSR citizens.

We advocate simplification of visa formalities throughout Europe. The Soviet Union submitted relevant proposals at the Paris conference on the human dimension which was held last June.

[Yusin] What is your opinion of "exclusion" zones for foreigners? Are there not too many of them in our country?

[Chaplin] At present, about 10 percent of USSR territory falls within "exclusion regions." Our rules in this regard are much stricter than those in other European countries. A different practice prevails around the world. Usually, it is specific installations (like plants or military bases) rather than entire regions that are closed to foreigners.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to draft new rules governing travel by foreigners on the Soviet Union's territory, which will be submitted for consideration by the Council of Ministers. We propose to reduce the number of "exclusion regions" and reduce their size to within reasonable limits.

[Yusin] Are there plans to open new Soviet consulates general abroad or foreign ones in the USSR in the near future?

[Chaplin] We have agreed to open a Canadian consulate general in Kiev, Spanish and Brazilian missions in Leningrad, and a Chinese consulate in Khabarovsk. Soviet consulates general will make their appearance in Toronto, Rio de Janeiro, Barcelona, Shenyang (PRC), and other cities.

With a view to effecting savings, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has restored the institution of honorary consuls, which existed in the first few postrevolution years. The persons appointed to this office are foreign citizens (academics, cultural figures, and businessmen as a rule) who are not Soviet employees and do not receive any remuneration for their work. They are entrusted with representing the Soviet Union's interests in various cities. The USSR's first honorary consulate has already started functioning in Santa Cruz (Bolivia).

[Yusin] How do Soviet consular services protect our compatriots' interests in countries with which the USSR has no diplomatic relations?

[Chaplin] A Soviet consular group is at work in Israel, and a similar Israeli group is in Moscow. Consular departments have been set up under the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry mission in Seoul and under the South Korean KOTRA [Korea Trade Promotion Corporation] in Moscow. Since there are no diplomatic relations between our countries, these departments cannot make use of state symbols like flying flags or displaying state seals. Their functions cover only consular matters.

Our position is that Soviet citizens should enjoy their state's support and protection in any country in the world. The absence of diplomatic relations should be no obstacle to consular services' exercising their humane functions.

Aeroflot Requires Hard Currency From Foreigners

PM2802110190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Second Edition p 8

[Ye. Makhatadze report under rubric "For First Time": "Airline Tickets for Hard Currency"]

[Text] A new procedure for paying for airline tickets has been introduced for foreign citizens on all Aeroflot routes. V. Samorukhov, chief of the Civil Aviation International Commercial Administration, comments on this news:

Over the last few years, the number of people wishing to use the airline's services on international routes has drastically increased in connection with the new regulations for foreign travel. At the same time, Aeroflot's hard currency payments to foreign airlines have also begun to rise. Thus, whereas in 1987 we paid 60 million foreign currency rubles for the transportation and transfer aboard their aircraft of Soviet and foreign passengers who bought tickets with rubles, in 1989 these payments totaled almost 100 million rubles.

The incomplete nature of the current regulations has also resulted in abuses. Foreign passengers, for instance, bought tickets with rubles for Aeroflot flights (the new ruble rate made this advantageous for them) and then rebooked their seats on foreign airline flights. As a result, Aeroflot lost twice over—it paid the foreign company the cost of the flight in freely convertible currency and carried empty seats since the reservations on the Soviet aircraft were often not canceled.

What is more foreign airlines received the right to sell tickets independently. To put Aeroflot on an equal footing with other airlines it was decided to introduce new conditions for ticket sales, above all to compensate for our hard currency expenditure.

Henceforth, all foreign citizens, including those accredited in the USSR, those working in joint enterprises and organizations and on contracts, those who come to the USSR on invitation or on private business, and students in transit to third countries on vacation must buy tickets with hard currency.

Foreign citizens and people without citizenship who are permanently resident in the USSR, whom the hard currency regulations treat as USSR citizens, have the right to buy tickets with rubles. Students studying in the USSR and traveling home for the vacations, along with socialist countries' citizens on routes between these countries and the USSR, also enjoy this right.

The reduction in unwarranted hard currency expenditure will enable Aeroflot to spend some of this money on improving services for air passengers and improving its infrastructure. There has been no change in the conditions for obtaining tickets for Aeroflot's international routes.

Building of New Paper Plants Urged

PM2802094590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

["Appeal to Government by Timber and Paper Industry Workers Adopted at Sitting of USSR Ministry of Timber Industry Collegium" under rubric "Following Publication in PRAVDA": "Let Us Extricate Sector From Crisis!"]

[Text] On 25 January and 1 February this year, PRAVDA requested communists, workers, and engineering and technical personnel at the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry to ensure the uninterrupted publication of newspapers in the country, including of the party's central organ PRAVDA.

Fully sharing the alarm conveyed by these items, we inform the government that the situation in the country is extremely grave as regards not only newsprint but all other types of paper. Some paper products have to be imported to ensure even the minimum satisfaction of demand.

Production capacities are all in use and work under great pressure. Only 25 of the 157 operating enterprises were commissioned after 1960. Up to 85 percent of the equipment has reached the level of 100-percent depreciation write-off.

The operation of enterprises with obsolete equipment and technologies clashes with the rigid demands of USSR environmental protection legislation and, despite the fulfillment of a large volume of environmental protection measures, the situation remains tense, results in complaints by the public, and leads to the closure of enterprises and shops.

Pulp production has ceased at the Priozersk pulp plant, the Okulovka pulp and paper combine, and the Lyaskelya pulp and paper combine. It has been decided to close down the Slokas plant in Latvia. The threat of closure is hanging over pulp and paper production at the Klaypeda and Tallinn combines. Plant capacities for the production of of 432,000 tonnes of pulp have been decommissioned in the last three years alone.

Meanwhile, new capacities are not being built. Not a single new pulp plant has been commissioned in the last nine years. Hands are tied and opportunities are limited in utilizing even the funds earned by enterprises, including foreign currency earnings, in building new enterprises and modernizing existing ones both by using their own resources and by attracting foreign partners.

The grave situation in which paper industry workers have to work is further aggravated by additional difficulties. Due to a shortage of cars, the USSR Ministry of Railways fails to ensure prompt delivery of raw material to pulp and paper enterprises and the shipment of finished products to consumers. When assigning state orders for 1990 to the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, the USSR Gosplan [State Committee for Planning] and the USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] failed to ensure that they were balanced against raw and other material resources. Our obsolete and worn-out equipment is falling apart, but we cannot get any spare parts for it. Almost one-half of spare parts are imported, and yet all the foreign currency we earn is taken away from us. A feeling of bitterness and resentment results from the knowledge that, while ranking first in the world in terms of timber reserves, our country is firmly established in 42d place in per capita consumption of paper and cardboard. Whereas this indicator stands at 300 kg in the United States, it is only 37 kg in our country.

Unless work to build two or three new pulp and paper enterprises begins immediately, the paper shortage in the country will turn into paper famine in five or six years.

We put to the government an urgent demand to take all necessary measures to normalize the situation at pulp and paper enterprises and to approve for the 13th Five-Year Plan a ratified program for the development of the pulp and paper industry which would make it possible to create conditions for the sector's gradual extrication from the crisis.

[Signed] V. Zhiganov, general director of "Tsentrbumprom" TNPO [xpansion unknown]; Hero of Socialist Labor V. Zakharov, cardboard machine operator at Arkhangelsk pulp and paper combine; A. Kononov, general director of "Syktyvkarskyy LPK" Production Association; M. Kuleshov, chairman of the Timber, Paper, and Woodworking Industry Workers Trade Union Central Committee; M. Kiryakov, personal pensioner and former deputy minister of the pulp and paper industry; Hero of Socialist Labor V. Lapukhin, director of Balakhna pulp and paper combine; V. Tatarchuk, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and former director of Solikamsk pulp and paper combine; USSR People's Deputy A. Tyutryumov, trade union committee chairman at "Kondopogabumprom" Production Association; V. Chernyakevich, secretary of the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry party committee; V. Chuyko, USSR deputy minister of the timber industry.

Economic

Finance Minister on Monetary Reform Issues

LD2802133690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] The forum of practical workers and scientists participating in the conference on perestroyka in the finance and credit system, and intensification of its effect on increasing production efficiency, is continuing in Moscow. Our correspondent Igor Zorin talks to Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov, USSR minister of finance, chairman of the USSR Economics Society, and a doctor of economic sciences.

[Begin recording] [Pavlov] Yes, it is indeed one of the very urgent aspects of our perestroyka today, and for this reason many interests intersect here, on the one hand, and all our shortcomings intersect as well. For this reason a great deal of our progress in perestroyka and in our economy as a whole will depend to a great extent on finding the right direction for perestroyka in the finance and credit system and on not acting by the trial-and-error method.

[Zorin] Six aspects are at work. Here is the first one: the role of the budget in increasing social production efficiency.

[Pavlov] Today the entire structure of the our budget system does not accord with the policy of self-recoupment and self-financing that has been adopted. In this sense we must find new criteria for structuring a budget system which would offer both regions and republics the possibility of having their own financial basis, but at the same time we must not lose our advantage; in other words, we need unity in the principles of structuring and unity in the system of administration.

[Zorin] The second aspect is the financial mechanism and the socioeconomic development of the country.

[Pavlov] As you yourself understand, reorientation of our entire economy toward the individual, his needs, and his interests, calls for a corresponding monetary, and above all financial reinforcement; in other words, we should link the creation of financial resources, as it were, with visible results in raising our people's standard of living and their working and living conditions.

[Zorin] Do you agree that the role of banks and credit in our economic mechanism was ignored for a long time? That is in fact what the third aspect is called: the improvement of all these factors.

[Pavlov] Of course, in our country the banks were developed with only one aim for many long years: the aim of providing funds for the tasks which, as we now call it, were derived from the so-called system of administration by injunction. For this reason, perestroyka of the entire banking system onto a normal track of economic relations has set us the immense task of, I would say, essentially recreating the banking system in the true sense of the word.

If we want the banks to work effectively, then the client must be assigned paramount importance within the banking system, on the one hand, so that the bank is a real partner and helps the client to seek better ways and methods of using his resources. And on the other hand, the bank system must above all work on the basis of unity of management of monetary circulation. It will then work toward strengthening the ruble, and the bank's role in the economy will increase. As long as the system works toward eroding financial values, so to speak, then it is quite simply working toward devaluing the ruble, including by means of unrestrained credit expansion, and in that case the bank is working in a contrary manner, of course.

[Zorin] Now we have come to the problem of regulating monetary circulation. That is the task of the next aspect.

[Pavlov] At the moment our system of managing monetary circulation is split up into individual local circulations. And in this sense we do not yet have an approach to a unified system worked out for management. And without this, it will not be possible to do anything to hold back the flooding of the consumer market. [end recording]

Economic Aspects of CPSU Platform Discussed

PM2802093190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Toward an Efficient Economy"]

[Text] Among the fundamental problems raised by the Central Committee February (1990) Plenum in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress, an important place is assigned to urgent tasks in improving the basis of our society. A special section of this document defines the ways and sets out the work methods of our party and the people in creating an effective planned market economy.

This kind of development of the perestroyka processes is logical and highly topical. The past year did not gladden us with successes in the solution of social questions or with a tangible improvement of the economic situation in the country. There is evidence of acute negative processes—labor and plan discipline have slackened, output of many types of goods has decreased, the rate of output updating has slowed down. The system of measures to stabilize the consumer market which has been elaborated by the government is being implemented too slowly. The first two months of 1990 which have almost passed have not inspired optimism in people either. There is still a lot of foot-dragging and disorganization both at central organ and local level in the implementation of the measures that have been outlined. Boldness, initiative, and businesslike efficiency are lacking even when it comes to tackling urgent tasks. Direct economic ties between enterprises have still not been established, the anti-expenditure mechanism has not been brought into play, and, as in the past, production units are reluctant to assimilate new equipment and progressive production processes.

At the current, third, session of the USSR Supreme Soviet there has been sharp criticism of the slow eradication of freeloading attitudes among local-level cadres, and the sluggishness and irresponsibility of economic managers which has produced social tensions in a number of regions. This applies above all to railroad transport, whose fitful work has sharply impaired the efficient functioning of many economic sectors.

Food supplies to the population remain the most acute problem, the CPSU Central Committee draft platform notes. Therefore the CPSU favors the priority development of the agrarian sector of the economy. The basis of the solution of the food problem is to be provided by the development of all types of farming. State, cooperative, and individual farms and the various forms of farming—contract, leasing, and family farming—must enjoy equal opportunities. Rural workers must be provided as soon as possible, with modern, reliable, and inexpensive equipment, not just for cultivating and growing produce but also for processing and storing it and sharply reducing losses during transportation to the consumer. It is this comprehensive solution of the problem which will enable us to change the situation for the better.

Urgent measures to improve the economy were adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies last year. The adoption of this program must be followed up with day-to-day, persistent practical work on the part of all management organs from bottom to top. This is all the more important since there is evidence of economic anarchy during the transitional period in our country. We are discarding old methods of economic management, and the market has not yet taken over. This is why production is not backed up by the requisite resources, yet the Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] is looking on from the sidelines, as it were.

The party believes that the successful solution of current and long-term socioeconomic problems is inseparably bound up with the implementation of radical economic reform. It is this reform which will enable us to switch from the command-and-distribute system characterized by monopolism, lack of initiative on the part of the workers, mismanagement, high costs, and disregard for the interests of the consumer, to a planned market economy. This type of economy must be based on a diversity of forms of ownership, competition between independent goods producers, a well-developed and healthy financial system, and powerful individual and collective incentives to achieve high end results.

Wherever the principles of the reform have been passed down to shops, teams, and work stations—as is the case, for instance, at the Cherkassy "Rotor" association—collectives are achieving excellent results. However, so far the reform is being implemented piecemeal and half-heartedly, and the forms of economic accountability that are being introduced are expenditure-based. An old problem is repeating itself: People are getting carried away with individual elements of the reform, while failing to advance it along the whole front. Essential economic regulators are lacking in the new economic mechanism and the principle of remuneration according to labor is implemented inconsistently. As a result, large sums of money are being paid out to people merely for putting in an appearance at work. Economic foresight and reliable scientific forecasts are lacking, as are decisive actions and resolve in the implementation of what has been outlined.

Only the adoption of resolute urgent measures which will make it possible to create a society where all benefits are distributed according to the results of labor will enable us to change the economic situation, defuse social tensions, and restore universal confidence in perestroyka. What is needed now more than ever before is hard, highly organized, creative labor on the part of everyone since this is the only way to increase the volume of the good things in life which are in such short supply. On the other hand, uncontrolled rally-type democratism will not produce constructive results, endless arguments will not increase the supply of food and goods in stores.

As world experience has shown, stability in any state depends to a considerable extent to the situation within the trade union movement. The role and place of the trade unions in society must now be brought in line with the genuine rebirth of the workers movement and the activeness of the masses which has increased tremendously. The point is this: Either this energy of the working people will be allowed to develop spontaneously, in which case the aims of perestroyka will be swept away by the anarchy of chaos, or this energy will assume an organized character and will be geared above all to the accelerated development of the economy and thus contribute to the renewal of society in conditions of order and tranquillity. It is obvious that there is no alternative here, since democracy is neither total license nor anarchy. And, of course, the main point which must be grasped by each and everyone is: Social wealth must be created before it can be distributed.

For the essence of the draft platform, including its economic basis, to become the vital concern of millions, its content must be brought home and conquer the mind and heart of every Soviet citizen. The main contribution to this is to be made by economists working in production units and also at the country's scientific and educational establishments. The army of economists is being reinforced with every passing year. According to the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] during the past year almost 4 million people were working within the economic services of the country's national economy. A tremendous force. Skillful and energetic specialists must make up the generation of economic managers capable of operating in conditions of the new methods of management, in perfect command of the situation on the domestic and the external market. Mobilizing economists' experience and directing them toward the dissemination of the new knowledge among the masses is one of the key tasks of party committees in propagandizing the ideas of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform.

Less and less time remains before the 28th Party Congress. In the course of preparations for an event of such importance for the fate of perestroyka and the fate of our motherland, every communist is called upon to measure each day with a new yardstick and to strengthen the foundation of perestroyka—our economy—with highly organized labor hour by hour.

Department To Handle Developing Securities Market

PM0103091990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[I. Zhagel report: "There Will Be a Securities Market"]

[Text] In accordance with a government resolution, a securities administration will be set up in the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] in the very near future.

This is probably one of the few cases where the formation of an additional subdepartment in our central departments elicits approval and support. By permitting enterprises to issue shares in 1988, we took the first step toward a securities market, without which radical economic reform is simply inconceivable. Naturally, such a market must be civilized and be carefully prepared and set up. This is what the new Gosbank administration will tackle.

Its functions include drawing up normative documents to regulate the procedure for issuing, recording, and moving securities and to determine their launch value and market value. As well as studying the embryonic market situation and methodically guiding market activity.

In order to picture how important this is today, it is possible to cite the following example. The Supreme Soviet has approved a state budget deficit of 60 billion rubles [R] for this year. Where is this money to be found?

It is possible, of course, to rob enterprises, removing funds from their accounts by force. It is possible to increase the prices of raw materials and semimanufactures. In the end, it is possible simply to switch on the printing press. But these methods from the arsenal of past years would only worsen the economic situation in the country.

There is another way. The state can issue securities on terms favorable to labor collectives and so mobilize their funds to resolve very important economic and social programs. And such funds do exist. According to the 1989 results, for example, the country's enterprises failed to utilize R34 billion from economic incentive funds. Vast sums have also been frozen in above-normative stocks. So, if enterprises realized these and invested the money in securities, they would make a sizable profit instead of incurring additional costs for buying and storing these stocks. It should be emphasized here that the existence of a securities market makes it possible to turn shares, bonds, and treasury bills back into money at any moment.

The introduction of various kinds of securities into economic circulation will enhance the mobility of financial resources and make it possible to concentrate them promptly on the most important sectors of the national economy, without increasing the mass of money.

Finally, is it possible to imagine without a securities market the full-blooded existence of such progressive forms of production management as joint-stock companies, partnerships with limited liability, and a number of others? A rhetorical question, of course.

In short, the structural changes in the USSR Gosbank accord with today's most vital requirements.

EEC Seen as Ideal Economic Model for Federation

904A0211A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by M. Bronshteyn, USSR people's deputy, member of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Economic Reform: "Our Common Market Is an Alternative"]

[Text] **The work of the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is of interest to all. This is understandable. The future of the union and its political and economic structure are largely being determined at present. Are all of us going to solve our problems together, or will each republic do it alone? This issue also concerns USSR People's Deputy M. Bronshteyn.**

Throwing stones is a sad sign of our time. The number of mutual wrongs and complaints is increasing. Centrifugal trends are getting stronger. Until recently, these processes were associated primarily with Transcaucasia and the Baltic area. However, they are increasingly spreading to the Russian Federation, its autonomous republics and regions. At the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, Deputy V. Matyukha made a serious claim: R40 billion annually are appropriated from the wallet of Russia in favor of other republics due to non-equivalent trade. During this process, regions which are the richest in resources end up facing the most catastrophic situation: the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR], Tataria, Chechen-Ingushetia, the north of Siberia; more examples may be given.

Who has benefited? Could it be the republics of Central Asia? However, their representatives refer justifiably to the tremendous losses inflicted on their republics due to the single-crop economy imposed by the center and to low cotton prices. Could it be that the Baltic area has been "lucky?" Why then is its inclination to secede so strong? It cannot be explained solely by the events of 1939 and 1940. The mounting centrifugal tendencies are due to a considerable degree to the current situation in the sphere of economics, ecology, social policy, and interethnic relations.

To be sure, we can produce bills for each other for a long time to indicate who is "robbing" whom—whether the Baltic area is doing it to Russia or the other way around. In the process, people will always be found for whom this escalation of claims and demands is advantageous. Meanwhile, all of us should have understood long ago the simple truth that the peoples' troubles are due to the administrative-command system with its characteristic harsh dictates and disregard for normal human interests

rather than their neighbors. This is why no amount of incantations and appeals for consolidation within the framework of this system will stop the throwing of stones which hit with increasing power nothing else but the heads of neighbors. The entire experience of the world, including domestic experience, testifies to one thing: A common market in which equal partners freely interact, be they individual economic cells or sovereign states, is the main unifying force.

Let us look at the experience of postwar Europe. Not only its cities but also its economic structures were destroyed. All the countries which had very recently fought each other were trying to survive somehow. It was lucrative for the victors to squeeze the vanquished still more which, incidentally, was one of the reasons for the rise of German revanchism and fascism after World War I. However, fortunately for Western Europe, in the 1940's wise statesmen came along who began to create integrated structures in the ruins of opposing blocs. Little by little, the structures embraced ever new aspects of economic and political relations, increasing their attraction for more and more European countries. By 1992, the formation of a unified market space within the framework of the EEC will be completed. National boundaries will cease to be barriers to the free movement of goods and resources. Economic integration of West European countries is becoming the basis for a closer interstate entity with appropriate political structures and economic and legal regulations. Their prototype is found in the already existing mechanism of regulation within the framework of the EEC.

Last year, I happened to familiarize myself with the operation of this mechanism in the FRG while on a visit with a delegation of agrarian economists. I was surprised to find out that over there all farmers were primarily interested in the agrarian policy pursued in Brussels. West Germany is a sovereign state. The farmers are also sovereign. Nobody can tell them what to produce or how much. They follow market demand. However, the condition of the agrarian market and, correspondingly, the economic situation of the farmers hinges largely on the quotas for the production of individual goods set in the EEC capital of Brussels, as well as the volume of subsidies and price supports which the agrarians of various countries can count on provided they produce and export products within the quotas allocated.

Decisions are not made easily in Brussels. After all, the budget of the EEC itself is formed from the contributions of member countries. The amounts contributed and received are always the subject of a sharp discussion. We got to hear complaints from farmers and heads of land and federal organs concerning the level of quotas and subsidies. However, the following precise answer was always given to the question of why they did not leave the EEC: "The existence of the community is in our profound interest; it ensures a variety of goods and services for us, as well as protection from external competition. As far as contradictions within the EEC are concerned, we strive to resolve them by consensus."

How is this experience to be used in our country? After all, compared to post-war Europe we have considerably greater economic and resource potential and quite developed cooperation and division of labor within the union national economic complex.

To be sure, negative factors are also at work. In Western Europe, the system of goods-and-money relations with a corresponding mentality, forms of behavior, and infrastructure has emerged over many centuries whereas we have been destroying market structures for decades persistently and "successfully." This is exactly the paradox: There is no all-union market whereas the all-union national economic complex is apparently well-developed. Contacts in the national economy are maintained with an increasing strain through an extremely centralized command-and-distribution system. Correspondingly, disproportions, mutual resentment, and complaints mount, and ultimately the centrifugal tendencies.

The all-union market cannot be created through declarations or appeals for unity. No matter how many such appeals are made, protection of the internal market and a search for advantageous partners outside the Soviet Union, where one's own products may be sold for hard currency, become the main driving motive for the actions of republic and local organs given goods-and-currency imbalances. The transition to the economic independence of republics and individual regions (regional economic accountability) is initially interpreted in this very manner.

However, restricting the delivery of goods to other regions of the country may only aggravate the economic and social difficulties of those who practice this. Such a transition to closed economic systems within the framework of republics would require hundreds of billions of rubles in additional investment to create "missing" branches and enterprises. The aspiration to provide for local needs by squeezing additional taxes from operating enterprises will unavoidably reduce their competitiveness and will bring about declining financial proceeds in the future. Access to foreign markets is extremely restricted for now for obvious reasons.

The Russian Federation, with its potential, is in a relatively better position. We have already heard predictions according to which Russia, having shed "the burden" of other union republics, will become the richest and most prosperous country in the world. Indeed, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] is the richest in terms of potential. However, hundreds of billions will have to be invested in augmenting production in order to accomplish "the great leap" toward absolute prosperity. Massive sales of natural resources would bring about an abrupt decline in world prices for raw materials, to say nothing about the depletion of the natural sources of national wealth. Besides, centrifugal tendencies are not restricted to the union alone. Within the RSFSR, there also are "resentful" regions. Why shouldn't Siberia in this case sell oil, gas, diamonds,

lumber, and furs abroad on its own? Given the still available natural resources and low density of the population in its individual regions, every Siberian would live almost like a Kuwaiti sheikh. However, what will happen in this case to the regions where Russia's origins exist?

Therefore, it is clear that ultimately no people stands to win from destroying the union national economic complex. However, our immense ship is staying afloat with the greatest difficulty even now. There are fires in some compartments. Others are trying to set out on an independent cruise. They can only be unified by a common interest: creating the mechanism of a unified market. A market can work efficiently only in keeping with its inherent laws, the main ones of which are the free choice of partners and the equivalent exchange of goods on the basis of their social value. Ultimately, this value is reflected in the structure of world prices.

Indeed, the laws of the market are cruel: The one who gets ahead builds on his advantage whereas the unlucky one weeps. Our competitiveness in the world market is low for now, and we will fall behind even more if we sell our goods at world prices. The degree of differentiation among republics and regions which have differing conditions to start with will increase. The sudden lag of individual republics and regions will exacerbate tension in interethnic and social relations which will also weaken the economy of the country as a whole. Is there a way out?

It is known that prevention is cheaper than the treatment of a neglected illness. Preventive measures should be built into the very mechanism of regulation. The goal is to ensure the defense and increased competitiveness of the union market, as well as to improve its lagging elements.

How can this be accomplished? I believe that it is necessary to set up general economic organs in which all union republics—sovereign states—will be represented on an equal footing initially next to, and subsequently instead of, our "commander fathers" who assign compulsory tasks and resources in central departments and ministries. The task of these organs would be to work out an overall development strategy and ensure its implementation, as well as the protection of the union market, to which end they, naturally, need appropriate financial resources and economic devices. I will name the most important of them.

A compensatory mechanism. It is needed in order to ensure partial indemnification for losses caused by unfavorable natural and economic conditions in an individual region or losses due to natural calamities or erroneous actions. Chernobyl, the death of the Aral Sea, pollution of the Baykal, and overall deterioration of the ecological situation are our common woes and common fault. To be sure, we may look for specific culprits in the center or in the republics, but not one of them will be able to pay an indemnity for the losses inflicted.

In the course of the discussion of draft laws on the transition of republics to economic independence and self-financing, the demand has already been made to first bring those lagging behind to the level of leaders in terms of the national income generated per capita. This evening out, or rather leveling, of initial opportunities is unrealistic. Differences in the availability of natural resources and the demographic situation in the regions are too great. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union as a whole should make up, for example, the loss inflicted on the republics of Central Asia as a result of their external orientation toward a single-crop cotton economy while procurement prices were unjustifiably low. Also, a certain minimum wage and minimum social benefits for all regions should be set at the union level. However, incomes of the population will depend on the efficiency of work and management in the field in the environment of republic economic independence.

Such differences in the EEC countries are substantial. However, an efficient fund of regional development has been set up. Some of the profits are redistributed through the budgets of individual member states of the EEC as well. It is obvious that under our conditions we should also envisage the transfer of some of the additional profits associated with better natural conditions (differential rent) in order to give aid to less developed republics and regions. This, in turn, presupposes differences in the norms of contributions to the union budget.

An innovation mechanism. It is necessary at both the union and regional levels in order to rid our country of its role as a raw-material appendage of the world market. Certainly, our transition to a variety of property forms, development of free competition throughout the union market, and anti-monopoly legislation are important in this matter. However, this is not enough. The funds and efforts of not only individual enterprises but also regions will need to be pooled in order to develop basic research and accelerate the transition to research-intensive and capital-intensive technologies. To my mind, the creation of pertinent innovation funds is possible both on a commercial basis (joint stock) and on the basis of direct participation or support by the state through tax reductions or subsidies to large-scale scientific and technological programs. The experience of developed countries confirms that this avenue is a promising one.

A reserve bank system. It is impossible to conceive of a union market in the absence of a universal monetary equivalent. For example, in the EEC market natural progress toward a common monetary unit, the ECU [European Currency Unit], is under way. However, it proceeds through the reinforcement of national currency systems. By now, the opposite process has emerged in our country: from the ruble, a universal monetary equivalent, toward closed monetary systems or surrogate money (vouchers, invitation cards, etc.).

Apparently, the irrational nature of this process is understood by all specialists. Calls have even been heard to ban the creation of national currency bills within the

framework of the union. However, how can a consequence be banned as long as the cause, which is found in goods-and-money imbalances, is not affected? After all, no matter how many incentives a particular republic provides for augmenting the stock of goods or how much it restricts the growth of monetary income, all efforts will be undermined by a stream of money from other regions not covered by the delivery of goods. Hence the aspiration to protect one's local market from "outside-buyers" [pokupanta] by means of one's own currency or, better yet, a customs checkpoint which role might even be played by the gates of a plant.

Bans hold no promise in this endeavor. Creating a union reserve bank system in our common interest is another matter; the system would amount to an interrepublic financial institution independent of the central departments, the main task of which would be to reinforce, and subsequently to ensure the convertibility of the universal monetary equivalent, the ruble, in the world market.

At present, the main point is to combine organically two invincible trends of our time—the striving of all peoples to become masters of their own land and growing interdependence which results from the very nature of the development of productive forces. If we ensure this unification within the new economic and political structures of the union market the country will be given a genuine opportunity to overcome critical situations and to greatly improve the affluence of our peoples.

International Center for Small Enterprises Opens

904A0187A Moscow TRUD in Russian
9 Feb 90 p 2

[Report by V. Borisov: "A Big Future for Small Enterprises"]

[Text] The International Center for Development of Small Enterprises opened in Moscow yesterday. The opening was attended by L. Abalkin, academician and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; K. Turysov, secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU]; V. Pavlov, USSR minister of finance; and other officials, both Soviet and Italian. Experience abroad has confirmed the high efficiency of small enterprises: their ability to adjust quickly to new circumstances, to restructure themselves, and to cooperate actively with industrial giants. No less than half of the gross national product in the industrial countries goes to small business.

The international center should give a powerful stimulus to the development of small enterprises. It will provide consultative services, sell new technology, concern itself with training cadres, marketing, and advertising, and seek out potential partners from among Soviet and foreign enterprises. With access to a European data bank, the center will be able to offer detailed information about any foreign firm, its business reputation, and its potential, and direct a customer to the enterprises operating in his field.

In addition to acting as an intermediary, the international center will also organize joint enterprises. One of its long-range goals is to create and develop joint tourist firms. In fact the international center itself is a new joint enterprise. Contributors on the Soviet side include the AUCCTU, the Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development, the USSR Academy of the National Economy, the Innovations Fund of the State Committee for Science and Technology, and several enterprises. Foreign participants include the Milan Chamber of Commerce and an association of Italian Chambers of Commerce. Naturally the center has the required reserves, part in rubles and part in dollars. The AUCCTU was a cofounder of the center. The creation and development of small enterprises in the country will help not only to flood the consumer market with goods but also to resolve job placement problems.

Agricultural

Umbrella Agro-Industrial Labor Collective Formed

PM2802145390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent E. Matskevich dispatch: "We Resolve Our Problems by Ourselves"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—A republic agro-industrial complex labor collective council has been created in Kazakhstan.

It was elected at the representative conference of agricultural workers held recently in Alma Ata.

The idea of this innovation is to avoid departmental diktat and give the agrarian workers in the localities a free hand. The council's decisions that fall under its authority are binding for all ministries and departments in the agro-industrial complex, as well as for the State Planning Committee, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the Ministry of Finance, and other departments. It can repeal resolutions that are adopted without the council's agreement, that are damaging, or that limit the independence of its enterprises.

"The members of the council include people in charge of water resources and forestry management, grain production, finances, consumer cooperatives, and all other departments connected with agricultural production," V. Tursumbayev, chairman of the republic state agro-industrial committee and chief of the labor collective council, says. "Each of the 17 oblasts has a group of production workers, primarily directors and chairmen of farms, who can now resolve their own affairs without a mediator, directly within the framework of the council. The agro-industrial complex will, in a sense, become a working component in it.

"For example, the same Ministry of Grain Products has a great deal of grain storage capacity, part of which is not used. At the same time many sovkhozes [state farms] have nowhere to store seeds and fodder. Couldn't they come to an agreement based on mutual benefit? Well no,

because administrative barriers are preventing this. A grain product system supplies mixed feed to stockraising, but it does not always meet the necessary requirements. So what about setting up actual on-farm production of mixed feed?

"So we have acquired a certain amount of freedom in regulating reserves and meeting farmers' and leaseholders' needs. The council has a great deal of power. We are going to make a practical start on resolving all agricultural questions, including the formation of a state order for output, the use of capital investments and resources, and cadre policy. Social policy, advanced experience, foreign economic ties, and many other things also come under our authority."

Stroyev Addresses Agricultural Academy Meeting

PM2802120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Meeting at Academy"]

[Text] A meeting was held at the K.A. Timiryazev Agricultural Academy in Moscow 27 February between Ye.S. Stroyev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and students at the All-Union Higher School of Agro-Industrial Complex Management, the directors of experimental-production farms at agricultural higher educational establishments [VUZ's], the rectors and secretaries of party committees at the capital's agricultural VUZ's, and the academy's professorial and teaching staff.

The meeting examined questions of increasing the role of instructional farms in training the country's agro-industrial complex new-generation cadres capable of working intelligently under the new conditions.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary talked about the main avenues for implementing the CPSU's agrarian policy and the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March (1989) Plenum, and shared his ideas on the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th Party Congress.

Scientific

Cargo Ship 'Progress M-3' Successfully Launched

LD0103015490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0122 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 1 Mar (TASS)—In accordance with the program of further work for the "Mir" scientific research complex, the automatic cargo ship "Progress M-3" was launched in the Soviet Union on 1 March 1990 at 0211 Moscow time [2311 GMT].

The purpose of launching the vessel is to deliver consumable materials and assorted cargo to the "Mir" manned space station.

The vehicle "Progress M-3" has been placed in an orbit with the following parameters:

—maximum distance from the earth's surface: 245 km;
—minimum distance from the earth's surface: 188 km;
—period of revolution: 88.6 minutes;
—inclination: 51.6 degrees.

According to the telemetric information received, the onboard systems of the automatic cargo ship are working normally.

Launching of Information-Gathering Satellites

Oceanographic Satellite

LD2802115890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1050 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb (TASS)—An Okean artificial earth satellite was launched in the Soviet Union today by a Tsiklon rocket launcher.

The basic task of the launch is to receive up-to-the-minute oceanographical information and data on ice conditions in the interests of various branches of the USSR natioanl economy and international cooperation.

The satelite was launched with the following parameters:
—maximum distance from earth's surface (apogee)—679 km
—minimum distance from earth's surface (perigee)—655 km
—inclination of orbit—82.5 degrees
—initial period of orbit—97.8 minutes.

The satellite is carrying sets of scanning, optical-mechanical, and radiophysics apparatus.

Information from the satellite is being received for processing and distribution at the State Research Center for the Study of Natural Resources and at autonomous centers for receiving information belonging to the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology.

'Nadezhda' Navigation Satellite

LD2802113290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1046 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb (TASS)—An artificial earth satellite "Nadezhda" was launched in the Soviet Union 27 February 1990 from the "Cosmos" rocket carrier.

The satellite carries apparatus of a navigation system for determining the position of vessels of the USSR's maritime and fishing fleets, and also apparatus for work within the international space system for the search and rescue of vessels and aircraft in difficulties (KOSPAS-SARSAT).

The satellite has been placed in an orbit with the following parameters:
initial period of revolution, 104.9 minutes;
apogee, 1032 km;

perigee, 975 km;
orbital inclination, 83 degrees.

The apparatus aboard the satellite is woking normally. The coordinating and computing center is processing the incoming information.

Thermal Electric Power Station Reports Accident

LD2802230290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 28 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] An accident has occurred at the thermal electric power station in Ulan Ude.

[Correspondent Ya. Nikolayev] For reasons still unknown a fire broke out in the fuel supply gallery. Only emergency measures to convert the thermal station to liquid fuel, the stopping of a number of production facilities using a great deal of water and steam, and the switching off of hot water throughout the town have helped to keep the power station's power units in operating condition. The heat duty and the generation of electricity have decreased by 60 percent. I will remind you that in Buryatia the winter is not likely to end and the temperature drops to minus 30 degress at night.

[V.K. Kukshinov, chairman of the town executive committee, identified by screen caption] Emergency measures have been taken in the town today. Facilities involved in the economy, housing and public and cultural premises have not been permitted to freeze. In the next few days everything must be done to get the initial coal feed complex going. The accident is graphic evidence of the fact that the town of Ulan Ude is very likely the only town in the Soviet Union that only has one source of heating. Unfortunately, the construction of a second thermal power station has also been delayed. I would like to appeal to the USSR Ministry of Power Engineering to specifically render considerable assistance to us in building a second thermal power station and in arranging the town's heat supply. For without that assistance there can be no further development in the construction and, therefore, no further development in the town.

[Nikolayev] We are accustomed to complaining about the inefficiency of the local authorities. In this case, a headquarters was already set up during the night to eliminate the consequences of the accident. In the morning repair work began. It is hoped that the lack of heating in this large industrial center of Buryatia will be eradicated in the next few days.

[Announcer] For your information: 342,000 people live in Ulan Ude. It will be cold there for another month or six weeks, so while the local authorities cannot resolve their problems themselves we join in making the request of the town's executive committee chairman. The Ministry of Power Engineering should help Ulan Ude. [video shows views of the power station, scenes in the town and the interview with executive committee chairman.]

Nuclear Waste Dumping May Be Cause of Illnesses

LD2802221990 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1900 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] (Jaan Mati Punning), director of the Estonian Institute of Ecology and Oceanography, claims that radioactive waste from Estonian nuclear plants has been dumped off the coast of the Gulf of Finland. According to Professor (Punning), also waste from a chemical factory, containing heavy metals and uranium, has been stored close to the Gulf of Finland in an area which is separated from the sea by only a small dam. Professor (Punning) also believes that in the town of Sillamaee in northeastern Estonia, where the nuclear plants are situated, the cause of the greater than usual illness among children is radioactive waste. (Jaan Mati Punning), professor of Tartu University, is visiting Joensuu for discussions on an international environment conference to be arranged in Estonia next year.

Erkki Ilus, special researcher at the Finnish Radiation Protection Center, considers it very unlikely that the Sillamaee nuclear plants in Estonia have dumped radioactive waste in the Gulf of Finland. According to his information there are not even any nuclear plants in Sillamaee. The dumping of waste in the Baltic Sea has been banned by an agreement in 1974.

Military

Reportage on 1975 Mutiny Aboard Soviet Destroyer

Details Revealed

PM2802184890

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 February 1990 Morning Edition carries on page 6 under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA" and under the headline "Was There a Mutiny on a Soviet Destroyer?" a feature comprising an undated New York dispatch by its own correspondent A. Shalnev, a "Commentary by Major General of Justice A. Boriskin chief of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office Directorate for Supervision of the Application of Laws by USSR KGB Preliminary Investigation Organs and Rehabilitation Questions," and a "From the Editorial Office" footnote.

The 900-word Shalnev dispatch briefly previews the movie "The Hunt for Red October," and summarizes at length what it describes as "the American version" of events which occurred on board the Soviet destroyer Storozhevoy when it attempted to escape to Sweden in 1975, as contained in James Oberg's book "Digging Up Soviet Disasters."

The Boriskin commentary reads as follows:

"I fully agree with the correspondent—people must know the truth because, whenever it is concealed from the people, there emerges a mass of rumors and conjectures. And now about the facts.

"It is true that, back in November 1975, Captain 3d Rank V. Sablin, deputy commander of the large antisubmarine ship Storozhevoy, attempted to implement a scheme he had been hatching for a long time—to take over the warship, having isolated the commander and a number of officers and petty officers and deceived the crew. Contrary to the command's categorical orders, he hijacked [ugnal] it in the Baltic Sea, outside the Soviet state border limits at a distance of 21 miles in the direction of Swedish territorial waters. They were only 50 miles away when the ship was halted and returned to base.

"Yes, weapons were used at the time. The bombing was not aimed at the ship but ahead of it, across its bows. Of course, there was not a single hit, nothing at all was damaged either on deck or on the superstructure. Nor were there any killed or wounded members of the large antisubmarine ship's crew. That is, apart from Sablin himself: He suffered a leg wound as a result of a pistol shot fired by the commander when he tried to restore legality and order on the warship.

"On 13 July 1976 the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium found V. Sablin guilty of having for a long time—since the spring of 1973—hatched schemes aimed at attaining criminal goals which were hostile to the Soviet state: betrayal of the state and social system and replacement of the government, including by violent means. Later on, and in breach of the military oath, he embarked on the practical implementation of an adventurist action.

"Sablin's guilt in committing the crime was completely proved by the testimony of many eyewitnesses, numerous items of material evidence, and his full admission of his own guilt.

"Sablin was stripped of his military rank, orders, and medals and sentenced to execution by firing squad. His accomplice Seaman A. Shein, who had previously served a sentence for theft, was sentenced to 8 years' deprivation of freedom.

"Criminal proceedings were instituted against the six officers and 11 petty officers who were deceived by Sablin and had assisted him in capturing the ship and sailing it outside the limits of the USSR state border, but the cases against them were soon dismissed. It is, therefore, absurd to talk about 82 men having been shot.

"Many people today say that nowadays Sablin's political views would have been perceived quite differently from 1975. That he was almost a harbinger of our perestroyka and the current reforms, including reforms in the Army and Navy... What is there to say? Primarily: At that time, just as now, a breach of the military oath, unauthorized takeover of a warship, withdrawal of such a warship from its subordination to the Navy command, and refusal to obey orders were and still remain the gravest of military crimes, a betrayal of the motherland. Furthermore, this classification is applied to such actions not only by our own Criminal Code but also by the legislation of any civilized state.

"Sablin's ultimatum, which was transmitted by radio to the Navy commander in chief, began with these words: 'The territory of the ship Storozhevoy is proclaimed free and independent of state and party organs...' Both during the investigation and at the trial he remained calm, did not change his political views even though he repented for having chosen the wrong path for implementing them, and did not feel a sense of real responsibility for his actions.

"I would like to especially emphasize an idea which I consider topical, especially today: Adventurism, including political adventurism, and especially if based on unlawful and violent actions, cannot be justified by anything and can only result in elementary crimes. This must be borne in mind."

The footnote "From the Editorial Office" reads:

"This feature certainly does not answer all the questions remaining after the Storozhevoy mutiny. Only the first significant step toward uncovering the details of this story was taken today. Over the last 15 years, however, everything that happened with Storozhevoy and Capt. 3d Rank Sablin has been embellished by the most diverse rumors which the editorial office cannot verify. This is why we would like to find out about events on 8-9 November from eyewitnesses and participants. The law strictly punishes military crimes, and the tribunal expressed its attitude toward the large antisubmarine ship's deputy commander. But it is still not completely clear: How did he decide to take such an extreme step, what was he thinking, what was he preaching?.."

Mutiny Remembered

LD0103102490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 1 Mar 90

[From the central press review]

[Text] The readers of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA will probably be attracted to the article under the heading "The Last Parade." This contains excerpts from the study by writer Nikolay Cherkashin about the dramatic events that occurred in the Riga roadstead in November 1975. I will remind you briefly about the subject of those events. On the second day of the November public holidays the large antisubmarine warfare [ASW] ship Storozhevoy sailed out of the ceremonial formation of warships without authorization and headed for the open sea. The deputy political officer arrested the commander, took his place on the bridge, and sailed the ship into neutral waters. There he addressed a revolutionary appeal to the country's leaders by radio. Aircraft took off and stopped the Storozhevoy

with warning shots. And when the commander managed to free himself, having climbed on to the bridge, he seriously wounded Sablin, his deputy responsible for the political sphere, and turned the ship round.

Now one can talk about this at the top of one's voice. But it is true that it is strange and painful. The words that we are reading today about the deformation of socialism, about the need to return to Lenin's principles, to genuine democracy, cost Sablin his life, no sooner had he hastened to express them to Brezhnev, Nikolay Cherkashin writes in his study.

Yashin Uses Military Reform as Campaign Platform

PM2802140190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yu. Yashin conducted by Colonel A. Belousov; time and place not indicated: under the "Let's Prepare for the Elections" rubric: "For Constructive Changes"]

[Text] Colonel General Yu.A. Yashin, USSR deputy defense minister, has been registered as Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] candidate people's deputy for Arkhangelskiy National-Territorial Okrug No. 25. He is a doctor of technical sciences and USSR state prizewinner. Our correspondent met with the RSFSR candidate people's deputy.

[Belousov] Yuriy Alekseyevich, your election program contains a good deal of constructive ideas concerning the transformation of the Russian Federation. And yet certain questions have been passed over which require a clear and precise answer now, otherwise one simply cannot hope, in my opinion, to be successful in the election campaign. For example, the opinion is expressed that perestroyka in Russia won't work and the republic won't obtain real sovereignty unless we have our own communist party and central committee. What is your position on this?

[Yashin] I should first say that my platform must not be regarded as something that is rigid and fixed once and for all. It is being expanded and augmented during my meetings with voters. But the conceptual bases do, of course, remain unchanged.

As to that which directly concerns your question, I think that it is not just the organizational perestroyka of the party but also economic, social, and moral perestroyka that is important for Russia. Our republic's economic autonomy is a sine qua non of this. But I am deeply convinced that it is impossible to carry out economic reform without extending the rights of primary party organizations, increasing their autonomy, and renewing forms of work. No redeployment of cadres either vertically or horizontally or the resignation of city or oblast party committees will help fundamentally here. The autonomy and responsibility of primary party organizations and party committees are the main thing. And precisely for this, I consider that the creation of a Russian Communist Party and Central Committee is possible. As part of the CPSU, of course. But this question should be solved by communists themselves with the widest discussion.

[Belousov] What is you attitude to military reform?

[Yashin] There are two factors which make it necessary: The military-political situation in the world and our country's potential. Positive changes are taking place in the world, but it is necessary, after all, to take account of the fact that the combat effectiveness of the strategic offensive forces of the United States and NATO countries is growing rather than decreasing. In such a situation and also in view of the political, economic, and social processes taking place in our country we must certainly think about reorganizing the Armed Forces based on the new political approaches. Ensuring high combat readiness on the part of the Armed Forces and strengthening the unity of the Army and the people constitute the dual objective of military reform.

What are the thrusts of military reform that I see? First, the improvement of Armed Forces management in the light of the possible election of a president and change in the role and powers of the Supreme Soviet in relation to the Armed Forces. Second, the reorganization of the organizational-staff structure. Third, a change in the procedure for orders of arms and military hardware and the carrying out of scientific research and experimental design work. Four, improvement of the principles of manpower acquistion and the performance of service by personnel. To make this clear: This means increasing the percentage of professional, highly trained servicemen and providing for the possibility of voluntary service...

[Belousov] Excuse me, Yuriy Alekseyevich, the specific thrusts of military reform are expounded by you here for the first time, and therefore each point requires elucidation. But that clearly should be the topic of a special discussion. But now I should like to learn your opinion as to whether you consider it normal that young people be drafted for active military service by means of a defense ministry order?

[Yashin] No, I do not. This should be the prerogative of the Supreme Soviet, since Army service is the execution of a constitutional duty by citizens. But for the time being that is what we do have. It is impossible to explain to people why the defense minister issues a command to civilian youth and why the order is signed by him if the draftees go to the USSR KGB and the internal troops...

[Belousov] Your election program is geared in many respects toward developing Arkhangelsk Oblast, establishing social justice, solving environmental problems... How do you intend to achieve your plans?

[Yashin] Through radical economic transformations, carrying out agrarian reforms, making effective use of people's creative potential, and placing everything that has a bearing upon the utilization of nature and people's living conditions under fundamental public control.

[Belousov] And yet, if one is to be more specific... For example, you are in favor of a mother being able to look after the upbringing of her child until the age of three while retaining her average wages, of the wages of working pensioners not being dependent upon the size of their pensions, of students being paid a grant irrespective of their progress... But where is the money to be obtained?

[Yashin] There is only one way and that is through the oblast's economic autonomy. And for that at least the following should be implemented. Twenty-five percent of the timber procured here should remain in the oblast—for the construction of housing, schools, and children's establishments, the building of roads, and the construction of a gas pipeline. Twenty-five percent of the profit of industrial enterprises subordinate to the center, and that applies to around 90 percent in the oblast, should go to local soviets. Soviets will then have real power and the opportunity to influence the development of the social and consumer sphere. The matter will also be helped by a decisive reorientation of military production toward boosting the output of quality consumer goods. I also consider it essential to set up a special state fund to assist the development of northern Russia and provide it with goods and food by extensive use of conversion to those ends. Effective legislative measures are necessary in the sphere of the environment are essential. This means above all ensuring that the work involved in developing the oblast's raw materials base, the operation of paper and pulp combines, and the activity of military garrisons are environmentally clean.

Article on Defense Spending, Professional Army

AU2802214690 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 22 Feb 90 p 5

[NOVOSTI article "especially for ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI" by Ivan Yudin, doctor of economic sciences: "The Price of a Soldier's Equipment"]

[Text] A country that spends more and more of its resources on the arms race can lose a war even before hostilities break out due to a financial overload. That is the view held by Boris Shapostnikov, the Soviet military commander and scholar. Is the USSR spending a lot on armaments, or is it spending little?

In 1988, shortly before the present armed forces reductions and conversion of military production to civilian production, defense spending constituted more or less nine percent of the gross national product. That was almost the limit of our country's economic possibilities.

So what does the immediate future hold? It is estimated that defense spending will take up about eight percent of the gross national product this year. If the program of unilateral armed forces and armaments reductions is completed by 1991, there is a chance that the financial burden of defense spending will be reduced to seven percent of the gross national product.

Unless international society causes a radical disintegration of the military-political situation in the 1990's, and provided that Europe and the United States reach an agreement concerning armed forces and armaments reductions, then halfway through the next five-year plan the Soviet Union will be able to reduce defense expenditures to approximately six percent of the gross national product, which is the world average. Such a level seems to be optimal for the country. Reducing military spending to this level will have a noticeable effect on the process of healing the entire economy, but without affecting the state's defense capability. How can this be achieved?

Most of all, it is necessary to improve the recruitment and training of the Army and Navy much more energetically. Some people are in favor of a professional Army, while others prefer compulsory military service. But in order for the USSR to be able to switch over to a professional Army under present conditions, defense spending would have to be increased by 12-16 million rubles a year. So where is the solution?

There is a solution. This is it. One could reduce the Armed Forces and make a greater proportion of them professional, while simultaneously guaranteeing their defense capability by reducing military expenditures. Making a qualitative improvement in the Armed Forces while reducing their numerical status is the key to solving this problem.

Following the present reductions, there will be 3.7 million people in the Army and Navy by the end of 1991. Almost two-thirds of these will be people undergoing compulsory military service. The rest, 35 percent, will consist of professionals: officers, non-commissioned officers, warrant officers, and women.

Many experts think it would be a good idea for the ratio of conscripts to professionals to be approximately one to one. Such a ratio already exists in many branches of the Armed Forces and on warships. Replacing three conscripts by one professional would not be harmful from the military point of view and would be advantageous from the economic point of view.

Logic tells us that in the country's present economic situation, Soviet society must reduce defense spending. It must do so without lowering the Army and Navy's defense capability.

Chief Inspector Sorokin Defends Armed Forces

90UM0320A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 8, 24 Feb 90 pp 1, 8

[Interview with General of the Army M.I. Sorokin, chief inspector and USSR deputy defense minister, by special correspondent E. Lunev: "The Times and the Army"]

[Text] [Lunev] Comrade General of the Army, the history of our illustrious Armed Forces is well known. Despite certain criticism today, the Army has been and

remains the true defender of the country and the Soviet peoples, regardless of their national affiliation.

[Sorokin] You are right. Throughout its history the Army has stood reliably on guard. The mass heroism of Soviet fighting men and their selfless devotion to the motherland and their military duty, courage, bravery, and unbending morale—all these excellent qualities are characteristic of our people's Army today also.

As far as the criticism is concerned, it has not always been constructive recently. There are people who make absolutes out of negative facts, argue portentously and not, I would say, all that competently about the alleged absence of any threat to our state from outside, advocate the accelerated reduction of the Army and Navy, chiefly unilaterally, and are emasculating their role in Soviet society.

It is regrettable that these ideas are finding many supporters among young people also and are becoming the basis for the creation of certain informal organizations of youth of an extremely pacifist nature who reject Army service and express anti-patriotic views.

Of course, there are shortcomings in the Army. The party Central Committee's evaluation of the negative phenomena associated with flagrant violations of Army discipline, particularly of nonregulation relations between servicemen, which the people have come to call "hazing," was pointed, just, and high-minded. It needs generally to be recognized that the defects of the Army are largely the defects of society.

We are today speaking openly about this not only from meeting platforms but also in the military press. We are endeavoring to bring this openness of ours to society.

[Lunev] Mikhail Ivanovich, we have recently been witnessing a growth in interethnic tension, and in places this has developed into bloodshed, violence, and grief. Does the Army perform a stabilizing role in such instances?

[Sorokin] Permit me to ask a counter-question. Has there been a moment in our history when the Army has left the people alone in their trouble? Who was the first to rush into the scorching nuclear heat of Chernobyl? The Army. Who was the first to crawl into the hell of the Spitak earthquake? Who was the first to become a wall on the boundary of interethnic passions? Again the Army. Notice that I have cited three extreme situations, in which the Army is not trained to operate and for which it is not intended. However, in each of them it proferred its firm and kind hand. Today it is protecting the citizens against gangsters who have taken leave of their senses and humanity and who, taking cover behind nationalist slogans, are engaging in lawlessness and are committing acts of homicide and engaging in pogroms and robbery.

Men of the Army and Navy are honorably performing the duties entrusted to them, displaying here forbearance, self-possession, patience, balance, and tact and putting themselves at risk, and ensuring stability in the cities and localities in the state of emergency zone.

[Lunev] Very good, Mikhail Ivanovich, but I recall an incident described by an eyewitness. A municipal bus was proceeding along its route when it stopped suddenly in the middle of the street, and the driver, glancing in his rearview mirror, announced on the radio that the bus would be going no further until two officers got off. And no one, no one took exception to this outrage against the honor and dignity of an officer.

[Sorokin] If this incident really occurred, it cannot be categorized as anything other than vile. I think that that driver had personal grievances, perhaps some people in the service had given him a hard time, as they say. Only it is hardly reasonable to accuse the whole Army of this. Let us imagine for a moment that some half-educated doctor has made a false diagnosis. Is all of domestic medicine to blame for this? Generally speaking, a certain part of society today is inclined to see the Army merely as an instrument for defense against an external enemy, not as an inalienable structure of society itself with all the ensuing commitments to it. Decidedly aggressive attacks on the Army and its role and place in the political and state structure of our society are increasing. The attempts which are being made to accuse the Army of holding back perestroyka and undermining the economic power of the state are nothing other than an endeavor to drive a wedge between the Army and the people.

A leaflet is being disseminated among the young people in Lithuania, for example, which maintains that the Lithuanian state is occupied by the Soviet Union and that for this reason the republic's citizens have the right to renounce service "in the occupation Army of the Soviet Union" and return their military service cards and draft papers. Such instances have occurred in the Transcaucasus also.

Much is being written and spoken about national formations in this connection. I would like to emphasize, therefore, that the Army, which is brought up to strength on the basis of the principle of universal military service, is a factor of the consolidation of the nations and removes a whole number of contradictions between society and the Armed Forces.

[Lunev] And the final question. Life is testing our country, society, and the Army. On the 72d anniversary of the formation of the USSR Armed Forces how do you envision their role at present and in the future from the position of a person who does not have the right to adopt an impartial attitude toward all that is happening in the Army?

[Sorokin] A difficult question. The main thing is that the Armed Forces be maintained in the composition and the condition which ensure the prevention of war, the reliable repulse of possible aggression, effective operations in emergency situations, and the curtailment of military

provocations. In short, it should be a question of reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defense.

And it is important to stress here that much in the realization of the principle of sufficiency will depend on the other side. After all, a real intensification of the process of relaxation of international tension and mutual trust, particularly in such a complex sphere as the military, is possible only on a bilateral basis and presupposes a constant lowering of the levels of military confrontation, given observance of reciprocity, equality, and equal security. That it has been possible to push war back does not in the least mean that the threat of aggression against us has already been lifted.

The events occurring in East Europe have today made it a kind of nerve center of the planet. The world political climate will depend subsequently to a large extent on the kind of processes which occur there. And our Army under these conditions is performing a stabilizing role and contributing to the peaceful flow of political passions, remaining a principal guarantor of order. It is itself here also subject to change and renewal. We have to be gratified that a clearing out of stagnation phenomena has begun in the Army and that a struggle against the bureaucratism, protectionism, careerism, coarseness, and arbitrary action of certain officials is under way.

I believe that in the next few years we will have succeeded in doing away with all that nasty, negative and atypical of the Army. Young, competent, and energetic generals and officers who think in the new way and are capable of bringing firm order to bear and not repeating past mistakes, are coming to positions of leadership today. The Army will be modern and will correspond to the spirit of the times and the letter of the defensive doctrine which we have proclaimed. And, of course, it will remain the most organized and most efficient force of society—as it has always been.

Baltic Republics

Lithuanian Official Urges Coalition Government

AU2802180090 Paris AFP in English 1653 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 28 (AFP)—A Communist Party official in the wantaway [as received] Baltic republic of Lithuania called Wednesday for a regional coalition government of communists and nationalists, press reports said. Yustas Paletskis, third secretary of the party's Central Committee, told Radio Moscow's INTERFAX service it was crucial that a majority of Lithuanians support the administration resulting from last weekend's elections.

Mr. Paletskis said a coalition cabinet was also necessary to prepare for tough negotiations on independence with Moscow.

The Sajudis party grouping several nationalist organizations took 72 of the 141 seats in the first round of polls. The republic's Communist Party has already declared its autonomy from the Moscow leadership. More than 80 per cent of the candidates in regional elections, including 13 of the independent Communist Party, were elected in the first round.

Yuozas Bulavas, the republic's electoral commission president, said Wednesday that the second round of voting would be brought forward by one week to March 4, in about 20 out of 45 districts where a second round is necessary. In six districts a new poll is to be held because less than 50 per cent of the electorate voted last weekend.

Sajudis-Backed Deputies Meet in Vilnius

LD2802233890 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 28 feb 90

[Text] The elected deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet—those who were backed by Sajudis—held a meeting in Vilnius today.

Sixty-two deputies out of 71 participated (?in and) formed four working groups, two of them of interim character. The latter are to work out the principles of structural activities of the newly elected Supreme Soviet and the new government. The other two groups which will work on the problems of Lithuania's statehood, legislation, and defence, later on may become permanent commissions at the Supreme Soviet.

The Sajudis supported deputies also proposed to increase the number of members of the existing commission on the status of the USSR Armed Forces in Lithuania and military service of Lithuanian citizens.

Several important appeals to the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which during the interim period remains to be the highest organized power, were issued.

By one of them the presidium is urged to convene the first session of the newly elected parliament not later than 11 March. This will be on the eve of the session of the Congress of the USSR People's Deputies.

It has also been decided to establish a club of deputies who supported the Sajudis election program. It will be a similar kind of club Solidarity deputies have in the Polish Parliament.

More details about the meeting held by Sajudis deputies will be reported in our broadcast tomorrow.

Depoliticalization of Lithuanian Militia Viewed

LD0602141090 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS in Lithuanian No 4, 26 Jan-1 Feb 90 p 3

[Commentary by Rimvydas Valatka (assistant to chief editor), in the Savaite (Week) Section.]

[Text] We have not yet observed the first anniversary of Tbilisi and we already have Baku: Tanks against the crowd and an army against the people, whom the generals so boringly claim to defend. The version that described the military action as a means of saving Baku Armenians from new pogroms, does not hold up against criticism. The thought comes to mind that certain individuals at the mighty center are interested in escalating the war. Contrary to what happened in Tbilisi, the tanks were dispatched to Baku without consulting the Azerbaijan Government. Such is the actual sovereignty of republics. The order was signed by Politician No 1—without having informed the parliament. The tens, or according to some reports, hundreds and even thousands of victims, appear not to be the final result of this military offensive.

I cannot agree with commentators who label the Transcaucasian events as civil war. A civil war would exist in the event the Azerbaijanis would fight among themselves. What we have there currently, is a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Their armed conflict, which historically was to have taken place 70 years ago, when bolshevik leaders "assigned" Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan, was further complicated by the Soviet Army's intervention in Baku. That is why current attempts, appearing in our press even now, to decide—are Armenians or Azerbaijanis responsible for the international conflict, are impossible not to be astounded by. Is it unclear even to us, that we are reaping the fruits of the bolshevism doctrine, in other words, of the proletarian revolution, that has trampled inalienable human rights? It seems to me the reason that forced the tanks into Baku, was an attempt to regains those rights.

Of course, it is not easy to orient oneself in the Azeri-Armenian conflict, however it is impossible for a healthy mind to grasp why Moscow did not attempt to sit down for serious negotiations with the Armenian and Azerbaijani Popular Fronts, who have actual influence among the masses, unlike the mythical USSR filiates of those republics?

Political inflexibility? Or imperial habit of warming one's hands by the fire of conflagration? On Monday, Estonian and Latvian Popular Fronts' as well as Sajudis' representatives, signed an Appeal in Riga, addressed to both Transcaucasian nations, offering to serve as negotiation mediators. In my estimation, there is no point in talking about an end to the conflict, without giving Armenia and Azerbaijan the right of self determination.

Even the patient women of Russia were angered, this time, by reserve mobilization (as in the case of real war). There are some Lithuanian youths to be found in the Azeri kettle. What sense does it make for Lithuanians to die in yet another distant and foreign land? The army, or to be more specific, the generals' problem is easy to discern. The Soviet soldiers are being increasingly and presistently urged to return home from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but the Fatherland is not yet prepared to absorb such a number of the military—thousands of officers' families will face the critical housing problem.

Following the sudden crumpling of the Eastern Bloc, a wave of anti-communism is sweeping Romania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Communist activity has been stopped in the first of these states. It looks as if a similar fate may await their colleagues in other East European states. Dark times have descended upon those states' secret services, that have so recently been all-powerful. Following the shameful demise of the Securitate, a similar fate befell the East German security. A scandal has evolved concerning the activities of Hungarian "revolutionary knights." Well, what about the fatherland of Cheka? According to foreign radio coverage, Azerbaijani and Armenian security forces have joined their nations' side.

Monday, a somewhat unexpected bit of news reached us from the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs, who has appealed to the Republic's Supreme Soviet, requesting depoliticalization of Lithuanian militia. It would be of interest to learn how that section of the State Security Committee will be dealt with, whose one duty assignment is to keep an eye on... the militiamen themselves. A GK correspondent was told by a MVD officer, who for obvious reasons did not wish to be named, staffers of this section are comprised of individuals who are, for the most part, neither Lithuanians nor militiamen (they are from THERE), although they all have MVD credentials and sit in Room 378.

Perhaps that is not true and maybe the officer lied or was a provocateur? Being mindful of the nature and structure of security, which received only a whitewash after 1953, and knowing that just recently the post of deputy rector for education affairs of the Vilnius Pedogogical Institute, was occupied by an individual from THERE, this type of information should not cause a sensation. After all, everything was geared in the USSR for the total surveillance of its people. In spite of the fact Kryuchkov is already granting intelligentsia-like interviews to the press, this agency (especially since it sides with the party of the night) will never merit trust.

As for those who are angered with this type of assessment, it would be to their advantage to pay more heed to their East European colleagues' fate. It is possible to avoid excesses by initiating radical restructuring reforms of repression organs. An increasing number of people are aware of the fact, Lithuania has no need for a Security Committee.

The fourth week of Lithuania's economic independence will please the republic's "economically independent" citizens insofar as they will no longer be required to exchange currency prior to departing abroad. This is how Moscow turned off the first faucet (Latvians will feel it even more—from now on their official newspapers will be published only once a week—Moscow will not supply them with paper). How will Lithuania react to this? In holding meetings, issuing declarations and editing various statements, we forgot to prrepare a Program on how to deal with similar circumstances.

The closer the goal, the more can be found in Lithuania of those who want to squabble among themselves, and discover who is the better and who shall not even have the right to vote in rekindling of independence. Similar moods abound in the press and some were in evidence at the Sajudis Seimas Council this Sunday. Juozas Urbys, the last foreign Minister of Independent Lithuania stated in an interview with LIETUVOS RYTAS: "We should not be competing now in determining who said what first. I find it very strange and uncomfortable to see various parties squabbling among themselves in seeking to determine who was the first to speak out for independence."

It seems to me, the situation has matured sufficiently to have a serious forum (dialog) between Lithuania's various parties, movements, emigre organizations and the church, which would not take the form of a declaration, similar to the one in Gotland, but would be a concrete agreement on several and in my estimation, necessary matters: Its participants would agree not to find fault with party names and conceed that abstract criticism—is already a thing of the past; that in raising ourselves up, we will not be belittling and abusing others; that agreement will be reached on principles in establishing a coalition government etc,. Otherwise we will only show we are not prepared for a serious confrontation with the empire, which judging from events in Azerbaijan, is not really disposed toward bringing freedom on a plate. Particularly, in view of the fact, a campaign against Lithuanian leadership was conducted in Vilnius Rayon, this week. Is someone is displeased by the peaceful manner in which things have been progressing here?

Lithuania Ends Broadcasting Censorship

LD2802162190 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] For the last time today, the texts of our broadcasts were read beforehand by a censor, and the visa stating that the program can go on the air was also stamped down for the last time here in Radio and TV Committee of Lithuania. From 1 March the law on the press is going into effect in Lithuania, and therefore media censorship has been eliminated—though for some time already the censorship of Lithuania did not interfere in politics, mostly guarding state secrets only.

RSFSR

Ligachev, Girenko Address Moscow Workers

LD1602205390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 16 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Ligachev today met with the workers and specialists of the Chernyshev machine-building association in Moscow's Tushinskiy Rayon and addressed the party and economic aktiv of the enterprise. The draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress, the decisions of the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum, at which political bearings were elaborated for our movement toward genuinely humane and democratic socialism, and the solution of the pressing tasks of perestroyka were focussed upon.

At a meeting that took place between Comrade Girenko and the working people of the Miller Helicopter Works in Moscow, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee told about the results of the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and about the main provisions in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress.

Yakovlev Addresses Moscow Party School

LD2302092890 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, addressed the students of the Moscow Higher Party School.

Aleksandr Yakovlev, among other things, was asked what he believed the model of the president in the USSR should resemble and what is the need for introducing it?

[Begin Yakaovlev recording in Russian fading into English report] I proceed on the following, said Aleksandr Yakovlev. Today we see the democratic process developing in the country. At one time when the government was totally in the hands of one person, this question did not arise, but now we see a rapid democratic process in our life. I think, stressed Aleksandr Yakovlev, that in our large multinational and very complex country the institution of president is necessary as a symbol of statehood and the integrity of our country. This can also introduce an element of stabilisation in the development of our country. The president should be a consolidating nucleus which would unite us all in times of stress and in times of calm.

Answering a question of how he sees the role of general secretary of the party in the future, Aleksandr Yakovlev said that the general secretary must not only be its leader but also responsible for party strategy and policy. [end recording]

And that was a short fragment from the speech presented to students of a higher party school here in Moscow by Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev.

Journalists Attacked at Russian Festival

PM2302144190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Krayukhin: "Some Tradition..."]

[Text] Leningrad—On 20 February during the opening of the "Russian meetings" festival organized at the initiative of the "Neva-Ladoga-Onega" public rescue committee, the committee's activists attacked journalists from the newspaper SMENA.

"Under the threat of having his camera destroyed, photographic correspondent A. Nikolayev's film was taken from him. Journalist A. Repina was injured. The militiamen present, despite a direct appeal to them, refused to defend the newspaper workers' legal rights" (from the statement of the secretariat of the board of the Leningrad organization of the USSR Journalists Union).

On 21 February the "Russian meetings" festival in the "Yubileynyy" sports palace was continued. Those present included young men in the uniform of officers of the old Russian Army. The newspaper ROSSIYA with the glaring headline "Fatherland in Danger" and portraits of His Majesty the Emperor were on sale at the entrance. In the hall was the slogan "We welcome the best Russian writers!"

The brass band played the song about the "Varyag" [reference to a ship whose crew played heroic role in Russian-Japanese war] and Glinka's "Praise Be." Later those present honored with one minute's silence the memory of the "murdered emperor." Opening the evening, S. Vikulov, secretary of the Board of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Writers Union, said that the genetic stock of the Russian people and their moral and physical forces have been undermined. He blamed this not only on Stalinism but also on Trotskiy, Kamenev, Zinovyev, Uritskiy, Yaroslavskiy...

Among all the mass media, he named the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA as the true leader of the patriotic movement.

The evening was filmed for television. Voices from the hall demanded to know who had authorized this and who would edit the film. In continuation of these sentiments P. Kolovantin, a member of the "Neva-Ladoga-Onega" rescue committee, held the Leningrad press up to shame and called V. Yugin, the chief editor of the SMENA youth newspaper, a "stifler of liberty."

Leningrad critic M. Lyubomudrov greeted the 5,000 patriots who, as he put it, had gathered under one roof for the first time in more than 70 years. According to the speaker a fifth column has been formed in Russia and the television program "Fifth Wheel" and other mass media have become the propagators of its ideas. In this connection he urged that a people's control committee be created over the mass media. Those assembled greeted this proposal with an ovation.

When one of the speakers said that "A.N. Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo," is directly to blame for the events in the GDR, Romania, and the Baltic," the hall began to chant: "Down with Yakovlev!" The slogans "Down with Primakov" and "Down with Yeltsin" were then chanted with no less enthusiasm.

The writers V. Belov and V. Soloukhin; critics V. Bushin and F. Shipunov; M. Alekseyev, chief editor of the journal MOSKVA; and A. Kazintsev, deputy chief editor of the journal NASH SOVREMENNIK, spoke.... Academician F. Uglov said that the total alcoholization of the Russian population is taking place in the country and this is "the weapon of Zionism." Poet Ye. Markova enthusiastically read out "Nicholas, miracle worker, save Russia...from the Jewish merchants."

On the crest of universal inspiration the meeting resolved to make such meetings traditional and to hold them every year in late February.

Some tradition....

Reader Questions Yevtushenko Crowd Appeal

PM2402154690 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Letter from L. Karpova in Moscow: "Crowd Scene for the Movies?"]

[Text] USSR People's Deputy Ye. Yevtushenko has had a bright idea—to make a movie about the events surrounding Stalin's funeral. And this idea alone would be worthy of applause. But his appeal to the newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on 22 February 1990, requesting that masses of Muscovites be summoned to Trubnaya Square on 24 February supposedly for filming, looks like rather more than simply a solution to the technical problem of a movie crowd scene. The poet intends vigorously to politicize the crowd of people while the movie cameras whir. After all, it is obvious to everyone that this event will not take place without speeches. And the rally euphoria will create a colorful background for the monologues of the characters in the movie. What then?

And another question. Is not this appeal an attempt to bypass the Supreme Soviet's statement on the stabilization of the situation in the country and strict accountability for the holding of unauthorized rallies? One hopes that the movie director and screenwriter will publicly take upon himself the responsibility for every excess, if such things occur during shooting, especially since Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich himself has said: "When little Ulsters are springing up all around us, we must all join hands."

Bashkir Obkom Bureau 'Retired'

90UM0951A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by M. Merzabekov: "Retirement Approved: Notes From a Special Plenum of the Bashkir Obkom of the CPSU"]

[Text] The events, which are the only thing the capital of Bashkiriya lives with these days, began to unfold a week ago. A plenum of the Ufa city committee was held on 2 February, and the question of improving interethnic relations appeared on its agenda for the first time; however, this is understandable. The city has a complex ethnic structure and, for this reason, the comprehensive special purpose program was brought to the attention of the plenum. The program's basic provisions were covered in reports by F.A. Gaysin, secretary of the CPSU gorkom [city party committee], and D.M. Gilyazetdinov, a professor at Bashkir State University. The program was received with interest, and it was evaluated as an important step in the scientific comprehension of the problem.

However, the ethnic aspect seemed to have lost its priority for this plenum after R.R. Gareyev, the first secretary of the Ufa City CPSU soviet, presented information. The first secretary observed that increasingly growing public activity, especially now in the preelection period, requires the resolution of many problems of a sociopolitical, economic, and ideological nature. It was said further that, in meetings with workers, questions were heard relating to the activity of the leadership of the oblast party organization. The citizens are troubled by the lack of contact with the secretary of the CPSU obkom and by the leaders' extremely poor attention to their needs. Passions are seething, the irritation and dissatisfaction of the people is growing, and proper measures are not being taken...

The information contained sharp criticism of the oblast committee and its bureau and of R.Kh. Khabibullin, its first secretary, for adherence to old, antiquated methods of work and the lack of desire and, perhaps, inability to restructure. It was also said that the absence of a firm

policy line, an integral policy of renewal in the main spheres of life, the repetition of former mistakes, and the shortage of constructive proposals and decisions on the part of the secretaries and apparatus of the oblast committee created an area of alienation and separateness in the activities between the obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms [rayon party committees]. The autonomy of the republic fell greatly with the introduction of territorial cost accounting, and ecological programs are being implemented slowly, which is promoted by a policy of noninterference in questions of the construction of the Ishtuganovskiy reservoir and the Bashkir AES [nuclear power station]. It was proposed that the obkom bureau call a special plenum of the obkom for next week.

Participants in the plenum displayed much activity in considering the information—23 people spoke. All of them supported R.R. Gareyev's proposals. Only one speech was given against it—that of A.P. Zhityayeva, chief of the department of party organization and personnel work and candidate for bureau membership, who considered it unethical to "hold court over the obkom bureau in the absence of a second party." However, the obkom representative's objection did not receive any support.

The plenum of the city committee adopted the resolution: Approve the conclusions set forth in R.R. Gareyev's information, support his position, and express distrust in the obkom bureau's methods of managing the restructuring processes. The conference participants set forth a demand to convene a joint plenum of the Ufa City committee and the Bashkir Oblast committee to examine urgent questions.

The decision of the plenum of the gorkom disturbed all of the party activists of the republic. Party meetings were held in enterprises, in VUZ's [institutes of higher education], and in scientific institutes, at which the communists in general supported the initiative of the plenum of the gorkom. In addition, a number of the largest party organizations approved a decision to demand the retirement of the bureau of the city committee. This measure was considered logical and just inasmuch as the gorkom is headed by obkom bureau member Gareyev. The local press published the full text of the materials of the city plenum.

Incidentally, broad publicity turned out to be very necessary in this situation to dispel all kinds of idle talk and rumors surrounding the gorkom's initiative.

In general, however, the retirement of the obkom's bureau was already decided before the special obkom plenum that was announced for 10 February. The day before, members and candidate members of the CPSU obkom bureau made a statement to the communists of the republic through the press. It says: "Recognizing that there are serious shortcomings in the work of the obkom bureau in ensuring restructuring processes for the purpose of creating conditions for the consolidation of communists and all workers of the republic, we decided to submit a request to the forthcoming plenum of the obkom to accept our collective retirement."

And so a plenum of the obkom began its work in Ufa on 10 February, to which both members of the Ufa gorkom of the CPSU and representatives of public organizations of the city were invited.

R.R. Gareyev appeared before the plenum with information about the city plenum's decision. Later the floor was taken by R.Kh. Khabibullin, first secretary of the CPSU obkom. After noting some positive facts in the leadership of the obkom in the socioeconomic life of the republic, the first secretary admitted that he himself and members of the bureau were unable to mobilize the party organizations and workers to overcome stagnant phenomena in the economy. At the same time, he observed, there are contradictions in the charges made against him by the city committee. On the one hand, it is said that the "first" abuses the pressure method and dictates and, on the other hand, one can hear the criticism that not one party penalty was brought against the bureau for administrative errors. Or, on the one hand, it is asserted that R.Kh. Khabibullin engages in administrative questions in the old-fashioned way and, on the other hand, that he does not work on them substantively. "It is this inconsistency which conceals the very erosion of our criteria in the evaluation of the party management of the economy," the first secretary noted, "and the tenacity of the administrative bias in party work that even I and other members of the bureau could not escape."

In considering the information of the Ufa Gorkom, the participants of the plenum approved it as a bold initiative and they assessed it as a reflection of the decisive refreshing changes that were occurring in the country and in the party. And together with this, they attempted to disclose more fully why the obkom bureau was unable to become the collective leader and a valuable staff of the oblast party organization, and why, after less than three years following the assumption of leadership by the current obkom staff, it is again necessary to return to that which it began with in the summer of 1987. The aktiv sees the reason for the current crisis, first and foremost, in the tenacity of the old methods of personnel selection.

"The obkom bureau suffered a fiasco because," said R.R. Mavlyutov, rector of the Ufa Aviation Institute, "it was formed on instructions from above without consideration for the opinions of the party masses of the republic. We all know that the obkom leadership works a lot and that it does not spare itself; but given the range of work, the obkom bureau still was not capable of formulating the main tasks confronting it or to rank the tasks according to degree of importance."

Continuing this very same thought, the secretary of the party committee of the Sterlitamakskiy synthetic rubber plant, Khakimov, turned to Khabibullin and said: "Ravmer Khasanovich, it is not through your wish or fault that you came to our obkom in a stagnant time. It is the fault of the higher party organ. And here they did

not help you to become a party leader. Set an example by the fact that those leave party work for whom it did not work out, and let this be your help for the party organization. And so that good changes occur after this plenum, I propose as one of the conditions that the obkom bureau not be formed on the nomenklatura principle. For example, why is there only one position for a working person on the current staff? Why are there no scientists, teachers, doctors, writers, or representatives of other public circles?"

"It is absolutely necessary to search for the future first secretary of the obkom from among the first secretaries of rural raykoms, because this is the most numerically large detachment of the party aktiv, and, secondly, the APK [agroindustrial complex] carries great weight as a proportion of the economy of the kray," continued A.G. Galimov, the first secretary of the Yermekeyevskiy Raykom of the CPSU.

D.M. Kuvatov, the general director of the association "Bashkirkhleboprodukt" [Bashkir bakery products], objected to this reasonably:

"This means to approach the selection of party cadres according to the notorious production indicator. The first secretary, I boldly object, should be neither "rural" nor "urban." He must be a personality who is capable of leading the republic's party organization."

It must be said that the obkom members treated with understanding and, I would say, even with sufficient tact, the unhappy finish to the short party career of R.Kh. Khabibullin, giving just due to his democratic personal qualities. They noted his responsiveness, openness, and trustworthiness. However, as some participants of the plenum believed, he did not have around him a collective of like-thinkers and party comradeship, and some members of the bureau cut themselves off from him. As R.Kh. Khabibullin himself admitted, and as others noted, he did not have enough party experience and political work, and it was too late—and, indeed, impossible—to acquire it while on the job. For the reason that at such a critical and complex time, when even veteran party chiefs fail, when even the most prepared political leaders have difficulty in selecting the optimal style, when the party is seething on the inside and is receiving blows from all sides, it was simply too difficult for him, an oil worker by specialty, to make appropriate decisions. It is precisely because of a lack of political experience that Khabibullin sometimes allowed "firmness" where it was absolutely unnecessary; for example, concerning the question of glasnost. Substantive differences were found between the reports presented by R.R. Gareyev at the gorkom plenum and at the obkom plenum. In the second reading, no place was found for the paragraphs that recounted what kinds of prohibitory methods the obkom bureau and its first secretary used to manage the mass media and bring pressure on it continuously. Is that not why the local newspapers, sensing that the party leadership of the republic of the current staff is already counting off its last days, and with a premonition of liberation from the fetters of dictates from above, has with unprecedented activity come out in support of a distrust of the obkom leadership?

...The plenum decided to ratify the statement on the collective retirement of members of the CPSU obkom bureau and, through a secret vote, elected a provisional bureau from alternative candidates that will manage the oblast party organization until the special party conference is convened.

V.S. Bondarchuk, deputy chief of the Department of Party Construction and Personnel Work of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the plenum

Public Protests Stop Karelian AES Project

LD2202213890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1231 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Vladimir Zlobin]

[Text] Petrozavodsk, 22 Feb—At the demand of the inhabitants of Karelia, an autonomous republic in the north west of the USSR, prospecting work has been stopped on the site of a proposed atomic power station in Muyezerskiy Rayon on the border with Finland. The Karelian Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted a decision to suspend work on the feasibility study for the nuclear electric power station [AES] project until the adoption of a USSR law on the use of atomic energy and nuclear safety. And this, despite the fact that 4.3 million rubles has already been spent on developing the project over the past two years. It was the unresolved ecological aspects of the development of atomic power and in particular the uncertainty over the radiation safety of the reactor type propsed for the future AES that prompted the local people to campaign for an end to the construction of such a dangerous facility.

The planners intended the Karelian station to become one of the biggest, producing up to 6 million kw of power. In place of the AES, scientists are now urgently working on an alternative power supply program for Karelia, taking into account the introduction of energy-saving technologies at enterprises. A study is being done on the opportunities of obtaining hydropower from Karelia's numerous rivers, and of constructing power installations using nontraditional renewable sources of energy.

Khabarovsk Mayor Quits Election Race

PM1502171190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 p 1

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent G. Mironova: "Mayor Has Decided To Stop the Campaign"]

[Text] There were some surprises in the election campaign in Khabarovsk. A. Panchenko, the city's mayor, dropped out of the campaign for the deputy's mandate.

The reason for this was two articles—in IZVESTIYA and in the local newspaper TIKHOOKEANSKAYA ZVEZDA—about irregularities in the distribution of apartments. A luxury block in the city center attracted people's attention while it was still being built. It was built with funds from the party budget, but afterwards was handed over to invalids and war veterans. But it turned out that most of the apartments nonetheless were occupied by economic leaders, scientific workers, and army chiefs. Three apartments stood vacant for a whole year waiting for the next nomenklatura. In the next few days two sessions—of the city and rayon soviets—have to examine the question of a vote of confidence in A. Panchenko as well as in G. Klychnikov, chairman of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee], who also excelled—"he endorsed the illegal acquisition of a three-room apartment (while two others were reserved) by N.Z. Grishenko, the transportation prosecutor."

There was also a scandal in the kray's trade union council. The public demanded that the passenger lists of the latest cruises to Japan be checked. It turned out that among the tourists there were mainly commercial representatives and trade union leaders, and often party apparatus workers led the groups. The presidium of the kray's trade union council made an application to the trade union organization of the CPSU kraykom [kray party committee] to expel from the trade union V. Tarabanko, an advisor, who was in charge of international tourism over a period of several years. Tarabanko himself meanwhile is on... a Japanese cruise.

Leningrad Oblast, City Hold Party Plenum

LD2202204690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Text] A joint plenum of the Leningrad Oblast and city party committees is taking place in Smolnyy today. Our correspondent Matvey Frolov reports.

[Begin Frolov recording] The results of the February CPSU Central Committee plenum and the Leningrad party organization are being discussed. The date to convene a joint oblast and city CPSU conference, its agenda, and procedures for electing delegates are being determined.

Comrade Gidaspov, first secretary of the oblast and city committees, delivered a report. The plenum participants familiarized themselves with the results of the referendum on a number of issues that the city and oblast communists are worried about now in the party organization. A total of 424,000 of the CPSU members and candidate members took part in the referendum. More than 90 percent favor forming a single party committee instead of the already existing oblast and city committees and supported the suggestion for direct elections of conference delegates according to party districts and on the basis of alternative candidates. About 80 percent believe that it is necessary to form a Russian Communist Party.

The discussion at the plenum passed in a very energetic, sharp, and principled manner. (Terentyev), secretary of the Arsenal Association party committee, thinks that the Central Committee draft platform doesn't answer many topical issues and that in the spring the first organizational congress of the Russian Communist Party must be held in Leningrad.

In conclusion it was decided to convene a joint conference in April. The first secretary of the party oblast committee will be elected directly at the conference and not at the plenum, as before. [end recording]

Former Leningrad Chief Expelled From Party

90UN0870A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by V. Nevelskiy: "In a Mercedes, Out of the Party"]

[Text] Yuriy Philippovich Solovev, member of the CPSU Central Committee, former first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast party committee, former candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and former member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, made a personal declaration that in December of last year a commission shop that deals in automobiles sold him a luxurious Mercedes at a practically token price comparable to the cost of a new Zhiguli. If this car were sold at an auction, for instance, it would bring the state tens of thousands of rubles. This was reported on the television program "600 Seconds" on 30 January by the show's chief, A. Nevzorov, who corroborated his words with a demonstration of the documents and the Mercedes itself.

Unfortunately, instances of this type in the city are not isolated. For instance, G. Bukin, deputy chairman of the Leningrad Soviet Executive Committee (at this time, former deputy chairman), purchased an almost brand new Audi automobile in the same manner. True, Comrade Bukin, who had overseen trade, retired from his post not because the details of his misuse of his official position had been published, but rather under pressure from the public and the deputies of the Leningrad Soviet who were dissatisfied with the performance of his work.

Today, as the election campaign has developed, the city's party leaders have reacted instantly to the scandalous subject. At a special session of the bureau of the Leningrad Oblast party committee on Thursday, the results of an operation inspection conducted by the commission for party control were presented. The commission acknowledged the authenticity of the facts presented by A. Nevzorov. By decision of the bureau of the oblast party committee, Yu.F. Solovev was expelled from the party "for manifest indiscretion and violation of the norms of party ethics."

In addition, the bureau of the oblast party committee charged city Procurator D. Verevkin with examining the legality of the purchase of automobiles by communists—

leaders of party, soviet, and public organizations and economic organs. The examination will take in today's leaders and former leaders who have left for a "well-deserved vacation" as well.

Magadan Oblast Secretary Expelled From Party

LD1602132190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] A plenum of the oblast party committee has been working in Magadan today. After a heated discussion, the plenum relieved Comrade (Korolev) of the duties as secretary of the oblast party committee for compromising himself through the illegal improvement of his housing conditions. He was expelled from the party by a decision of the primary party organization.

The matter of confidence in the oblast committee bureau was also discussed. The communists expressed confidence in the bureau. At the same time, sharp criticism was expressed against comrade Svekolkin, first secretary of the oblast party committee, who was elected to the post two months ago, and other secretaries of the oblast committee.

The plenum elected a commission to clarify the privileges still enjoyed by party apparatus staff.

Measures were outlined to accelerate the resolution of acute socioeconomic and political problems in the oblast.

Communist Party Club Founded in Ulyanovsk

LD0602194290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 6 Feb 89

[Text] Communists for the Radical Rejuvenation of the Party is the name of the party club founded in Ulyanovsk. The communists from primary party organizations, united in the club, see their main task as taking part in the preparations for the 28th Party Congress and in elaborating proposals on changing the rules of the CPSU. They intend to cooperate with all public organizations interested in the radical rejuvenation of society. The theme of the first meeting of the party club will be: Our opinion on the work of the February CPSU Plenum.

Moscow TV Updates Volgograd Oblast Situation

LD0802134190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by Ye. Orlov]

[Text] [Announcer] We have already spoken several times both in the "Vremya" program and in the "Seven Days" broadcast about the stormy events that have unfolded in Volgograd where first Kalashnikov, first secretary of the oblast party committee, was obliged to resign, followed by all of the secretaries and members of the Oblast committee bureau. However the sociopolitical situation in Volgograd Oblast continues to remain complex.

[Orlov] Because the functions of the oblast committee are now limited by preparations for the extraordinary oblast party committee, all power has virtually been transferred to the local soviets. Nevertheless, at the latest rally of Volgograd people, where the most popular call was "Down with everyone and everything," a resolution was adopted in which lack of confidence in the whole membership of the oblast executive committee and in its chairman personally was expressed. Opinions were expressed that they should also resign as the leaders of the party oblast committee had done before this. That is, emotions started to go manifestly overboard.

At this moment a group of USSR people's deputies representing the oblast in the higher power body demonstrated wisdom. They decided to come to the aid of the oblast soviet, and set up in the executive committee a coordinating committee and invited representatives of all public and informal organisations to cooperate in it. [video shows mass rally, people holding banners expressing criticism and lack of confidence in individual party members]

First of all, a rumor spread throughout the town that this committee was, it seemed, to take power into its own hands. The suspicions intensified after the opening of the first joint sitting of officials of the executive committee, members of the committee, and representatives of the public was delayed by exactly 24 hours. Meanwhile, stormy disputes seethed outside the conference hall. Positions on the new public body were formed behind closed doors, and when the meeting at last began it became clear that there were two such positions. One was elaborated by USSR people's deputies and the second, against every eventuality, by officials of the executive committee. Lawyers were invited to the meeting to evaluate the legal basis of what was occurring, but the fears turned out to be in vain. The lack of trust soon dispersed and the sides came to mutual accord. [video shows conference hall and discussions in progress]

[B.F. Pylin, USSR people's deputy, identified by caption] We will, by our actions, do everything to enable more and more power functions to be transferred from the oblast committee bureau to within the jurisdiction of the oblast local soviet.

[Orlov] Addressing the members of the new committee as a voluntary helper and representative of the public, Orlov, chairman of the oblast executive committee, said: We are all now in the same boat, but it is true that it was not worth waiting for an explosion in popular indignation to come to such a simple thought. [video shows Orlov addressing meeting and further shots of the rally]

[Announcer] I remind you that the next plenum of the Volgograd Oblast party committee, already the third

during the past 20 days, should be assembling during the next few days. It should determine the precise date for the oblast party conference.

Party Official on Volgograd Oblast Elections

PM0502153790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Yu.A. Nekrasov, secretary of Volgograd Oblast party committee interim bureau, by correspondent Yu. Shcherbinin, datelined Volgograd; no date of interview specified; first two paragraphs are an introduction: "Consulting Communists"]

[Text] "No anarchy at all," Yuriy Aleksandrovich Nekrasov, secretary of Volgograd Oblast party committee [obkom] interim bureau, told PRAVDA's correspondent when describing the situation in the oblast.

The interim bureau's main task today is to prepare for the extraordinary party election conference. This was decided by the CPSU obkom's last plenum. Unfortunately, no more specific recommendations were made as regards the time for holding it or the election mechanism. How is the bureau coping in this situation?

[Nekrasov] We invited all Communists and residents of the oblast to take part in preparations for the conference. Every day we receive a vast quantity of proposals and advice about the qualitative and quantitative composition of future elected organs, and about the nomination of conference delegates and obkom members directly by primary party organizations.

[Shcherbinin] This is an interim bureau, but the CPSU Statute has not been amended yet. Are you deliberately breaking it?

[Nekrasov] At one of the plenums we had already directed a request to the CPSU Central Committee that we be allowed to conduct the conference on democratic principles. Maybe by way of an experiment. We hope that the forthcoming Central Committee plenum will adopt the amendments expected by Communists. For example, it is time to expand the rights of primary organizations in the composition of elected organs.

[Shcherbinin] What role does the apparatus play in the obkom today?

[Nekrasov] The one it should play—to systematize and sum up proposals and to help obkom and aktiv members in every way. Furthermore, the apparatus does have quite a few experienced and creative officials. They also have many ideas, but nobody asked their opinion in the past. Now they have also started talking in a nonstandard fashion.

[Shcherbinin] Do people in Volgograd associate the election of the interim bureau and the subsequent development of democratic principles with an improvement of the socioeconomic situation in the oblast?

[Nekrasov] People do have faith. But the supply of sausage and panty hose will not improve overnight. Everyone must realize: The economic situation today depends on the way everybody works. Now we have to work harder than ever before.

[Shcherbinin] Passions in Volgograd are boiling as regards apartments and the problems of social justice as a whole.

[Nekrasov] Law enforcement organs are already dealing with violations. Information is carried in all press organs, on television and radio. The culprits have either been or certainly will be punished along party and administrative lines. Some apartments have been vacated. The courts will decide about the others. But I would also like to say this: If all the energy and attention focus mainly on work to expose everything during the entire period beginning with Stalin's days, who will be working for the present and for the future? There are more than enough demolition workers. Businesslike people are, alas, few and far between.

[Shcherbinin] Tell me, is there free access to the CPSU obkom now?

[Nekrasov] On production of party cards. Duty officers can put nonparty people in touch with the relevant apparatus officials or tell them where to go. This should have been done a long time ago.

Furthermore, while we are on the subject, the oblast soviet executive committee's [oblispolkom] "Latoshinka" Subsidiary Farm, which was commonly known as obkom dachas, is being transferred under the oblast health department. The specialized hospital will remain specialized, providing services only to war and labor veterans. A branch of the obkom hotel has been transferred to the medical institute for use as a hostel. The interim bureau backed the decision of the CPSU obkom and the oblispolkom party organizations to cancel the privileges their officials enjoyed in the allocation of housing, which were instituted by local soviets many years ago.

[Shcherbinin] The PRAVDA correspondent's office at times receives questions expressing confusion: "But who is in charge of the oblast now?"

[Nekrasov] Soviet power. But the interim bureau has not drawn aside from the problems concerning vital services for the oblast's residents. All departments, including the agrarian and the socioeconomic, are functioning.

Volgograd Oblast Forms Coordinating Council

LD0402161290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] A coordinating council has, at the initiative of USSR people's deputies, been set up under Volgograd Oblast soviet executive committee. Representatives of public organizations are members. The purpose of the council is to coordinate the efforts of those who in deeds

and not just in words favor Perestroyka and give active aid to the oblast soviet in tackling the problems of improving the acute socio-political and economic situation. Its efforts will be directed at overcoming the forces holding things back. Through the coordinating council the public obtain real conditions for actively influencing executive authority.

Western Republics

Crimean Lawyer Protests Charges Againt Tatars

LD1602121490 Moscow World Service in Russian 1040 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Report on interview with Mustafa Dzhemilev, chairman of the Crimean Tatars National Movement, by unidentified INTERFAX correspondent; date; place not given]

[Text] Six independent lawyers from different towns in the country consider that the criminal case instituted against six Crimean Tatars has been fabricated. This was stated in an interview with an INTERFAX correspondent by Mustafa Dzhemilev, chairman of the Crimean Tatars' National Movement organization.

As has already been reported, an attack by local residents and the militia on a tented encampment where 29 Crimean Tatars who had returned to their homeland were living temporarily took place on 14 December. The encampment was smashed up and partly burned. Mustafa Dzhemilev is certain that this attack was inspired by the leadership of the Crimean Oblast, which in his opinion is opposed to the restoration of the Crimean autonomous entity, which was eliminated by Stalin in 1944. He also said that the lawyers were not allowed to go to the place where the tented encampment was situated.

Post-Chernobyl International Aid Requested

LD2802102890 Moscow TASS in English 2221 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] New York (United Nations) February 28 TASS—Soviet Byelorussia will need 17 billion rubles, which is equal to nearly two of its annual budgets, to eliminate the consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, Byelorussia's permament representative at the United Nations Lev Maksimov told a news conference in New York on Tuesday.

He read out an appeal of the presidium of the Byelorussian Supreme Soviet and Government to the parliaments, governments, international organisations, foreign fellow-countrymen and all people of goodwill to give all possible aid and assistance to Byelorussia in eliminating the disaster's consequences that turned out to be much more serious than predicted by major scientists and experts.

The appeal expresses deep concern about the health of the people, especially children, in Byelorussia's contaminated areas.

Speakers at the news conference noted that 70 per cent of all radioactive contaminations caused by the Chernobyl accident in European USSR fell out on Byelorussia with a population of more than 2.2 million people. The republic lost 20 per cent of its farmland and nearly 15 per cent of woods. Many residents have been evacuated from their native areas.

New spots of radiactive contamination continue to be revealed. Despite intensive decontamination, the radiological situation in Byelorussia remains tense.

The Byelorussian Parliament and Government urged the international community to unite efforts to overcome the consequences of a disaster that has become an extraordinary ecological phenomenon on the national and international scale.

'Anti-Army Sentiments' in Moldavia Deplored

PM2802143590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Colonel N. Mulyar report: "Moldavia. Who Benefits?"]

[Text] The situation in the republic remains tense. Signs of division between people on ethnic grounds are increasingly clear. As P. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, stressed at a recent meeting with the party, soviet, and economic aktiv in Kishinev City, all this can be stopped only by pooling the efforts of all healthy forces and channeling them toward constructive dialogue.

However, the fact that anti-Army propaganda aimed at whipping up anti-Army sentiments and ending the military-patriotic education of young people and their preparation for Army service is being increasingly mounted in the republic against a backdrop of instability is worrying.

"In the center of the Moldavian capital," the political commentary prepared by a Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee department and published 20 February in the newspaper VECHERNIY KISHINEV states, "There has been for some time a clear sense of intolerance toward the Army, and groups of people who gather there pin offensive labels on it. And all this is inevitably accompanied by malicious chants such as 'Occupiers!' and 'Invaders!'"

Even during the republic meeting of voters held 11 February in the central part of Kishinev, there were anti-Army slogans among the slogans calling for the removal of the mafia and the bureaucrats. Incidentally, this meeting in Victory Square was staged by the Moldavian People's Front.

As a result of the whipping up of anti-Army sentiments among the republic's population, unsanctioned rallies are spilling over from the square and heading for military garrisons. This is what happened 21 January. The residents of a population center surrounded an antiaircraft missile battalion defending the republic's airspace and demanded that it be moved across the Dnestr.

The same day near the Stephen the Great Monument there was an attempt to verbally and physically insult a patrol detail on duty in the city center. And literally on the eve of the Soviet Army and Navy holiday patrols brought Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Ishchik, the city commander, a leaflet they had picked up on the streets. In it certain members of the national guard state that they no longer want to serve in the ranks of an army of occupation.

The aim of these leaflets and appeals is clear: Stooping to anything, destructive forces are trying to shape in the people's social awareness a negative attitude to the military and military service and to create the image of an internal enemy.

The whipping up of these feelings not only complicates the situation but also affects the quality of draftee training. This is alarming. And the political commentary is very right to note that "unfortunately, local party and soviet organs do not always make a principled assessment of cases of attacks on the Army, and sometimes adopt the position of onlookers."

Who benefits from this?

Moldavia's Luchinskiy, Snegur Beat Rivals

PM2802145990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[E. Kondratov report under the general heading "Choice Made. We Await Results. Parliamentary and Local Soviet Elections Have Been Held in Four Union Republics: Moldavia"]

[Excerpts] Information on the results of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and local soviet elections held Sunday is still coming into the Central Electoral Commission. It is already clear that in many republic cities and villages voters will have to go to the ballot boxes again in 2 weeks time. [passage omitted]

Telephoning the rayons in the morning I learned that P. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, has beaten his electoral rival, a journalist, and that M. Snegur, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, has beaten his opponent, a collective farm chairman. Lawyer A. Plugaru and V. Ustroy, general director of the "Valeologiya" state-cooperative association—heroes of recent articles in IZVESTIYA—have clearly won their campaigns and become deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet.

'Socialist Perestroyka' Union Set Up in Ukraine

LD2803185790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] A Union of Working People for Socialist Perestroyka has been formed in the Ukraine. Here is a report by our correspondent Vladimir Sokolov.

[Begin recording] [Sokolov] The concept for such an organization, as shown by its constituent conference, matured simultaneously in various parts of the republic. This was confirmed by the envoys of work collectives, who numbered 670, from 22 oblasts of the Ukraine, consisting first and foremost of the republic's major enterprises, many collective and state farms and organizations. Incidentally, over half of those taking part in the conference were workers and collective farmers.

The conference adopted a provisional program and set of rules for the Union and elected its coordinating council. Our interview here is with (Nikolay Vladimirovich Kalyuzhin), a member of the council and a foreman fitter at the Mayak Scientific and Production Association in Kiev.

So what are the main features of the union's program, Nikolay Vladimirovich?

[(Kalyuzhin)] First and foremost there is the consolidation of all healthy forces on the basis of perestroyka and on the basis of socialism. Second, there is the strengthening of labor and public discipline as the prime basis of democracy. Third, there is help for perestroyka by practical deeds and productive toil and not by the rallies, which are fashionable now. Finally, and this is perhaps the most important thing, there is the development of the view among the public that indeed the fate of perestroyka and all the changes it is bringing are above all in the hands of the working people and in the hands of those who create all the values in our country, and, of course, our union sees the path of perestroyka—and this is reflected in its program—as the power of the people with a strengthening in every way of a renewed federation of our country.

[Sokolov] By what means does the Union intend to tackle these tasks?

[(Kalyuzhin)] By the creation in all work collectives of its cells and by a consolidation of forces above all to improve the work of their enterprises, collective farms, and organizations. We see this as the primary basis for the improvement of the entire situation throughout the country and for the perestroyka's success. I am confident that it will be the largest mass socio-political organization in the republic.

[Sokolov] But there already exists inthe Ukraine a very similar social organization to your union, even in its name - namely the People's Movement for Perestroyka or as it is called Rukh, which is the Ukrainian for movement. What is the difference?

[(Kalyuzhin)] The difference lies first and foremost in the methods of campaigning for perestroyka. People are already tired of the fruitless rallies and noisy slogans that are being abused by the Rukh. A widespread view is being increasingly firmly asserted that it is necessary to work and not to hold rallies. This is precisely the way the matter is being presented by the Communist Party, whose platform our Union shares. This is unlike Rukh, which is openly boycotting the party. We do not set the goal of achieving power, as Rukh does. We advocate the power of the people. However, we are, of course, ready to cooperate with all healthy forces that support our program. I would say the program may be most concisely and simply expressed as being: Do not hold rallies, work! [end recording]

Voroshilovgrad Obkom Releases First Secretary

LD1502120490 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 0030 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] A plenum of the Voroshilovgrad party oblast committee was held yesterday. It discussed an organizational question. The plenum released Lyakhov from the post of first secretary of the party oblast committee in connection with his request.

A report on the political situation in the oblast was delivered by Popov, second secretary of the party committee. The plenum was addressed by Yelchenko, member of the Bureau and secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee.

Donetsk Obkom Plenum Closes After 'Intermission'

PM1602115990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Nikolay Lisovenko under general heading "Direct Line; IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Obkom Has Shown Character"]

[Text] Donetsk—A plenum of the party obkom [oblast committee] has ended its work in Donetsk after being interrupted last week because a number of communists, strike committees, and some public organizations had demanded that, following First Secretary A. Vinnik, the entire obkom resign.

An intermission in the work was needed to ascertain the opinion of all 360,000 members of the Donetsk party organization on a whole series of very important issues: Whether to disband the present obkom or to allow it to work until its power expire, when to hold an oblast party conference, whether to abolish party raykoms [rayon committees] in cities divided into rayons, and a number of other issues. Having ascertained the communists' position, the plenum participants decided by an overwhelming majority of votes to retain the present party obkom until the oblast party conference, which should take place in early April.

During the plenum a meeting of many thousands took place on the square in front of the party obkom building. During the two days of its work the plenum was addressed by nearly 50 people and the same number addressed the meeting. Both in the hall of sessions and on the square several speakers were "shut up," prevented from speaking, and even insulted.

Dissatisfied with the party obkom plenum decision, the participants in the meeting intend to continue it.

13 Die in Pochenkov Mine Explosion

LD1602123890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] As we have already reported, there was an explosion yesterday evening at the Pochenkov mine, which is part of the Makeyevugol production association. Lives were lost. We have just received a report from Donetsk with the details of that tragic incident:

[Correspondent Gennadiy Kondaurov] At the Pochenkov mine, part of the Makeyevugol production association, there was an explosion of methane gas in the first western drift, located at a depth of some 1,000 meters. [video shows a mine shaft entrance, then parked ambulances; men walking around wearing helmets and breathing apparatus] It happened on the second shift, when a work team was working at the coal face. The automatic instruments installed in the mine to monitor the state of the gases in the underground workings did not give a warning signal about a dangerous build-up of methane. Three more explosions followed the first one. [video shows miners moving about underground].

A few minutes after the first explosion, mine rescue teams arrived at the pit from Makeyevka, and later from Donetsk, Voroshilovgrad, and other towns in the Donbass. They had to give help to miners in the difficult conditions of high temperatures and smoke because the coal in the drift had caught fire. Thirteen miners died. Those who had suffered were taken to hospitals immediately, and they were given all necessary medical assistance. [video shows man standing by a blackboard on which a diagram of the shaft is drawn, rescue teams, arriving, body on stretcher].

The cause of the accident has not yet been ascertained. A government commission has begun work at the mine. The underground fire has not yet been extinguished, so the mining of coal at the pit has been halted. [video shows men listening to tape recording].

February 16th has been declared a day of mourning in Donetsk Oblast. [video shows flag draped with black ribbon]. [passage omitted]

Picketers Demand Resignation of Lvov Party Bureau

LD1902153990 Kiev in English to Europe 1900 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] The Lvov Regional Communist Party Committee is being picketed by the local Committee for the Protection of Civil Rights. The organizers of the picket demand the resignation of the bureau of the regional party committee. They also insist that the young people enlisted to the Army should serve on the territory of the Ukraine only and that servicemen from other regions of the USSR are ousted from the Ukraine. The picketers condemned (Nadrekanov), (?chief) of the public health care system, the distribution of housing, and voiced their concern over the growing crime rate.

Red Cross Tours Contaminated Ukraine Areas

90UN0912B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 13 Jan 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Charity Is an International Affair"]

[Text] Delegates of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies arrived in Kiev to study the opportunity for an exchange of information and experience accumulated by the government of the Ukraine and the USSR Red Cross Society concerning the elimination of aftereffects from the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station].

The members of the delegation were met on 11 January by M.A. Orlik, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. In the course of candid discussions it was noted that the Chernobyl accident was a misfortune and a tragedy not only for the Ukraine but for all the peoples of the Soviet Union and all the people on the planet.

"The fact that you will acquaint yourselves with the local state of affairs, make the value of the international society known, and submit specific proposals for cooperation to the national committees of the Red Cross is, in and of itself, a positive one," said M.A. Orlik. "We are in a tight spot, unfortunately, and the physicians still have to be equipped with modern diagnostic equipment. We are already doing much in this area, but international help would be very useful."

That same day the guests visited the Central Committee of the USSR Red Cross Society and the All-Union Scientific Center for Radiation Treatment of the USSR AMN [Academy of Medical Sciences].

"From our very first day in Kiev we received a great deal of interesting information," said R. Nankolas, head of the Directorate for International Aid of the British Red Cross (of the United Kingdom). "We still have many questions, and we hope to find answers for them after our visit to Polesskiy Rayon in Kiev Oblast and Narodichskiy and Luginskiy Rayons in Zhitomir Oblast."

Ukrainian Doctors in Chernobyl Requested

90UN0953A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 7, 14 Feb 90 p 2

[Sergey Kiselev article: "Only If All Are Pregnant"]

[Text] The female graduates of the medical schools of the Ukraine may only avoid compulsory work assignment to the areas contaminated by radioactive substances as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station] if they are pregnant. Male graduates do not have any chance of avoiding forcible assignment....

"Virtually healthy graduates, as determined by the administered medical examination, with the exception of pregnant women and families with children under 14" should be sent to the zone contaminated by Chernobyl. This was written in a letter of instruction by Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Minister of Health Yu.P. Spizhenko sent to the chiefs of the Kiev, Chernigov, Zhitomir, and Rovno Oblast Departments of Health, as well as the rectors of medical institutes.

As they told me at the republic Ministry of Health, they expect to find about 1,500 such "virtually healthy" and nonpregnant people. Over there, they also told me about what awaits these new physicians during their three to four years of work in the areas contaminated with radionuclides. First of all, it is an increased radioactive background and foodstuffs are contaminated with radionuclides which cannot be tracked and which they will have to use since other foodstuffs are not available; it is inhaling dust with long-lasting isotopes, and so on. That is to say, it is known ahead of time that these young people will ruin their health and in the future quite a few of them will not be able to get pregnant and have children.

Yes, unfortunately, people still live in the zone contaminated by Chernobyl. Indeed, there is a catastrophic lack of physicians there. However, it is beyond a doubt that specialists should not be retained here by the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health by using the method of serfdom or by violating human rights. I am certain that only **volunteers** should be sent here, and that they should be brought in for shift work.

The Ministry of Health has announced a crusade of pediatricians through the locales of the Chernobyl tragedy intimidating the graduates of medical colleges with having their diplomas confiscated. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense has been driving deceived reserve soldiers directly into the zone of the fourth reactor. They have been called up, supposedly for retraining, and have been sent to the station instead under the threat of a court martial. The public of the republic has been fighting to close the station down completely, thus far to no avail.

Attacks in Kharkov Not Considered Racial

90UN0983B Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 Feb 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "After the Meeting"]

[Text] On 13 February our newspaper published an article about a meeting in Kharkov. The meeting was directed against any manifestations of extremism. Worried readers started calling the newspaper office and our correspondent decided to ask for some explanations from A. Bandurka, chief of the Kharkov MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. The latter stated that some hooligans did attack several apartments in Kharkov as it had been discussed at the meeting. However, these illegal actions were not of a nationalist character, but purely criminal. They were directed against people of different ethnic backgrounds and not just the Jews. The case is being investigated. The law enforcement organs have the situation under complete control.

Construction of Mukachevo Radar Station Halted

LD2502190690 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] The local council of the Transcaucasian region in the western Ukraine has decided to stop the construction of a powerful radar installation in the area of Mukachevo following numerous protests from local residents. The public fears that a radar creating powerful electromagnetic radiation will be harmful to people's health. For a long time the purpose of the project was concealed from the population which gave rise to varous inventions and rumors. It has been decided to invite a competent government commission for the final solution of the problem.

Yazov Agrees With Decision

PM2802161990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Sergey Tsikora report under the general headline: "Direct Line. Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter"]

[Text] **Kiev—Military Construction Project Halted**

The Defense Ministry has agreed to halt the construction of the radar station near Mukachevo while a commission of experts is at work.

And so the mysterious project in the Carpathians which has given rise to rumors and protests among the local population has finally been halted. IZVESTIYA reported earlier that a session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet sent a message to the USSR minister of defense demanding that the construction of the military project near the village of Pestryalovo in Transcarpathian Oblast be halted as a matter of urgency and a commission of experts set up. Independent specialists should give a conclusion on the possible impact of the project under construction here on the ecology and people's health.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has received in reply a cable signed by D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense. It reads:

"A missile attack warning system radar station is under construction in the area of Mukachevo in Transcarpathian Oblast.

"Since the beginning of 1988 the population and party and soviet organs of Transcarpathian Oblast have been expressing concern about the impact of the radar station under construction there on the oblast's ecology and people's health. With a view to assessing the socioecological situation in the Mukachevo area and the impact of the radar station under construction there on the population and the environment, a commission has been set up under the leadership of Academician Velikhov. It comprises scientists and specialists of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry, the USSR Ministry of Health, and representatives of Transcarpathian Oblast.

"Taking account of the concern expressed by the public of Transcarpathian Oblast, we deem it necessary to agree to the proposal of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet to halt the construction of the radar station near Mukachevo while the commission is at work.

"The appropriate instructions have gone out to construction and installation organizations involved in the construction of the radar station".

It remains for us to await the experts' conclusion.

Week's Political Events in Ukraine Reviewed

PM2802151990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 3

[Own correspondent Olga Musafirova report: "Ukraine: Chronicle of the Week"]

[Text] Kiev—Cloaked militiamen and people carrying placards were standing outside the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium, where the 12th session of the republic's Supreme Soviet had started work.

Snow was falling on the women's black headscarfs and streaking the paint on the paper. There was no rally. The silent pickets demanded: "Responsibility for Chernobyl!" They warned: "Today We Are Passive—Tomorrow We'll Be Radioactive!" They reported: "Kiev Oblast, Polesskoye Urban Settlement. Cesium-137—Up To 350 Curies Per Square Km, Strontium-90—5 Curies Per Square Km, Plutonium-239—0.084 Curies Per Square Km."

Some deputies were strong enough to cut straight across the square in front of the building and go through the line of pickets to the heavy main door with its gilt handle.

The pickets from Polesskoye had been provided with two buses to carry the adults and children. Zhitomir Oblast

was there in the shape of the long-suffering Narodichi and Ovruch. Delegations came from the Chernigov area and the western Ukraine. All merely to ensure that the session devoted to ecological problems should not become divorced from real life but should sense behind it (or in front of it?) the people on whose behalf and for whose benefit decisions are made.

During this period the people's representative from Krivoy Rog in the auditorium was berating the pickets for all he was worth—he said that they had not gone to work on a working Friday and were failing to maintain production....

During a discussion on the agenda a proposal was voiced by the Ukrainian Republic Deputies' Club (a democratic association of a group of USSR people's deputies) to also discuss, apart from the planned issue, the question of the progress of the current election campaign, since the deputies' club is aware of cases of a "free" interpretation of the Election Law on the part of the Central Electoral Commission and okrug commissions. There is still a chance before election day—4 March—to settle the situation and bring it within a legal framework.

However, the session rejected the proposal by a majority vote. But they promised to hear the Central Electoral Commission report at the end of the session.

Then the parliamentarians' meeting had to adopt yet another statement—from USSR People's Deputies D. Pavlychko, Yu. Shcherbak, and V. Yavorivskiy. Having run for the republic's Supreme Soviet, they had withdrawn their candidacies as a mark of dissent with discriminatory decisions made by the electoral commission during the registration of candidates with regard to a number of representatives of the "Zelenyy Svit" ecological association, the T.G. Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, and "Rukh" [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka].

It has to be admitted that the statement was no bombshell: Neither excitement nor condemnation rocked those present. It was simply a case of three strong candidates voluntarily giving up three seats....

I have no statistics on how many current members of parliament have again entered the campaign for republic seats. Much less am I about to predict who will win and who will lose. But the session report made by Deputy V.A. Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, included several times in the most acute places a request that the "new" Supreme Soviet act more vigorously on ecology in order to make the problems less acute. Finally, four years after the disaster, the session adopted a decision on the need to shut down the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station]. The implementation of this phased process has been entrusted to the republic's Academy of Sciences, the Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation, and—needless to say—the "new convocation." The "old convocation" has left it a difficult and dangerous burden stamped "radioactive."

Whole oblasts have stirred into motion under the impact of the election processes in the Ukraine. The situation in Poltava remains tense. In Cherkassy the "Ekologiya" social organization—whose prestige is extremely high in the city since it was won in specific action against the construction of the Chigirin AES and the expansion of chemical production plants, and whose leader (the conservatory-trained musician Sergey Silkin) has been nominated as a Ukrainian SSR candidate people's deputy—is expressing its lack of confidence in the city authorities.

The recent plenum of the Voroshilov party obkom [oblast party committee] satisfied First Secretary I.A. Lyakhov's request to retire. The first secretary cited in explanation of his step the growing tension in the oblast and the lack of confidence in the leader, who even at the start of last year was not supported by voters at the elections for USSR people's deputies.

There is no time for science in Kiev's VUZ's [higher educational institutions]: Participation in the republic-wide student warning strike which affected many educational establishments 21-22 February is being discussed. The "student issue" has become one of the main questions at the Eighth Ukrainian Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee Plenum.

The journalist M. Sidorzhevskiy reports from Zhitomir that the city is "shaking"!

Two social organizations—a "Rukh" branch and the Civic Front for the promotion of perestroyka—emerged in Zhitomir approximately a year ago. The similarly named organizations turned out to be antagonists in terms of their methods. On 11 February Civic Front activists proclaimed a resolution at a rally whose essence was unambiguous: to seize power. Here is an extract from the document: "The time has come for resolute political action, the time has come to abolish the absolute power of the CPSU and to establish people power. The Ukrainian Communist Party obkom, as a wholly discredited organ of power, should resign without resisting the people."

"Rukh" members in Zhitomir have expressed their categorical disagreement with the "seizure group," insisting on the need to achieve change by democratic and parliamentary means, and called on the population not to support this action.

We very much hope that the struggle of ideas will not turn into a struggle between people using fists in the squares.

Caucasus

Danger of Missiles in Transcaucasus Viewed

LD2402172190 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Mikhail Gelebov commentary; read by announcer]

[Text] [Announcer] When the Soviet Union published a list of its missile bases earlier in January observers were not impressed. They had grown accustomed to openness in military affairs, but they began to study the list a few days later after ethnic clashes broke out in Azerbaijan. More on this from Mikhail Glebov:

[Second announcer] Many American thriller movies base their plots on sophisticated weapons falling into extremist hands. The Transcaucasian crisis has prompted United States' politicians to ask if this could happen in Azerbaijan, provided there are such weapons in the republic. The Armenian killings in the Azerbaijani capital Baku and a tide of violence throughout that land in mid-January led Moscow to send troops there to restore order. It was announced that the army came to guard all key facilities in the republic as well as protect the population from extremists. That announcement was to reassure the authors of gloomy prospects, but it didn't.

A few days ago more reassurements came from the CIA Director William Webster, rightly regarded as a major authority on the problem. The deployment of troops around the key facilities, he said, guarantee their security. The situation is a fresh reminder of the unexpected and grave effects civil unrest and ethnic conflicts can have nowadays. The presence of any sophisticated weapons, to say nothing about missiles, rends [as heard] such conflicts very dangerous.

At one point in the January crisis Armenian and Azerbaijani extremists were using helicopters and troop carriers. They also seized training tanks and (?anti-hail) missile systems. In recent years there have been calls from various Soviet republics for setting up republican armed forces as a symbol of their sovereignty. You can imagine what would happend had Azerbiajan and Armenia formed their own forces armed with aircraft and missiles. Our fragile world calls for reserve and refraining from any use of force, but it against another nation or against a man next door. Having accumulated heaps of weapons humanity cannot afford extremism or violence.

KGB Issues Statement on Pogrom Rumors

90UN0952A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the Committee for State Security"]

[Text] Lately, lots of rumors were circulating around Moscow and some other places about the future pogroms of the Jews, the Azerbaijani, and the Armenians. To make the rumors seem more veracious, those who spread them use the nationalistic "programs" of certain informal groups. They also exploit the provocative actions of some hooligans of the type that had taken place in the Central House of Writers in Moscow.

The USSR Committee for State Security does not ignore the extremist, nationalistic manifestations and takes measures to prevent them in cases specified by law. The committee is acting within the limits of its competence, especially where it concerns the defense of the rights guaranteed to the Soviet citizens by the USSR Constitution.

As for the pogrom rumors that are spread around, there is no concrete data to substantiate them. The only information received by the state security organs is the rumors themselves, their repetition by the mass media, and separate inquiries from separate citizens concerning same rumors. However, the USSR KGB is monitoring the situation and it will undertake necessary measures in case the situation becomes critical. In that case, the KGB relies on the help of the people—of those who might have some real knowledge of certain concrete facts of illegal actions or intentions to commit them.

Under those conditions it is important that the mass media cover such sensitive issues with more responsibility and do not spread unconfirmed information.

NKAO Paper Calls For Cooperation With Commandant

NC2602110690 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 25 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The editorial board of KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH has issued an open letter to Major General Safonov, commandant of the state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. The letter says: We sadly observe that an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual understanding between the commandant's office and the administrative organs of the oblast has not been created despite the fact that such an atmosphere might be the basic guarantee for the situation to stabilize. Instead, mutual distrust and chilliness is observed. This situation developed particularly after the unfounded allegations were leveled against our representatives at the country's parliament and the leaders of the oblast, after the Karabakh television and radio committee was virtually transformed into an garrison, and after the oblast broadcasts ceased by your arbitrary order. What political objectives does this confrontation pursue, and who stands to gain from it?

YEREKOYAN YEREVAN paper has published the full text of the letter.

Gorisskiy Rayon Official on 'Self-Defense'

NC0902184590 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Statement by Robert Aleksanyan, first secretary of the Gorisskiy Rayon party committee]

[Text] For the past two years the situation in the rayon has been kept under constant control. If the situation often became aggravated in border areas, this was the result of efforts to defend the people from atrocities and to forestall confrontation. The reasons for the decree introducing a state of emergency in Gorisskiy Rayon are totally incomprehensible.

In analyzing the way that decree is being implemented in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and the events of the last week in particular, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that the USSR Supreme Soviet's 28 November decision on measures to normalize the situation in NKAO is being implemented. The central authorities must realize that it is not possible to deny the NKAO's right to self-determination, perpetuate a historical injustice, and hamper the process of the reunification of the two sections of the same people with half-measures and army contingents. Any decision (?should be based) on truth, and truth demands that the problem should be tackled on the basis of national self-determination.

There has been much talk recently about self-defense guerrilla forces. In the union news media and from official rostrums, they are given different names, such as extremists, raiders, and nationalists. In the current circumstances, the word guerrilla is synonymous with the term Armenian people. There is no shortage of commentaries about their emergence and operations. I can use the example of Goris to describe the conditions under which they emerged and how the idea of self-defense evolved. To begin with, certain incidents took place last spring and fall which [word indistinct] undermined confidence in the Soviet Army and Internal Affairs Ministry troops. That was followed by numerous uncontrolled acts directed against the people's lives and property. When we add the arson attacks on agricultural installations, the pillage, the frequent attacks on convoys, and the consequent economic and psychological damage, then the situation faced by the people of the region can be clearly understood. Under these circumstances, did Goris not have have the right to resort to self-defense to protect its life and honor? There cannot be two opinions about this. To our credit, the groups in Goris have never been the aggressors; they have never resorted to lawless acts and have behaved properly.

I would like to take this opportunity to express gratitude on behalf of the rayon party committee and rayon and city soviets of the people's deputies to all those who forsook the comforts of home and normal life to defend the security of the population around the clock for months.

Reducing the tension in the region is our daily concern and an ever-present problem. However, tension cannot be reduced without accurate (?reporting) by the mass media. We cannot be indifferent to what is being said about us in other parts of the country and in different parts of the world, particularly at a time when there is growing interest in the NKAO problem. We want the information to be received at first hand, be given an objective assessment, and be presented to the country's listeners and readers without any distortion. The shortage of current information at the union level on political and interethnic processes must to overcome.

Another problem which may interest the radio listeners is the current situation prevailing in the region and along the border. Units of the Soviet Army and Internal Affairs Ministry troops have been deployed in areas adjacent to the borders. As a result of the joint efforts by rayon party and soviet official, law enforcement bodies, and labor collectives, tranquillity has been established on the borders.

The social and political life of the rayon remains normal. However, this tranquil and calm atmosphere can change, as was shown by the 1 February armed attack on a army surveillance convoy near the [name indistinct] village on Goris-Ghapan motor road which resulted in a soldier being wounded.

The artificial procrastination in unblockading the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert road is incomprehensible to us. To postpone the reopening of the road for a few days each time and to invent pretexts each time means to drive a wedge between the points of mutual trust [words indistinct].

In conclusion, I would like to mention that the higher union bodies must find a final and radical solution to the NKAO problem, which is the main issue, and thus eliminate this constant hotbed of interethnic conflict. We are convinced that our people, who have experienced much suffering throughout their 3,000-year history [words indistinct], will act sensibly so that they can emerge from this crisis.

Tyumen Delegation Investigates Baku Rumors

LD1902212990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] You will agree that many irreparable difficulties have been caused recently by all kinds of rumors and conjecture. Here I have a fresh example. In Tyumen, for example, a rumor spread to the effect that 65 Tyumen soldiers had died in Baku during the January events. The absurdity of this rumor ought to have been obvious because the overall number of deaths of servicemen, of which we have spoken many times, is just over half that. Nevertheless, there was a meeting in Tyumen at which the soldiers' mothers demanded that a public delegation be sent to Azerbaijan. It included Golouz, a secretary of the Tsentrainyy Rayon party committee in Tyumen,

scientists, a military commissar, and representatives of the local press and television.

The information—in quotation marks—about the soldiers who were alleged to have been killed did not just give rise to concern among the mothers. According to those who arrived from Tyumen, hostile attitudes arose in the oblast toward Azerbaijanis working there. There are about 100,000 of these, mostly oilworkers, in the oblast. The delegation met the soldiers in Baku. They gathered in a club and wrote a letter, several leters, even, to send home with their countrymen. Indeed, at times, relations between the army and the population in Azerbaijan are complex—someone has been insulted on the street, unknown people have tried to buy weapons and cartridges from someone else, they have offered money or drugs. At the same time, people in bakeries have refused to accept soldiers' money for bread. This has also taken place. Frequently the population helps the soldiers out with food.

Let us hope, of course, that the letters from these boys which their countrymen will take home will help pacify passions, as well as the videotape recorded at the meeting in which the soldiers greet their relatives and close ones.

General Rodionov on Perestroyka, Azerbaijan

PM2302110690 Paris LE FIGARO in French 21 Feb 90 p 5

[Pierre Darcourt dispatch: "The 'Open Door' Doctrine"]

[Excerpts] Moscow—The Voroshilov Military Academy of General Staff situated on the outskirts of the capital, prepares the officers accepted into it for the highest positions in the three branches of the Armed Forces. It is in this huge circular edifice of marble, glass, and polished wood, nicknamed the "Pentagon" by some people, that the Soviet Union's military thinking is drawn up.

Colonel General Igor Rodionov, commander of the Academy, a tall man with bright eyes and a red face, welcomed us with a smile. Rodionov was accompanied by around 10 generals. "We do not usually open our doors to journalists. But we are now showing what was never shown in the past." [passage omitted]

Have the upheavals in the GDR, and in Romania, the questioning of communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact member states, and the serious confrontations which have occurred in the peripheral republics led the military to doubt their mission?

The Integrity of Borders

"No," the academy commander replied. "The officers and soldiers are in favor of perestroyka. The Army is subordinate to the party's political leadership. Peace is always cheaper than war. The demobilization of 300,000 officers will be beneficial for industry because the vast majority of those officers have an engineer's diploma and high-level technical training. The Germans are Germans. The Romanians are Romanians. Their future depends on them. We are Russians. If our officers are dissatisfied, it is because of the lack of discipline in society, the increase in crime, the laxness in dealing with extremists and the nationalists' extremism which is causing death and destruction." This is a clear reference to the interethnic disturbances which are shaking the USSR.

Gen. Rodionov, a former commander of the Transcaucasus military district was in the news last April during the riots in Tbilisi in Georgia. The troops under his command violently ended the Georgians' uncontrolled demonstrations. There was a heavy toll: 26 dead and around 100 injured.

The general drew attention to himself by making very tough statements on television: "I was given a mission. I carried it out. I am responsible. Democracy is not anarchy."

With regard to Azerbaijan, he said that "the causes of the unrest can be attributed to a deviation from socialism, the action of a veritable local mafia combined with corrupt and incompetent officials." One name was mentioned: Geydar Aliyev. Who is this man? He is not just anybody. Geydar Aliyev, a former Politburo member, a former Communist Party first secretary and a former KGB boss in Azerbaijan, who headed a demonstration in support of the Azerbaijan People's Front in Moscow last Sunday, has just been expelled from the party. The Soviet press now reveals that this "leader of angry crowds" had been a deserter during the war, having himself diagnosed as suffering from "tuberculosis...." And every day brings revelations about the way in which he placed his brothers, his wife, his friends, his "henchmen" in "profitable" positions. His rowdy lifestyle, his trafficking, and his contraband networks are being revealed.

"We waited too long before sending in the Army," Gen Rodionov concluded.

It is not a simple issue at all. Defense Minister Yazov has left Moscow and set up his headquarters in Baku. The headquarters of the southern region is there, grouping three big military regions—North Caucasus, Trancaucasus, and Turkestan. There are major strategic stakes—oil, the Naval Air Force's land bases, radar, and advanced warning cover which sweeps the approaches to the territory, the straits of the Black Sea, and the Persian Gulf.

Azerbaijani Deputies' Term of Office Extended

NC2402182690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 23 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers have published a decree of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic's [SSR] Supreme

Soviet Presidium. The decree extends the term of office for the deputies of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet's 11th convocation and for the deputies of the Azerbaijan SSR local people's soviets until regular elections are held.

Armenia, Azerbaijan To Draw Up Security Measures

LD1602215190 Moscow TASS in English 1652 GMT 16 Feb 90

[By TASS Special Correspondents Konstantin Voitsekhovich and Gennadiy Kokukhin]

[Text] Yerevan February 16 TASS—A meeting of the Armenian committee for dealing with an emergency situation, held today, decided to draw up measures jointly with neighbouring Azerbaijan to protect Armenian and Azerbaijanian animal breeders on summer pastures.

Many enterprises, including the Kanaker aluminum plant and the Zangezur copper and molybdenum works, are not working to full capacity because of a shortage of raw materials and electricity. Bilateral railway traffic between Baku-Megri-Dzhulya-Norashen and Yerevan has not yet resumed. More than 25,000 freight cars with various cargos have not reached Armenia since the beginning of 1990 because of the blockade.

Armenia's only railway link with other Soviet regions is the transcaucasian railway, which passes through Soviet Georgia.

Georgian railwaymen sent 17 trains, including 224 tanks of fuel and 54 freight cars of food, to Armenia on Thursday. Limited air links with Azerbaijanian districts inhabited mainly by Armenians are also arousing serious concern in Armenia. There are no regular flights to the district centres of Getashen and Shaumyanovsk. many obstacles hinder the resumption of automobile traffic on the Goris-Lachin-Getashen road, meaning that some of the provisions of the decree pased by the USSR Supreme Soviet on January 15 are not being implemented.

Extremists continue turning in weapons in Armenia. This process could have been stepped up, if incidents in regions bordering on Azerbaijan could be stopped.

Armenian Interior Minister Usik Arutyunyan said that Azerbaijanian extremists in the Kubatlin region fired on an Armenian army post near the Armenian village of Shornuk in the Goris region, killing one serviceman, at three a.m. Thursday morning.

Casualties include not only servicemen but also civilians.

Despite all the difficulties, the Armenian people hope that the current spring, the signs of which can already be seen, will improve the relations between the two neighbouring republics.

Operational Staff Focusing on Refugees' Problems

NC2402094690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0545 GMT 24 Feb 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] The Operational Staff on the state of emergency, which began its operations following the exacerbation of the situation in the region, has been carefully following the situation in the republic. On the basis of the information received at the Operational Staff, it is possible to get a full picture of the exact situation in the republic and the (?concerns) of the people.

The urgent nature of the issues discussed at the Operational Staff is lessening daily. This is yet further confirmation that the situation has stabilized somewhat in the outlying regions and the republic as a whole. Under these conditions, the Operational Staff is devoting more attention to the solution of long-term problems related to the settlement of the refugees.

The log of the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry was brief and yesterday again listed only incidents of common crime. A worker at the Nayiri firm was wounded. Unidentified persons (?forced) an army driver out of (?his vehicle) which they stole.

The Operational Staff meeting indicated that the overcrowed conditions at hospitals must be a matter of concern to the health authorities.

The meeting also considered the question of improving road transportation in the outlying regions of the republic and building an airport at Noyemberyan.

Further on Armenian 'United Front' Organization

NC2402095890 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 23 Feb 90

[From the review of HAYRENIKY DZAYN of 21 February]

[Text] The representatives of 34 Armenian public organizations operating in Soviet Armenia and the USSR met in January 1990 and launched the United Front for Pan-Armenian Struggle to enable them to participate in the solution of the urgent problems confronting the Armenian nation, organize people's self-defense, consolidate the reunification of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] with Armenia, and revitalize the disaster zone. War and labor veterans are actively contributing to this movement. Two years ago they formed the Union for the Struggle Against the Crime of Genocide. In its current issue, the weekly has published an interview by its correspondent with the chairman of the union, Samuel Pogosyan.

Armenian National Hero Andranik Commemorated

NC2602134190 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 25 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The 125th anniversary of General Andranik's birth is being marked with ceremonies. The papers have published articles analyzing the life and work of this courageous son of the Armenian people. He did not pursue personal happiness and comfort. He said: I have always struggled for the liberation and well-being of my own native people, and I seek no praise for my work; the only thing I wish is happiness for those people I have served all my life. He said this at the begining of May 1919 before he was forced to leave Armenia in the diaspora. These words are characteristic of this national hero who devoted all his life and patriotic energy to the struggle against the hateful Turkish yoke, to liberating his people, and to creating an independent and united Armenia.

YEREKOYAN YEREVAN paper has published many articles devoted to the general. In his article, Vardges Petrosyan writes: Andranik was more fortunate than Aram Manukyan and Garegin Nzhteh [prominent figures in the Armenian liberation struggle]. Today, with his 125th birthday celebrations General Andranik has been legally returned to Armenia, which in spirit he had never left. Aram and Garegin, who also lived only for Armenia, will also be legally rehabilitated.

Today, the glorification of the memory of Andranik, Aram, Garegin, and thousands of our fedayeen cannot be confined merely to singing their praises, erecting monuments to them, and naming streets and schools after them. Above all, this glorification mandates consolidating their (?calls) for pan-national harmony. That harmony must be transformed into a [word indistinct] plan, into a pan-national division of labor, and into everyday hard work.

Armenian Church Leader Denies Allegations

LD2502152390 Moscow TASS in English 1439 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] Stavropol February 25 TASS—Armenian church leader, Catholicos Vazgen the First, refuted "provocational allegations" that were spread in Stavropol region in advance of the mass pro-democracy marches scheduled for Sunday.

In a letter to the chairman of Stavropol regional executive committee published in all local newspapers and read out in radio and TV broadcasts, the Catholicos said "We have learnt that false proclamations bearing my signature and of openly provocational character are being spread in the Stavropol region."

"People with bad conscience, vying to pit local Russians against Armenians, are spreading repugnant lies to attain their vile aims," the message said.

"I want our indignation with this infamous provocation to be made public through the mass media."

"God bless all the residents of your region," it said.

No more than a hundred people attended the Stavropol rally. It is a normal, calm Sunday here today.

Armenian Earthquake Rehabilitation Viewed

LD1602184990 Moscow TASS in english 1554 GMT 16 Feb 90

[By TASS special correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Yerevan February 16 TASS—The landscape of Leninakan is still marred by ruins, makeshift barracks and trailer huts. There is an overturned passenger train lying on one of the railway tracks. The situation in Leninakan and around it has been very difficult since the devastating 1988 earthquake and due to the continuing blockade of Armenia.

"The quarterly house buildng programme will not be fulfilled in the disasater area due to lack of equipment and building materials, which got stuck somewhere en route to Armenia," TASS was told by Lavrentiy Kakoyan, secretary of the Leninakan party committee.

Georgiy Kurin, chief of the Department for Construction and Restoration in earthquake-striken Armenia under the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, is also displeased with the situation. He said many houses could not be commissioned due to a lack of finishing materials and fittings. "There were cases when we had to bring them in by air. This is very expensive, but delays are even costlier," he said.

"Even if the blockade is lifted," Georgiy Kurin said, "much time will be needed to restore the normal working rhythm and the disrupted technological process. Moreover, there are only about 25,000 building workers on the construction site, while we need at least 40,000," he noted.

The local authorities are particularly concerned about the employment of local residents, not working in construction, primarily women. There are practically no kindergartens in the city. But it is too risky to house children in cold makeshift barracks. Allowances to mothers—victims of the earthquake—expired on December 7 of last year.

Restoration work continues despite existing difficulties. Blocks of new buildings of improved seismological standards and modern layout are rising next to the devastated town. Builders who have come to Leninakan from all over the country realise that the sooner the people move into new houses, the faster they will recover from the nervous shock they experienced.

Soviet medics are working on the stress problem. There are also two teams of experts from France and the

United States contributing to the population's psychological rehabilitation. The importance of this problem is borne out by the fact that one rarely sees a smiling face in this town, which was formerly known as "Armenian Gabrovo" (a town in Bulgaria famous for jokes and funny festivals).

But life is returning to the town. There have even been several weddings. True, without music as of yet.

Baltic Emissaries Seen Fomenting Trouble in Georgia

PM1602164990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kaushanskiy report: "Why Does a Tailor Need Gas?"]

[Text] He was caught red-handed by the local internal affairs organs in the city of Rustavi. Yuriy Vanichenko, 36 years old, a resident of Vilnius. A tailor by trade, working for the "Lyuks" cooperative.

But he certainly was not detained with a sewing machine, scissors, thimbles, or other appurtenances of such a peaceful trade. What was confiscated from Vanichenko was... 13 small canisters containing toxins. Not Soviet-made, to judge from the writing on them. The traveling salesman's gentleman's accessories included packs of "Original," "CS Man Super," and "CS GAS-5000" gas. Yes, the very same CS of sad renown from the April events of last year in Tbilisi.

Georgia is always open to guests. This is known. But for some reason holders of a rather "strong-smelling" commodity from the shores of the Baltic have recently been forcing the open doors. Outside Tbilisi's Movie House a few days ago I was stopped by the owner of a pleasant baritone voice and the style of a street huckster: "Hurry up and buy the latest issue of ATMODA, and you will learn why Gorbachev and his socialism are doomed. Only a few copies left. Next sale Friday."

One ruble apiece and, as the saying goes, from Latvia with love. At the height of the Baku events I used to meet journalists from Tallinn at news conferences there. I chatted with one of them in Tbilisi. No, I certainly do not wish to deny my Baltic colleagues their inquisitiveness and desire to hasten in good time to the latest regrettably "hot spot" on the Soviet map. Freedom of the press within our borders today resembles a flower bed in which it is possible to cultivate not only flowers, but also weeds. My Tallinn colleague was mainly interested in "the atrocities of Soviet soldiers in the Transcaucasian republics." He is evidently preparing a fundamental, in-depth review. However, that is his right and a matter for his conscience.

But even the foulest-smelling article, pardon me, is still not a gas. And the tailor Vanichenko certainly did not cross the country from west to south in search of readers. Then whom was he seeking? "Who benefits?"—the republic newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA, which reported this fact a few days ago, rightly inquires in its headline. The question is all the more timely because, according to the newspaper, emissaries with canisters filled with toxins are turning up on the Georgian coast during days which are by no means humdrum but, to put it more accurately, crucial for the country and the republic.

Traces of the latter-day "chemists" and their commodity turned up in Georgia on the eve of the opening of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. When the situation in South Ossetia deteriorated, well bred uncles again hastened to offer their services for any taste—pardon me, for any nose. You do not have to seek the seal of chance on the fact that the latest traveling salesman was arrested on the eve of the start of the CPSU Central Committee plenum's work. Political commerce does not accept chance occurrences. The calculation here is extremely simple. Passions have been inflamed in the Transcaucasus, and people's nerves strained by fear and uncertainty. But people will always be found who like to play the interethnic pack without seeing their cards. Someone uses a canister, and an avalanche breaks loose. Perhaps blood will be spilled, which can always be written off as the costs of perestroyka or as preparation of the coming dictatorship. Buy any printed leaflet from the Baltic region in the streets of Tbilisi—there variations on similar stories involving gas have elicited a mass of questions among the Georgian public which the law-enforcement organs have to answer. But will the migratory "tailor-chemists" become extinct after this in the hospitable land, which is pretty tired of internal strife, together with the street hucksters who are pouring oil on the flames?

Provocations can, of course, have different cutters. Some use gas, others the printed word, while yet others lavish publicity smiles and display solidarity with "the peoples of the Caucasus fighting for independence" at unsanctioned gatherings. Different products, but designed for the same clients—those who prefer the language of ultimatums and pogroms to dialogue and who hope to make political capital for themselves out of interethnic quarrels.

However you dress it up, the abundance of emissaries from the cold Baltic region in the emotion-heated south resembles an excellently orchestrated attempt to shift public attention and, at the same time, a certain number of smoldering coals from one region to another. In short, the worse, the better. You recall the brilliant Veriko Andzhaparidze inquiring from the screen at the end of the movie "Repentance": What is this street for, if it does not lead to the temple? I will venture a paraphrase: Why are people appearing in the streets of Georgian cities who are paving the way into an impasse?

Georgian Social Democratic Party Reformed

LD2602141190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1242 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Zurab Grdzelishvili]

[Text] Tbilisi, 26 Feb (TASS)—The reestablishment of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) has been announced in Georgia. A declaration on its revival, and a statute and program were adopted at an SDP Congress held on 24 and 25 February in the capital of this Transcaucasian Soviet republic. The Social Democrats of Georgia are now said to number about 800 members. They plan to put forward their candidate deputies at the forthcoming elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet, to be held on 25 March this year.

The first such organization emerged in Georgia, which was part of the Russian empire, in 1893. The party ceased to exist in 1921.

Party's Principles Explained

PM2802094790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Unnamed own correspondent report: "Social Democrats' Congress"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 23 Feb—My interlocutor—Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor G. Muchaidze—is a member of the organizational committee preparing for the Georgian Social Democratic Party [SDP] Congress which will open in Tbilisi 24 February. Agreeing to meet at the party's headquarters, my host sat me under a huge banner. The background was red, and in the center was a white circle with seven black seven-pointed stars. Noticing my inquiring look, the professor explained: "The stars on the party banner embody its seven fundamental principles. These are national freedom, political pluralism, economic self-management, social justice, ecological security, demographic equilibrium, and external openness."

Just what is the "military" part of the SDP's program? Its demands are not new and are based on youngsters undergoing alternative civic service, which will not depend on military departments. The program "dictates" that citizens will do mandatory military service at their places of residence for 12 months—needless to say, as part of the recreated national armed forces. It is planned to train the cadres for these forces in a multidisciplinary military academy. There is also another demand: "We must create a national defense ministry headed exclusively by civilians."

At the end of our discussion Professor Muchaidze showed me a party relic: Its seal, which was preserved abroad for several decades and was only sent to Georgia from Paris on the eve of the congress.

What decisions will this seal ratify and to what extent will they accord with the aspirations of the Georgian and other peoples living on the republic's territory? Time and the events of the next two days of the congress, to which your correspondent was invited, will tell.

Central Asia

Army Candidates Successful in Uzbek Voting

PM2802132990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Majo: ' Korotkikh report: "Uzbekistan: Deputies in Uniform"]

[Text] The results of the 18 February elections to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet and local soviets have been announced. Candidates from the Armed Forces were successful in the election struggle. Voters elected 202 of the 249 registered representatives of the Army. Generals A. Zakharov, G. Kondratyev, V. Belousov, and V. Dzhanibekov, and Colonels V. Vasin and V. Makhmudov have become People's Deputies of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet.

"The election results demonstrate the high prestige of military servicemen in the republic," Lieutenant Colonel L. Blinov, member of the election operational group, noted. "In conditions of the worsening of the interethnic situation in the region people look to the Armed Forces hopefully as a structure ensuring order and protecting citizens' peace. True, the struggle was difficult. As a rule the elections featured a large number of alternative candidates. Representatives of certain informal organizations conducted active anti-Army agitation. Nevertheless, 81 percent of Armed Forces candidates have already been elected."

This figure is preliminary. It may increase after the repeat elections on 4 March.

According to preliminary figures the 25 February elections for people's deputies in the Kirghiz SSR were also successful as far as Army candidates were concerned.

Administrative Division Changes in Uzbekistan

LD2802125790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0230 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] The executive committees of a number of oblast soviets of people's deputies in Uzbekistan have petitioned the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic to make partial changes in the administrative divisions. In most cases, quite weighty arguments were produced in favor of setting up new rayons. On Tuesday, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic were published on the formation of a Sokh rayon inside Fergana Oblast. In Andizhan Oblast, Leninsk Rayon is removed from administrative subordination to the Leninsk town Soviet of People's deputies. The application of the executive committees of Tashkent Oblast and city soviets of People's Deputies to abolish the town of Narimanov in Tashkent Oblast and transfer its territory to the city of Tashkent is also granted. Thus, a new rayon has been formed in the capital of Uzbekistan—

Beksinirskiy. The former town of Narimanov, transferred from Tashkent Oblast, will be included in its composition.

Penalties Imposed for Ethnic Abuse in Uzbekistan

PM1902142190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Andrey Orlov report under the "Direct Link" rubric: "Liability for Provocation Necessary"]

[Text] Tashkent—A Decree on increasing liability for actions directed against public order and the security of citizens has entered into force in Uzbekistan.

"This is not the most effective means of influence, but so far there has been nothing else. Now there is one," D.A. Usatov, the republic's general prosecutor, said. "The relevant Decree of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has been adopted."

The Decree provides specific penalties for preparing and distributing materials, either in oral, handwritten, or printed form or as video or audio recordings, which call for pogroms or the forcible expulsion of citizens or which are aimed to cause panic among the population.

The Decree took effect straight away. For example, I. Guseynov, a worker of the Azerbaijan SSR No. 4 mobile mechanized column, was fined 500 rubles by the court for making appeals to "kick out the Armenians" and for spreading provocative rumors about events in Baku and Dushanbe in the bar of the "Samarkand" hotel. U. Sattarov, a worker of the Samarkand construction and repair administration, has been sentenced to two months corrective labor and docked 20 percent of his pay by the state for racial abuse and for "advising" a tangerine seller to "clear off back to Azerbaijan."

A number of other cases have been taken to court.

The new Decree has been greeted with approval by the republic's working people. In letters to local newspapers they demand that a resolute campaign be mounted to normalize interethnic relations.

Uzbek Leaders, Turks Meet on Tashkent Conflicts

LD2702183990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1140 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] Tashkent, 27 Feb (UZTAG - TASS) A joint meeting of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers took place here with the participation of representatives of Meskhetian Turks living in the republic.

Those taking part in the meeting examined the facts of local conflicts which have occurred recently in Tashkent Oblast. Measures to stabilize the situation in areas where there is a dense Meskhetian Turk population and to resolve socioeconomic problems were discussed.

It was noted that the reason for the conflicts lies in the illegal activities of corrupt and criminal elements who are trying to kindle dissent between the nationalities for mercenary purposes. The most decisive measures will be taken toward them in accordance with the law.

The meeting was addressed by Islam Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee. The republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and its Council of Ministers adopted a decision on this issue.

Those taking part in the meeting also adopted an address to the USSR Supreme Soviet. It contains an appeal for the work of the commission on the problems of the Meskhetian Turk population to be stepped up and for regular information to be supplied on measures being taken to satisfy their desire to return to the land of their ancestors.

Tashkent Party Chief Sentenced to Six Years

PM0702105790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Karpov report: "Sentence Passed"]

[Text] Dushanbe—The trial of M. Musakhanov, the former first secretary of the Tashkent Party Obkom [oblast committee] and a member of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, on a charge of receiving major bribes lasted around three months at the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Court. The judicial collegium for criminal cases under the chairmanship of Tajikistan Supreme Court member K. Makhmudov has completed its work. As has already been reported, both the accused and most of the witnesses in court retracted their former testimony. However, a painstaking analysis of the preliminary investigation materials has confirmed all the cases in which Musakhanov received money from various officials. In particular, it was established that the already convicted K. Kamolov, former first secretary of Kara-Kalpak Party Obkom; and D. Dzhamolov, former chief of the Tashkent Oblast Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Administration, had at various times given Musakhanov 10,000 rubles [R] each. The total amount of bribes received by the accused was R46,000.

Musakhanov was sentenced to six years imprisonment with confiscation of property. His sentence is to be served in an intensified regime corrective labor colony.

The state prosecution case at the trial was presented by State Judicial Counsel Ye. Zakharov, deputy prosecutor of the Tajik SSR.

Turks Homes Burnt Down in Tashkent Oblast

PM2702113590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by own correspondent A. Orlov: "Incident in Rayon"]

[Text] Tashkent—Militia posts are to be encountered frequently on the roads in Bukinskiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast. They diligently examine the vehicles driving by.

On Thursday it became calmer here, but only yesterday houses were burning. Rampaging thugs set fire to over 30 houses belonging to Meskhetian Turks. Of the 30, 10 burned down while firemen managed to extinguish the other fires. According to preliminary reports there are no casualties.

Fearing for their lives, taking the most essential supplies, 2,600 Turks have left and the local authorities have accommodated a further 1,954 people in rest homes, sanatoriums, and tourist centers in other rayons of the oblast. Commissions created on sovkhozs [state farms] and kolkhozs [collectives farms] under the leadership of the rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] have taken over the guard of the empty houses.

At the Bukinskiy Party Raykom [rayon committee] I met with S. Saydaliyev, secretary of the Tashkent Party Obkom [oblast committee] and A. Yuldashev, chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]. Like the oblast's other leaders they are now meeting with people and trying to normalize the situation. But not everyone is heeding the exhortations. Tension is mounting in neighboring Akkurganskiy Rayon. There, as in Buka, there has been a demand that the Meskhetian Turks be resettled.

In connection with the situation which has taken shape, members of the bureau and secretaries of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee and leaders of the republic's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers are in rayons of Tashkent Oblast.

An extraordinary session of the Tashkent Party Obkom Bureau noted the dilatoriness of the law enforcement organs, the confusion and lack of resolve of the party and soviet organs, and the absence of the necessary explanatory work at people's places of residence, which has led to the spreading of provocative rumors and then to the clash between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks. Kh. Pirnapasov, first secretary of the Bukinskiy Party Raykom, has been relieved of his post. A. Khudaybergenov, chief of the Bukinskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, and rayon prosecutor N. Ergashev have also been dismissed. Other responsible workers have been punished.

The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted a decree which states: "Temporarily, until the sociopolitical situation stabilizes in the republic, street marches and demonstrations will not be allowed and sanctioned meetings and gatherings must be held within the established procedure and only in closed premises."

Refugees Destabilizing Tajik Situation

90US0565B Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Report of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] has received information that the operational situation in the regions bordering Tajikistan has deteriorated in connection with events in that republic. Leaflets have begun to appear more often claiming that refugees from Azerbaijan are being settled there and that housing space is being presented to them, and there are calls for the immediate eviction of Russians from the borders of Central Asia.

Refugees from Tajikistan traveling across the territory of the republic are destabilizing the situation seriously. Operational information regarding the activities of extremist emissaries from Azerbaijan and the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] is being verified.

In the Khamzinskiy Rayon of Tashkent two residents discovered leaflets in their mailboxes with an anti-Russian content and a demand that they depart the city before 1 March.

As a result of operational-investigative measures on the occasion of the discovery of leaflets on 13 February 1990, Kh. Saidov was arrested in Samarkand. Upon examination, 30 more leaflets of an anti-Armenian nature were discovered. The issue of his liability is being decided.

On 14 February I.B. Guseynov was fined R500 by the rayon people's court in Siabskiy Rayon for stating in the Samarkand Hotel on 13 February that Armenians should be expelled and that force should be used against them.

Dushanbe 'Gradually Returning to Normal'

LD2802224990 Moscow TASS in English 1918 GMT 28 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Trofimov]

[Text] Dushanbe February 28 TASS—The situation in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, is gradually returning to normal. There are no armoured infantry carriers or army patrols in the streets.

However, Interior Ministry troops will still control the most important municipal services. The curfew was cut by two hours last night.

Major General Makhmadayev Navzhuvanov, Tajik interior minister and Dushanbe commandant, told TASS that "the curfew was cut thanks to the improvement of the situation in the city, which was disturbed by mass riots between February 12-13."

"At the same time law enforcement bodies continue to investigate into crimes and to track down people who participated in disturbances in mid-February.

"Militia operating together with self-defence voluntary teams are carrying out preventive measures to seize various weapons. Law enforcement bodies actively work to detect people trying to destabilise the situation by inciting ethnic strife and to spread rumours.

"At the beginning residents received many provocative telephone calls, but the situation has now changed. Some trouble-makers have been apprehended and called to account. Every criminal case is being investigated."

All industrial enterprises are operating as before the tragic February events, medical, transport, trading and service establishments are also in operation.

All specialised secondary and higher educational establishments resumed their lessons. Pre-school children's establishments also began to function today.

Tajik Central Committee Discusses Dushanbe

LD2802210190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] [Announcer] A news conference took place in the press center of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee. The situation in Dushanbe and in the Republic following the well-known February events was assessed. Over to our correspondent (Muzafar Mudzhidov).

[(Mudzhidov)] Never before have the leaders of the party and the government of Tajikistan met so frequently with journalists from the central and republican newspapers, and from radio and televison. After the tragic events in Dushanbe in mid-February, briefings and news conferences have become almost a daily and inalienable form of communication. That is not by chance. It has become clear that in extreme situations, glasnost plays a stabilizing role. Today, journalists met with Izatullo Khayeyevich Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajikistan council of ministers. He said in particular:

[Begin recording] [Khayeyev] The situation in the republic's national economy, including in the city of Dushanbe, is normalizing. Enterprises and industry are already at the level of those normal days at which they were working before these events. However, there are many difficulties in providing the enterprises with raw materials and materials, the deliveries of which depend not just upon the republic, but also upon other regions of the country.

[(Mudzhidov)] In fact, the situation in Dushanbe is returning to its previous course. However, due to the curfew, some people have been late for work and have been leaving earlier since difficulties arose with the work of public transport.

[Khayeyev] That is why yesterday we made the decision to reduce the curfew by one hour from the beginning, that is, not from 2200 but from 2300, and not until 0600 but until 0500 in the morning. The further reduction of the curfew depends, of course, on the behavior of the population, on the observation of order.

[(Mudzhidov)] Izatullo Khayeyevich, after all, part of those who were demonstrating then, [word indistinct] (?having sobered up), began to make claims on the law for the improvement of socioeconomic conditions of life. Are any kind of fundamental changes planned in the work of the State Planning Committee, of the Council of Ministers of the Republic?

[Khayeyev] In the present situation, well, part of the structure of the national economy will be reexamined. That means the creation of small enterprises, small capacities, particularly in rural areas and rayon centers, to somehow guarantee people work. [end recording]

Turkmen Arms Thefts Report, Gorbatko Commentary

PM2302145190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Feature comprising V. Kuleshov report and V. Gorbatko commentary under the general heading: "Grenades Have Been Stolen. Are Guns Next?"]

[Text] From a Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Ministry of Internal Affairs criminal investigation report: "At 2300 hours some unknown individuals broke the locks on the ammunition depots of a military unit situated in a small village not far from Ashkhabad and seized 40 F-1 hand grenades, 20 grenades, and 2,160 cartridges for a Kalashnikov assault rifle. As of 8 February 1990, 21 grenades and 1,320 cartridges had been discovered and confiscated during the investigation. A. Yegorushkin, Ye. Leonov, V. Demin, and A. Shanshakov have been detained on the given criminal charge. All four of them were born in 1973 and were studying at Vocational and Technical College 51."

How did they get onto the territory of the ammunition depot?

"Very easily," Shanshakov explained. "During the day the watch tower was manned by some invalid, and in the evening there was no one there at all."

Yes, that is how it was: They walked around the territory as if they were in the courtyard of their technical college. They broke the locks and dragged out a box of grenades from the premises. They took a box of cartridges from the other ammunition depot. They were not able to take everything away at once, so they buried several dozen grenades and 1,320 cartridges in a pit full of sawdust where fire extinguishers and other firefighting equipment was kept.

"It is dark in the depots. The boys lit matches there so that they could see," Lieutenant Colonel Selimov, deputy chief of the local city internal affairs department,

says with some anxiety. "They were young and stupid... After all, there was a nuclear explosion simulator device in one of the depots where they were wandering around. It is frightening to think what would have happened if this device had exploded..."

"Why are the depots guarded by paramilitary security forces and not by draftees?" I asked S. Shekhikyan, commander of the military unit.

"I can't answer your question," he said, shrugging his shoulders.

"Who can?"

"The Defense Ministry..."

The most surprising thing is that this is true. Under a General Staff directive of 1949, the ammunition depot of a military unit is guarded by paramilitary security forces. All right, maybe this was a blunder by the General Staff. But the organization of guard duty is still the concern of Lieutenant Colonel Shekhikyan. For a start he could illuminate the approaches to the depots with searchlights and put up signaling devices and proper fencing instead of the primitive wire that small boys from the neighboring houses can easily cut through with their pliers. Alas... None of these things were done—although reports of malpractices in carrying out guard duty and disgraceful practices in the transportation of ammunition and even the theft of ammunition from depots have frequently reached the Turkestan military district command.

"No one took our reports seriously," K. Tangyev, a senior operations official said. "But it is not just our views that they disregard. IZVESTIYA published an article "Cartridges To Take Away." Do you think that anyone from the command drew any conclusions from it? Scapegoats were found, the major from whose unit the submachine guns "disappeared" was removed. The warrant officer who dealt in cartridges was imprisoned...

From the official response to the editorial office: "The article 'Cartridges To Take Away' in IZVESTIYA (August 1987) was examined by the district military council, political directorate, and staff and in military units in Ashkhabad and other nearby garrisons. A group of generals and officers from the district checked the state of the storage, distribution, and registration of ammunition on the spot and gave assistance to commanders and staffs in establishing and maintaining the necessary order as set out in the regulations..."

The current situation as regards robberies of ammunition depots shows what this order looks like and the value of the words of V. Stryalnin, officer and political worker, who signed the response to our editorial office. It is surprising: The Ashkhabad meat combine is guarded by a triple protection system. But here, where not just cartridges but also powerful explosive devices are stored—and in the vicinity of large housing developments, moreover—anyone who wants to, can come and walk around!..

And the weapons that disappear from the depots "make themselves heard" from time to time. Grenades explode. Not so long ago a grenade exploded at the Ashkhabad School No. 42 in the hands of a teenager, Koli Rakhmanov—the boy died in the hospital and another nine children were seriously injured...

How long are we going to look for scapegoats and lay the blame on sergeants, warrant officers, and hooligans as regards the safekeeping of weapons and ammunition?

...For the time being just the grenades and cartridges have been confiscated from the boys from Bezmein. But here is new information: Investigating officers have found heavy machine guns that had been hidden by the boys.

Commentary by Major General V. Gorbatko, deputy chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Main Administration

Irresponsibility in any situation is intolerable. Criminal irresponsibility the more so, regardless of its scale and sphere. This theft was possible because of the negligence of a number of military chiefs who did not even eliminate the shortcomings that were revealed by a USSR Defense Ministry commission in October of last year. This primarily concerns the organization of troops' service, the repair of the fencing, the illumination of the perimeter fence and the depot, and the installation of technical protection devices. It is also well known that the ammunition thefts were carried out by an organized group of adolescents who are on the militia's files and are either studying at the vocational and technical school or working at the cement factory. According to our data, the group was "headed by" a dangerous criminal, who supplied the boys with the necessary instruments and skeleton keys.

At the same time I believe that we must not remain silent about the problems that have arisen in connection with the sharp exacerbation of the situation in various regions in the country and the growth in organized crime. One of them is organizing the protection of installations where weapons and ammunition are kept. Some of these installations have been protected by the republic internal security service for decades. Until recently they fulfilled their tasks. However, recent events have provoked a real desire for weapons and ammunition. Marauding attacks on sentries and installations as a whole have multiplied. The republic internal security service has proved incapable of fighting these organized criminal riflemen.

They are now being replaced by military subunits. This kind of replacement is also being planned for the ammunition depot that the correspondent writes about. But in a situation where the USSR Armed Forces are being considerably reduced and new areas of tension are appearing in the country, this replacement will also be a

problem. Another problem is the introduction of technical protection devices. A decision has already been adopted on this question, but its implementation has been made difficult for a whole number of reasons. Not just money, but also material resources are necessary, and unfortunately there is a lack of these.

I would like to say in conclusion that it is indubitably very important to shed light on ammunition theft incidents, particularly at the Turkestan Military District depot. An analysis of the factors leading to such incidents, and conclusions drawn from what has happened, will help us to prevent similar crimes.